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Abstract
In recent years, renewable energy technologies have been increasingly adopted and seen as
key to humanity’s efforts to reduce greenhouse gases emissions and combat climate change.
Yet, a side effect is that renewables have reached high penetration rates in many areas,
leading to undesired curtailment, especially if existing grid infrastructure is insufficient and
renewable energy generated cannot be exported at areas of high energy demand. The issue
of curtailment is compelling at remote areas, where renewable resources are abundant,
such as in windy islands. Not only renewable production is wasted, but often curtailment
comes with high costs for renewable energy developers and energy end-users. In fact,
procedures on how generators access the grid and how curtailment is applied, are key
factors that affect the decisions of investors about generation and grid capacity installed.
Part of this thesis studies the properties of widely used curtailment rules, applied in
several countries including the UK, and their effect on strategic interactions between self-
interested and profit-maximising low-carbon technology investors. The work develops a
game-theoretic framework to study the effects of curtailment on the profitability of existing
renewable projects and future developments. More specifically, work presented in this
thesis determines the upper bounds of tolerable curtailment at a given location that allows
for profitable investments. Moreover, the work studies the effect of various curtailment
strategies on the capacity factor of renewable generators and the effects of renewable
resource spatial correlation on the resulting curtailment. In fact, power network operators
face a significant knowledge gap about how to implement curtailment rules that achieve
desired operational objectives, but at the same time minimise disruption and economic
losses for renewable generators. In this context, this thesis shows that fairness and equal
sharing of imposed curtailment among generators is important to achieve maximisation of
the renewable generation capacity installed at a certain area. A new rule is proposed that
minimises disruption and the number of curtailment events a generator needs to respond
to, while achieving fair allocation of curtailment between generators of unequal ratings.
While curtailment can be reduced by smart grid techniques, a long term solution is
increasing the network capacity. Grid reinforcements, however, are expensive and costs
weight to all energy consumers. For this reason, debate in the energy community has
focused on ways to attract private investment in grid reinforcement. A key knowledge
gap faced by regulators is how to incentivise such projects, that could prove beneficial,
especially in cases where several distributed generators can use the same power line to
access the main grid, against the payment of a transmission fee. This thesis develops
methods from empirical and algorithmic game theory to provide solutions to this problem.
iv
Specifically, a two-location model is considered, where excess renewable generation
and demand are not co-located, and where a private renewable investor constructs a power
line, providing also access to other generators, against a charge for transmission. In other
words, the privately developed line is shared among all generators, a principle known
as ‘common access’ line rules. This formulation may be studied as a Stackelberg game
between transmission and local generation capacity investors. Decisions on optimal (and
interdependent) renewable capacities built by investors, affect the resulting curtailment
and profitability of projects and can be determined in the equilibrium of the game.
A first approach to study the behaviour of investors at the game equilibrium, assumed a
simple model, based on average values of renewable production and demand over a larger
time horizon. This assumption allowed for an initial examination of the Stackelberg game
equilibrium, by achieving an analytical, closed-form solution of the equilibrium and the
investigation of its properties for a wide range of cost parameters.
Next, a refined model is developed, able to capture the stochastic nature of renewable
production and variability of energy demand. A theoretical analysis of the game is
presented along with an estimation of the equilibrium by utilisation of empirical game-
theoretic techniques and production/demand data from a real network upgrade project in
the UK. The proposed method is general, and can be applied to similar case studies, where
there is excess of renewable generation capacity, and where sufficient data is available.
In practice, however, available data may be erroneous or experience significant gaps.
To deal with data issues, a method for generating time series data is developed, based on
Gibbs sampling. This attains an iterative simulation analysis with different time series data
as an input (Markov Chain Monte Carlo), thus achieving the exploration of the solution
space for multiple future scenarios and leading to a reduction of the uncertainty with
regards to the investment decisions taken.
Energy storage can reduce curtailment or defer network upgrades. Hence, the last part
of this thesis proposes a model consisted of a line investor, local generators and a third
independent storage player, who can absorb renewable production, that would otherwise
have been curtailed. The model estimates optimal transmission, generation and storage ca-
pacities for various financial parameters. The value of storage is determined by comparing
the energy system operation with and without energy storage. All models proposed in this
thesis, are validated and applied to a practical setting of a grid reinforcement project, in
the UK, and a large dataset of real wind speed measurements and demand.
In summary, the research work studies the interplay among self-interested and indepen-
dent low-carbon investors, at areas of excess renewable capacity with network constraints
and high curtailment. The work proposes a mechanism for setting transmission charges
that ensures that the transmission line gets built, but investors from the local community,
can also benefit from investing in renewable energy and energy storage. Overall, the
results of this work show how game-theoretic techniques can help energy system stakehold-
ers to bridge the knowledge gap about setting optimal curtailment rules and determining
appropriate transmission charges for privately developed network infrastructure.
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This thesis uses game-theoretic modelling to study the effects of curtailment and line access
rules to generation, transmission and energy storage capacity investments. Procedures on
how renewable generators obtain grid access and how curtailment is applied, are key factors
that determine, to a significant extent, strategic decisions on capacity investments. Grid
access is used in this thesis as a broad term that describes grid connection terms, priority
of dispatch and constraint management. Curtailment refers to restrictions in renewable
power output due to oversupply or network constraints. The first part of this work focuses
on the study of flexible and interruptible connections offered to distributed generators by
power system operators and distribution companies. More specifically, this thesis studies
the effect of curtailment rules and practices on the profitability of renewable generation
projects. This thesis also studies important features and characteristics of curtailment
rules, such as fairness, and their effect on existing and future volumes of renewable energy
generation capacity, which are installed and connected in electricity grids.
The second part of this thesis focuses on the effect of curtailment and line access
rules to transmission capacity investments of private and distributed ownership. This
work is particularly relevant to settings where one private investor develops the required
infrastructure to access the grid and multiple low-carbon technology projects (such as
wind generation and energy storage) can use this infrastructure, against the payment of
a transmission fee. A game-theoretic and multi-agent systems framework (Stackelberg
and Cournot game formulations) is developed to model different types of investors as
self-interested and profit-maximising entities that act autonomously in order to achieve
their own local objective. Agent actions are interdependent on other agents (or opponents)
activities. Theoretical results are generated in conjunction with practical applications of
the developed models to relevant case studies. Methods developed achieved an estimation
of optimal decisions with regards to generation, transmission and energy storage capacity
installed by different players. The solution concepts developed in this work are relevant to
empirical and algorithmic game theory. In summary, this work shows how game-theoretic
formulations may assist energy system stakeholders to bridge the knowledge gap of setting




The following sections of Chapter 1 introduce the background area of the topic, along with
the aims, objectives and main contributions of the research work presented in this thesis.
1.1.1 Energy landscape
Since the industrial revolution, the global economy has heavily relied on fossil fuels in
almost all economy sectors including manufacturing, transportation, heating, synthetic
materials and power generation. One of such fuels is petroleum. However, limited global
oil reserves, managed and controlled from a small number of countries that are often
located in conflict zones or politically unstable areas, has repeatedly led to extreme price
volatility and threatened our energy security. In addition, the use of fossil fuels such as
coal and oil have put great strains to the environment we live, ranging from air quality and
pollution to extensive carbon emissions, considered by myriad scientists throughout the
world, as the main cause for global warming [136].
Climate change and increasing global temperatures have emerged as an urgent issue
threatening the longevity and prosperity of mankind, highlighting the importance to what
is widely known as the sustainability and decarbonisation agenda. The Paris Agreement
charts a new course of international effort to combat climate change with 195 countries
agreeing to keep average global temperature rise well below 2oC above pre-industrial
levels [73]. A recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report
revealed potentially devastating impacts to ecosystems, biodiversity, livelihoods, health,
food security, water supply and economic growth if drastic measures are not taken, and
suggested that efforts should intensify in achieving a temperature rise of no more than
1.5oC [114].
In the power sector, renewable energy sources (RES) have formed an integral part of the
solution to tackling global climate change. Renewable generation has been highly promoted
and incentivised within the European Union (EU). The key EU-wide objectives set for
2030 [74] include at least 40% reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions with reference
to the 1990 levels, a target of 32% share of renewable energy to energy consumption
and 32.5% improvement of energy efficiency. Policy initiatives at a national and global
level, such as tax exemptions or financial incentives, in accordance to technological
advances, have permitted large volumes of RES be connected to electricity grids. According
to a recent International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) report [113], renewable
energy capacity reached 2.18 TW worldwide in 2017. In 2017, renewable power capacity
(excluding hydro) reached 1,081 GW worldwide, including 402 GW of solar photovoltaic
(PV) and 539 GW of wind power capacity, out of which 98 GW of solar PV and 52
GW wind power generation capacity was newly added capacity in 2017 alone. The total
investment in the renewables sector reached an estimate of $279.8 billion [206].
The UK alone has agreed to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 [43]. In 2017,
29.3% of the UK gross electricity consumption was generated by RES, mainly from
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onshore and offshore wind farms and PV solar plants, accounting for 31.7%, 17.2% and
31.5% of the total installed RES capacity, respectively [57].
High levels of RES technologies adoption have been supported in many countries by
novel incentive provision and new energy market models. These include green energy
frameworks and policies, financial incentives and technical/regulatory structures, such
as green energy certificates and feed-in-tariff (FiT) prices. The FiT support mechanism
targeted small to medium renewable generation and guaranteed a fixed price for the
electricity produced. Green energy certificates called Renewable Obligation Certificates
(ROCs) [182] constituted the main supporting incentive mechanism for large renewable
generators until 2017, in the UK. Electricity suppliers were obliged to source a proportion
of their electricity supply from renewable energy sources and therefore, were required to
obtain a level of ROCs each year, as determined by the Department of Energy and Climate
Change (DECC) [52]. ROCs were issued by the UK’s independent system regulator,
the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM), per MWh of renewable electricity
produced and their actual value differed by type of technology, in order to promote the
development of new and more expensive technologies. ROCs were replaced by Contracts
for Difference (CfD) in 2017 [53]. CfD is a price support mechanism, which pays eligible
generators with a premium price in addition to the wholesale market electricity price,
so that the agreed ‘strike’ price is reached. If wholesale electricity prices rise higher
than the guaranteed price, generators are required to pay back the difference between
the wholesale market electricity price and the strike price. The CfD scheme aimed to
mitigate renewable investment long-term exposure to volatile electricity prices. For smaller
scale renewable generation, such as residential RES developments, the most important
mechanism was FiT prices i.e. a long-term guaranteed price for the energy produced [180].
Such incentives have gradually led to increased RES connections in both transmission and
distribution networks, however cost reduction and large RES adoption have led to some
of these incentives being reduced or removed. The levelised cost of energy (LCOE) for
such technologies, such as onshore wind or large scale PV, is currently competitive with
conventional generation, such as gas and nuclear [56]. However, integration costs of RES
generation need also to be taken into account.
RES are variable, difficult to predict and depend on weather conditions, hence raise
new challenges in the management and operation of electricity systems. More flexibility
measures are required to ensure safe operation and stability [33, 103]. Different types
of generators are required to compensate for the variability and potential loss of renew-
able supply, sources that so far have been predominantly fossil fuel-based, such as gas
generators. However, such generators are less and less utilised and pushed out of the
merit order, as more RES generators are deployed, leading to the reduction of the grid’s
inertial response and increased risks on power system’s stability. The merit order refers to
the positioning of generation assets according to their respective price or marginal cost
and power output in ascending order. Traditionally, the merit order forms the energy
supply curve, which combined with the demand curve results in the estimation of market
clearing prices. Marginal costs for RES generators can be near zero, pushing conventional
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Fig. 1.1 The fundamental change in the shape of the net load of the Californian system,
also known as the ‘duck curve’, caused by large volumes of solar generation [37]
generation further up in the curve and leading to short-term prices collapsing, at times even
reaching negative values, when it is expensive to shut-down conventional power plants.
In addition, RES generators cannot be dispatched, unlike conventional generators, and
are more challenging to control [203]. In fact, large volumes of RES, such as embedded
microgenerators, are often invisible to network/system operators and pose a significant
challenge to the overall system control.
A prominent and well-known example that illustrates the new challenges system opera-
tors are facing with the increased adoption of variable renewable energy comes from the
Californian grid. The California Independent System Operator (CAISO) published in 2013
the net load of the Californian system, as seen from the system’s operator standpoint. The
net load curve shown in Fig. 1.1 represents a fundamental change in the shape of electricity
demand and became widely known as the ‘duck curve’. The curve is the difference between
forecast load and expected electricity production from variable generation resources and
represents the system electric load that needs to be met by conventional generation when
solar generation is adopted at large scales [37]. As shown in Fig. 1.1, the system operator
is faced with an increased risk of oversupply in the morning hours as the sun rises and
conventional generation is replaced by solar generation. In the late afternoon hours, when
solar production ends, the system operator needs to dispatch generating assets that can
cope with the steep ramping-up curve, which can be at times equal to up to a third of the
system’s peak load in a period of just a few hours. These challenging requirements need to
be met by flexibility services.
Moreover, distributed generators (DGs) connected in distributed networks are gradually
transforming power systems into bidirectional energy flow networks, crucially challenging
the way they were designed and managed. For instance, from the initial conception of
the power system, protective equipment, frequency and voltage control were designed
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assuming unidirectional energy flows that emanate from large generation plants to load
demand centres. Reverse power flows needs to be carefully managed, desirably in an
automated way, under minimal human intervention.
Adding to the transformational change caused by distributed energy resources (DERs)
and renewables, energy systems are on the brink of entering the digital era as shown by
the massive deployment of smart meters in numerous countries [275]. In the UK alone, 53
million electricity and gas smart meters are planned to be installed by 2020, one for every
home and small business [179]. This goes hand in hand with the proliferation of intelligent
devices being deployed in electricity networks that have opened new opportunities for value
delivered by big data analytics (BDA) or promising technologies like artificial intelligence
(AI) and machine learning (ML).
In recent years, significant progress has been made in terms of volumes of renewable
energy assets installation in electricity grids, however additional efforts are required to
achieve ambitious carbon emissions targets. Energy policy makers and researchers are
turning their attention to whole energy systems integration and emissions reductions in the
sector of transport and heating. Modern renewable energy accounted for only 10.6% of the
total final energy consumption in 2016, with 79.5% still relying on fossil fuels use [206].
In fact, the majority of energy is consumed for heating/cooling (48%) and transport (32%),
rather than for electricity use (20%) at a global level [206]. Domestic transport alone
accounted for 25% of UK carbon emissions [45]. Energy storage, electrification of heat
and electric vehicles (EVs) are key target areas for future energy systems.
Electric motors, having higher efficiencies, are expected to substitute internal com-
bustion machines [63], however this will lead to increased electricity demand. In the
following years, the number of EVs is expected to rise drastically. The Electric Vehicle
Initiative (EVI) and the International Energy agency (IEA) are calling for deployment of
EVs reaching at least 30% of new vehicles sold by 2030 [111]. Other factors leading to
this potential rise in electricity demand are increasing global population and electrification
and industrialisation of developing countries.
EVs consist of large loads, which can put strains on the local transformers and low
voltage infrastructure. Moreover, load from EVs typically correlates and coincides with
the peak demand, as most EVs are expected to be charged in the afternoon hours, when
people return from work. Hence, EV charging schedule has to be carefully designed,
and decentralised control mechanisms need to be deployed [268]. AI techniques can
contribute to predicting the charging needs for each EV, depending on the travel needs
of each consumer and estimating with great accuracy the aggregate demand to the local
network. The role of ML is vital for achieving accurate predictions of energy demand.
While EVs pose significant challenges, if managed properly, they can also bring about
opportunities for better management of electricity grids. EVs can potentially be used for
Demand Side Management (DSM), as their batteries can be discharged according to the
system operator discretion [233]. This concept is also known as vehicle-to-grid (V2G)
operation.
6 Introduction
Demand side management is expected to play a key role in future energy systems
that will achieve efficient operation of the load or demand side. Traditionally, the supply
side is adjusted to the demand, by setting suitable power outputs of the generating units,
which ensure increased reliability and safe operation within the network’s operational
limits. However, as RES power output is variable and difficult to predict, it would be
highly beneficial to manage the demand and match it to the generation side.
Demand side management can be used to defer, shift or switch off load consumers
at the discretion of the system operator, not limited to times of peak demand or network
constrains, but also to other periods of time, which can optimise the system’s operation.
Some of the benefits of DSM [223] include ‘peak shaving’ or ‘flattening’ the demand.
Usually, peak demand is served by carbon-intensive and expensive power plants, therefore
demand response techniques could lead to lower electricity prices for end-consumers. It
could be also beneficiary for system operators as it could lead to efficient grid operation
and better recovery from power system faults, usually caused by generator failures or
power line tripping.
DSM can be implemented with two main techniques: automatic control of the con-
sumers’ systems and appliances or price signalling, which can both be deployed in a smart
grid environment. Several types of electricity tariffs other than standard types have been
discussed in the literature, including Time-of-Use meters, Critical Peak Pricing or Real
Time Pricing, which reflect the real cost of power generation. These tariffs can be used to
reduce the peak demand. However, they can also shift the demand and create new peaks,
at times when these are not expected. For this reason, sophisticated techniques, which
account for the system’s state, are required to predict both supply and demand. This is
rather a complex problem, as it requires data from several devices or buildings, weather
patterns, human preferences and activities. Such optimisation algorithms can be developed
through machine learning [22].
Moreover, demand response needs to be deployed in a larger scale at grid level, meaning
that multiple demand resources need to be aggregated so they can have a larger impact.
Examples of commercial schemes in the UK include Flexitricity1 and Upside Energy2,
which have mainly focused on aggregating demand resources from large office buildings.
In general, office or industrial demand is easier to predict and has a larger impact than
domestic demand response, which is considered more challenging. Several studies have
proposed the aggregation of smaller energy assets such as heat pumps and refrigeration
units acting as thermal storage [149, 171]. In these settings, successful delivery of demand
response services is more complex and needs to account for emergency cases, related to
social activities or extreme weather.
Another key pillar of future energy systems are energy storage systems (ESS). Energy
storage devices and batteries are expected to play a key role in the operation and manage-
ment of the electricity grids [192]. Promising use cases for ESS include assisting with RES
1https://www.flexitricity.com/en-gb/
2http://upsideenergy.co.uk/
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Fig. 1.2 A visualisation of future energy systems and the ‘smart grid’ according to the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) [108]
integration and applications for grid upgrade deferral, energy arbitrage, ancillary services,
regulation, frequency response, voltage support and black start services [4, 140].
The transformation of energy systems will most certainly require large sums of in-
vestment. To moderate requirements for funding, smart management and control need
to be adopted, tasks that are increasingly challenging as energy systems are growing to
become more active, decentralised, complex and ‘multi-agent’, with an increasing number
of actors and possible actions. Advanced communication and data exchanges between
different parts of the power network are to an increasing extent required, making central
management and operation more and more challenging.
This transformation has led to a new vision for energy systems commonly described as
the smart grid. According to the United States Department of Energy, the vision of future
electricity grids can be defined as [247]:‘A fully automated power delivery network that
monitors and controls every customer and node, ensuring a two-way flow of electricity
and information between the power plant and the appliance, and all points in between. Its
distributed intelligence, coupled with broadband communications and automated control
systems, enables real-time market transactions and seamless interfaces among people,
buildings, industrial plants, generation facilities, and the electric network.’
The research fields affected by this transition are not limited to the power systems sector
but expand to communication, information technologies, automation, security, economics,
social and political sciences, artificial intelligence (AI) and game theory [202]. The latter
are most relevant to the scope of this thesis. The following section elaborates on the value
that game-theoretic approaches can bring to delivering the vision of optimised, low-carbon
and smart energy systems.
In the context of deregulated electricity markets, game-theoretic models are increas-
ingly required to explain strategic behaviour of multiple agents that might have conflicting
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interests. Agents typically act in ways that maximise their own individual utility. Tools
from microeconomics or coalitional game theory can be useful to aggregate many RES gen-
erators and demand response agents or to design appropriate incentivisation mechanisms.
Equilibria need to be determined under settings of incomplete information, with uncer-
tainty and dynamic environments. Relevant works that showcase the value game-theoretic
modelling can bring to power systems are discussed in depth in Chapter 2.
On the other hand, AI techniques can develop algorithms and mechanisms for more
efficient operation of networks and the power system [200]. As future power grids require
smart interfaces and intelligent automation, we need to develop tools for prediction of gen-
eration and consumption from data collected by smart metering and sensing infrastructure
that enable optimal management of electricity grids. These algorithms can be computa-
tionally challenging and should have the capability to provide optimisation solutions that
are suitable for real-time operation. This can be extremely challenging as it requires the
management of multiple generation units of different technology types including variable
RES units, load curtailment, demand side management and energy storage devices, in
a constantly changing environment with varying demand, volatile prices and increased
uncertainty.
A key challenge studied in this thesis is the issue of renewable curtailment that has
come up as a consequence of high RES development, insufficient grid infrastructure and a
mismatch of local demand to supply. The background topic on curtailment and congestion
management is introduced in the following section.
1.1.2 Renewable curtailment
In areas where renewable generators have achieved high penetration rates, technical
limitations on the operation of energy systems, have led to curtailment of renewable
production i.e. the restriction of RES production in safe operational limits for the energy
system. Curtailment can happen at a system level (high voltage) or at a distribution level
when local constraints may be more important (medium or low-voltage levels). According
to Joos and Staffell (2018) variable renewable energy capacity, comprised of wind and
solar developments, and RES penetration saw a four-fold increase in Britain between
2010 and 2016 [116]. Curtailment is typically imposed when the system is at risk and
is most prominent at areas of favourable renewable resources, which may be remote
regions located away from energy demand centres and where renewable projects meet least
planning resistance. For instance, such areas can be windy islands where there is excess
RES supply compared to the required local demand. Well-known examples of such areas
in the UK include the Shetland and Orkney archipelagos and the Kintyre peninsula in the
Western coast of Scotland. Realistic figures based on the latter case are used for a practical
application of the theoretical models developed and presented in this thesis. Furthermore,
curtailment can reach critical levels in areas where the existing network infrastructure is
insufficient and therefore energy generated by renewable generators cannot be transferred
where required. In these areas, the network places heavy dependence on curtailment at the
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present time. The Orkney Islands (in north-western Scotland) are a classic example that
have experienced curtailment levels that are among the highest in the UK [126]. This has
significant social implications as many RES projects in Orkney are community-owned and
suffer from large curtailment, thus potentially harming RES acceptance among consumers.
The implications of curtailment extend to inefficient energy management and renewable
utilisation, potential economic losses for RES generators, wasted energy and increased
integration costs.
Curtailment not only means that clean energy produced by RES is wasted, but often
curtailment comes with high costs for renewable energy developers and energy system
end-users. Several works have studied the effects that RES intermittency has on electricity
costs, known also as integration costs [99]. Integration costs represent balancing costs and
constraint management costs. For example, in many countries, including the UK, when
generators operate at areas with network constraints, they are usually compensated for
reduced profits when imposed to curtailment, leading to increasing energy costs, which
are essentially allocated to all energy system consumers. In the UK, RES curtailment
costs rose from £5.9m to £81.9m between 2012 and 2016 and from 45 to 1,123 GWh of
curtailed energy. Onshore wind located in Scotland bore the major consequences, as up
to 32% of onshore wind farms’ annual output was curtailed over a period of 5 years. In
Germany, a country where RES capacity has vastly increased in the recent years, wind
curtailment increased 27-fold between 2010-2016 with a cost that reached e478m in 2015
(4,722 GWh) [116].
The issue of curtailment compensation has gained negative publicity in media channels
with reports that threaten social acceptance and public perception on RES technologies.
As more RES capacity continues to be installed, this practice cannot be sustainable and
cost-effective, therefore smart solutions are required for further RES integration. Hence,
system operators are gradually adopting new strategies with regards to curtailment, such as
Dynamic Line Rating (DLR) and Active Network Management (ANM), typically deployed
at distribution networks. DLR uses rating technology and instrumentation to monitor the
thermal state of the lines in real time and may improve the estimated capacity between
30% to 100% [60, 165]. On the other hand, ANM is the automatic control of the power
system by means of control devices and measurements that allow for real time operation
and optimal power flows. DLR and ANM can be combined to provide greater benefits in
terms of curtailment reduction [6].
From the DNO perspective, both techniques imply controlling generators’ power out-
puts, hence innovative commercial agreements between generators and the system operator
are required. More frequently, generators are offered interruptible, ‘non-firm’ connections
to the grid, along with a set of rules about the order they are dispatched or curtailed, as
opposed to traditional ‘firm’ connections, which might require grid reinforcement and
in which case any curtailment imposed by the grid operator is then offset by financial
compensation. Non-firm connections are a solution preferred in many occasions to avoid
high costs associated with grid reinforcement or enduring a long wait before permits are
granted and grid infrastructure is finally built [49]. These terms and conditions are known
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as ‘Principles of Access’ (PoA) and are a key focus of this work. PoAs determine and spec-
ify how curtailment is allocated among generators in practical settings. Similar schemes
have been supported by the UK Government through funding mechanisms encouraging
DNOs to facilitate renewable connections [181].
In fact, procedures specifying how renewable generators get network access and
how curtailment is applied are key factors affecting the decision-making process about
investments for renewable generation and transmission capacity installed. The curtailment
level and policy applied by the system operator can be crucial for the decision-making of
renewable investors on whether to invest in new renewable generation capacity [20]. In this
context, DNOs face a significant knowledge gap about how to implement curtailment rules
that achieve desired operational objectives, but at the same time minimise disruption and
economic losses for renewable generators. The study of curtailment rules, how curtailment
should be shared among generators and how this impacts strategic behaviours of renewable
investors, including their effect on the viability of RES projects, form the core research of
this thesis. A detailed review of the relevant literature on curtailment rules is presented in
Chapter 2.
System and network operators may also deal with curtailment issues by utilisation
of market-based instruments. One prominent example is the ‘six-hour rule’ applied to
subsidised RES generators in Germany. Oversupply of RES generation and inability of
certain large conventional generators to curtail their power output, often leads to negative
prices in wholesale electricity markets, including day-ahead markets. In the case of
negative day-ahead prices, any subsidy payments to RES generators cease for the duration
of at least six hours, hence providing a price signal for incentivising RES generators to
undertake more curtailment.
Such techniques can help dealing with the issue of curtailment, however, a long term
solution is investment in new grid capacity and network upgrades, that are preferably
supported by private investment, so that renewable projects can bear part of the costs
required for their integration. Grid reinforcement costs are recouped by network charges
shared among all users of transmission and distribution systems, which raises issues of
fair allocation. The energy community is increasingly engaging in discussions with policy
makers regarding a restructuring of the ways network charges are allocated, in order to
achieve a more efficient market operation [183]. The issues related to network upgrades
are introduced in the following section.
Other solutions to mitigate curtailment come from the use of energy storage, demand
side management and adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) that can be used to store excess
RES generation and reduce technical constraints by absorbing RES variable outputs.
Finally, another solution mentioned in the recent literature is the development of local
energy markets in constrained areas of the grid that aim to alter consumer behaviours in
order to better match demand to locally produced RES supply and minimise curtailment.
The practical implementation of local energy markets is being supported by the advent of
novel technologies such as distributed ledger or blockchain technologies [10]. A recent
example is the ‘Cornwall Local Energy Market’, a £19m project developed by Centrica,
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that aims to create a virtual marketplace and trading platform for energy and flexibility
services to the grid and the wholesale energy market [40]. Another example is the £28.5m
ReFLEX Orkney project, which aims to use smart grid techniques and local energy markets
for better management of energy use, grid constraints and alignment of demand to locally
produced renewable supply [185].
Use of energy storage and blockchain technologies are discussed in detail in the
succeeding sections. At first, however, attention is drawn to the background area of
network upgrades and grid reinforcements, discussed in detail in the following section.
1.1.3 Network upgrade investment
In most countries, the power grid was constructed many years ago taking a central and
top-down approach, with power being generated in large central units, typically coal-
based in the UK, and then transmitted and distributed to the consumers through power
lines. Maintaining safe operation of this ageing power grid infrastructure requires vast
amounts of (public) investment. Investing in new grid assets, such as the installation of
transmission/distribution lines and substations, and grid reinforcement can be expensive
with costs burdening grid network users and subsequently all energy consumers. It is
estimated that in the EU alone, the transition towards a more sustainable and secure energy
system would require an investment of C200 billion per year for generation, network and
energy efficiency development [64]. A report published by the Rocky Mountain Institute
estimated that $2 trillion in electricity network upgrades will be required by 2030 in the
US [32]. Significant network upgrade projects are being deployed to accommodate more
RES generation, such as the project of ‘Western link’, a high-voltage direct link (HVDC)
that aims to unlock a transmission capacity of 2.25 GW, from production sites in Scotland
to demand centres in England and Wales [226]. Similar developments are under way in
the US in order to accommodate increasing wind generation capacity [117].
In many countries, public funding has been used by transmission system or local
distribution network operators (TSO/DNOs) to reinforce such power lines. This is, however,
expensive and increasingly harder to justify (since only a few companies benefit from
what is essentially a public investment), and often leads to considerable delays in capacity
being installed. From a public policy standpoint, it would be highly desirable to incentivise
private investors to undertake part of the required grid infrastructure investment. As
a result, recent discussions in the energy community have focused on ways to attract
private investment in network upgrade projects, so that part of the costs required for
renewable integration is recovered by private funding. System operators have started a
debate on finding new ways to incentivise privately built lines [118], paid by the renewable
generation companies [132], possibly partially supported by TSOs/DNOs. In fact, there
is a key knowledge gap faced by network operators and regulators about how to best
incentivise privately owned network upgrades.
This raises the crucial issue of the line access rules to be applied to the new transmission
lines, as well as the interplay between the line access and the curtailment mechanism.
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Deregulated electricity markets and RES integration in principle enable private investors
participation in network investments. This market behaviour can be desirable from a public
policy standpoint but it raises the question for system operators of defining the frame-
work within which these private lines are incentivised, built and accessed by competing
generators. Currently, DG investors bear a part of the costs required for their integration.
In general the connection costs may vary, but usually include the full cost for the grid
capacity installed for own use and a proportion of the costs for shared capacity with other
customers, in the case of a network upgrade [7]. The remaining costs are recovered by the
system charges borne by all grid users, representing approximately 18% of the average
electricity bill of a typical UK household [258]. This has led to engagement in public
debate for the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM), the UK’s independent
system regulators, on the reform of network charges that would achieve more efficient and
fair allocation [183].
A special case that represented a key starting point for the models developed in this
thesis is the value that privately developed grid capacity could provide in settings where
several generators can use the same transmission/distribution line against the payment
of a transmission fee. Current practices may lead to inefficient solutions in real-world
settings. Consider, for instance, the problem of reinforcing transmission/distribution lines
in outlying regions of Scotland, such as in the Kintyre peninsula, an area that has attracted
major RES investment and is used for the practical demonstration of the game-theoretic
tools developed in this work. The scheme providing grid access to the RES generators
in this area followed a ‘single access’ principle, i.e. private lines for sole-use that were
sufficient to accommodate only the RES capacity of each project. This practice resulted
in the unintended effect of no less than three distribution lines being connected or under
construction in the same area. While the marginal cost of building a larger capacity line
is cited as a possible explanation, a less obvious, but potentially key reason is that each
producer had no incentive to build a larger capacity line which permitted access to rival
competitors. It is thus clear that current solutions are far from being optimal in terms of
network use and economic efficiency.
While lines with completely private access (so called ‘single merchant access’) lines are
possible, it would be beneficial if new power lines are built (partially) by private investors,
keeping the access to this infrastructure public. An approach would be that power lines
are built under a ‘common access’ principle, where a private renewable investor may be
granted a license to build a power line, under the obligation to also grant access to third
parties, such as smaller local generators or energy storage devices. The line investor is able
to recuperate line installation costs by charging other investors a transmission fee per unit
of energy transported, the level of which is subject to a cap set by the regulator.
The interplay between curtailment rules and principles of access applied to power lines,
raises potentially complex issues, especially as the line investor, regulator and local RES
investors may have different underlying goals [222]. This thesis developed methods from
empirical and algorithmic game theory that study these interactions and emergent complex
behaviour. In this work, investors, also called players or agents in the context of this
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work, are modelled as self-interested entities that aim to maximise their individual utility
function or their profits. The work shows that a complex Stackelberg game can occur
between the transmission capacity and other low-carbon generation and storage investors,
in which the decision to build a transmission line depends on the equilibrium strategy of
local investors to invest in additional capacity. The methods developed in this thesis may
help network operators and system regulators to optimally determine the transmission
charges that enable private infrastructure be installed, and thus achieving the development
of more efficient and resilient networks.
In this thesis, a two-location problem is considered, where excess renewable energy
generation and demand are not co-located. Next, the work studies the combined effect that
curtailment schemes and line access rules have on the decision to invest in new transmission
lines and renewable generation capacity built in an area.
The models developed in this thesis and their theoretical results were demonstrated
and applied to a practical application, based on a grid reinforcement project between
Hunterston and Crossaig, in the remote Kintyre peninsula in Western Scotland. This
remote region is a good example of a location with high wind generation potential, where it
became clear that private line investment would be needed to export the renewable energy
generated.
The main analytical results of this thesis suggest that, in such cases, it is possible for
system regulators and network operators, to encourage private line investors - possibly to
build larger capacity lines under a ‘common access’ rule, as long as transmission charges, in
the equilibrium of the game, are set in such ways that allow sufficient profits for investors.
Relevant literature to this vein of work is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.
Next, the research aims and objectives are presented along with a summary of the main
contributions of the work undertaken for the completion of this thesis.
1.2 Research objectives and contributions
The previous section introduced the broader topic area and problem statement of the
research work presented in this thesis. Here, the reader can find a thorough discussion on
the specific research objectives and the novelty of the research work undertaken in the
context of this thesis.
The broader objective of this thesis is to explore how game-theoretic and artificial
intelligence techniques can address challenges caused by excess renewable generation at
areas of the grid with network constraints and significant volumes of curtailment. The
specific goals contributing towards the main broader objective can be summarised into the
following:
• This thesis aims to provide an in-depth review of the topic of renewable curtail-
ment. The review aims to present a detailed analysis, description and comparison
of curtailment rules and practices applied by network operators for curtailment
allocation in ANM schemes. Secondly, this thesis aims to review the literature on
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the utilisation of game-theoretic and economic models that are suitable for analysing
market behaviour and strategic decision-making of investors in settings where re-
newable curtailment plays a significant role.
• In addition, this thesis aims to demonstrate how the economic performance of
distributed generators (DGs) is influenced by different curtailment strategies, and
what the long-term effects of curtailment rules to existing and future renewable
generation capacity investments are.
• Next, this thesis aims to investigate the impact of curtailment and line access
rules to network upgrade expansion investments that can be supported by private
funding. In this vein, this work aims to develop suitable modelling techniques
that capture the strategic decision-making of self-interested agents and low-carbon
energy investors, such as renewable and energy storage investors.
• Finally, the thesis aims to demonstrate the application of the developed theoreti-
cal models in practical settings. To achieve this, theoretical results of the models
under consideration will be applied in practical examples inspired by real-world
applications and based on realistic assumptions from UK-based case studies with
utilisation of large datasets of renewable resources and electricity demand. The latter
aims to showcase the value of the models in practical settings with the ambition that
this work can easily be replicated and applied to other cases and locations where
potential renewable generation and demand are not co-located and where curtailment
plays a significant role.
With these objectives in mind, this thesis developed several models and outputs, the
findings of which can be related to fields of smart energy systems, energy economics, game
theory, artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. The main contributions and outputs
of the work are summarised in the following summary statements:
• First, this thesis provided a principled study on different curtailment strategies and
their underlying properties. The effects of curtailment rules on the RES capacity
installed at a particular location are studied and formalised. The results show that
the capacity installed and profitability of different generators can differ widely under
different curtailment models. More specifically, this thesis focused on the analysis
and study of three widely used curtailment rules and showed, in simulation, the
effects these rules can have on the capacity factor (CF) of wind generators. This work
also studied the effect of spatial wind speed correlation to the resulting curtailment
and lost generator revenues. In fact, power network operators face a significant
knowledge gap about how to implement curtailment rules that achieve desired
operational objectives, but at the same time minimise disruption and economic
losses for renewable generators. In this context, this thesis showed that fairness
and equal sharing of imposed curtailment among generators is important to achieve
maximisation of the renewable generation capacity installed at a certain area. A
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competitive analysis approach, modelled as a Cournot game, is used to determine
the feasible level of RES capacity that can be built at a single location with network
constraints, including the determination of an upper bound of tolerable curtailment.
Given the importance of the fairness property, this work proposed a new round-robin
rule that minimises renewable generation disruption and number of curtailment
events a generator needs to respond, while achieving fair allocation of curtailment
between generators of unequal ratings.
• Secondly, a market model was developed for optimal decision making with regards
to investments on generation capacity and upgrades or installation of new grid infras-
tructure at regions that are already experiencing significant volumes of curtailment.
This model is analysed in the case of myopic agents, who take decisions without a
foresight to the future, and in the case of strategic agents, where players have the
ability to forecast their opponents behaviour and take this into account when making
their own decisions.
• While other works have studied transmission constraints and congestion (these works
are reviewed systematically in Chapter 2), to the best of our knowledge, this work is
one of the first to study the effect of commercial agreements and curtailment rules in
settings of private grid reinforcement. This work provides a novel formulation in
modelling private investment in network expansion required for further integration
of renewable generation. The problem under consideration included a two-location
setting of a demand and a RES generation site. A private investor, shortly called
the ‘line investor’ builds renewable generation capacity and constructs a power line,
but also provides access to other RES generators, shortly called ‘local generators’,
against a charge for transmission. In other words, the privately developed transmis-
sion line is shared among all renewable generators and follows a ‘common access’
principle. This leads to a Stackelberg game between the line and low-carbon genera-
tion investors. The decisions on optimal (and interdependent) renewable capacities
built by investors, affect the resulting curtailment and profitability of projects and
were determined in the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game. Stackelberg equilibria
are classified as solutions to sequential hierarchical problems where a dominant
player (here the line investor) has the market power to impose their strategies to
smaller players (local generators) and influence the price equilibrium. A feasible
range of the transmission fee is identified allowing both transmission and generation
capacity investments to be profitable. Hence, this work developed a game-theoretic
model that enables energy system stakeholders to bridge the knowledge gap of incen-
tivising privately developed grid infrastructure, especially in settings where multiple
generators can share access through the same transmission line, and determining
suitable transmission charges.
• As a first approach, a simple model based on average values of renewable production
and demand was studied. The line investor is the leader of the Stackelberg game,
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as he is the first mover and builds the transmission line. The decision variables
of investors were assumed to be the renewable generation capacities that players
need to install in order to maximise their profit. The decisions on optimal (and
interdependent) generation capacities, crucially affect the resulting curtailment and
profitability of projects and can be determined in the equilibrium of the Stackelberg
game. An average approach, based on expected values of generation and demand,
allowed for the determination of an analytical solution to the problem and an initial
examination of the Stackelberg game equilibrium properties over a wide range of
cost parameters.
• Next, a detailed theoretical model was developed, able to capture the stochastic nature
of renewable production and variability of energy demand. A theoretical analysis of
the game was presented along with an algorithmic estimation of the equilibrium by
utilisation of empirical game theory and real production/demand data from a real
network upgrade project in Britain. As opposed to other works in the literature, which
assume that the variables under optimisation are represented by simple mathematical
functions that allow for an analytical solution of the game equilibrium, in this work,
the game equilibrium is found numerically, hence bypassing the need for complex
mathematical formulation. Moreover, the emerging strategic game is informed by
complex energy system control schemes that lead to a more realistic analysis. The
proposed method for equilibrium estimation is general and can be applied to similar
case studies, where there is excess of renewable generation capacity and where
sufficient data is available.
• In practice, however, available data may be erroneous and may experience significant
gaps. To deal with this issue, a method for generating time series data was developed
based on Gibbs sampling. A Gibbs sampler was used to to generate observations
from historic resource and demand data in order to simulate multiple future scenarios.
This allowed for multiple iterations of the simulation analysis with different time
series data, on the principles of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) analysis, that
allowed the exploration of the solution space for multiple future scenarios, leading to
a reduction of uncertainties when considering future renewable generation capacity
decisions.
• Energy storage represents a promising solution that could reduce curtailment or
delay/defer network upgrades. Hence, a new, three-player model was proposed
consisting of a line investor, local generators and a third independent storage player,
who can purchase energy from renewable generators that would otherwise have
been curtailed. The model can estimate optimal capacity decisions on transmission,
generation and storage capacity decisions, based on a Stackelberg-Cournot game
analysis. An analysis on the operation of the energy system with and without
introducing energy storage was performed for comparative purposes.
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• Finally, the game-theoretic formulations proposed in this thesis were applied to a
practical setting of a grid reinforcement project from the UK and a large dataset
of wind speed measurements and demand. Examples of the models applied in
practice were based on realistic figures from a network upgrade project in the
UK. The financial parameters used for this analysis were released by OFGEM and
Scottish Southern Energy (SSE), the local DNO, as part of a public consultation
exercise [235]. Practical analysis included the utilisation of public datasets on real
wind speed measurements and demand data that span over several years. Throughout
the thesis, data is used to develop empirical game-theoretic models and algorithms
that enable the search and identification of the game equilibrium. Finally, it is
worth noting that, while the numerical application is specific to the UK case, the
analysis and equilibrium results are general, and the underlying problem of renewable
generation and demand not being co-located occurs in many other places around the
globe, facing similar challenges.
In summary, the research work presented in this thesis studied the interplay among self-
interested and independent low-carbon technology investors at areas of excess renewable
capacity with network constraints and high curtailment rates. The work proposed a
mechanism for setting transmission charges that ensures both that the transmission line
gets built, but investors from the local community can also benefit from investing in
renewable energy and energy storage. Overall, the results of this work show how game-
theoretic techniques can help network operators to bridge the knowledge gap about setting
optimal curtailment rules and determining appropriate transmission charges for private
network infrastructure. The following section presents the outline of the thesis report.
1.3 Thesis outline
Chapter1 presents an introduction and the research motivation to the topic of this thesis. In
particular, Chapter 1 presents the energy landscape of current and future energy systems,
since the proliferation of renewable generation and deregulation of the energy markets.
In this light, game-theoretic modelling and multi-agent techniques are required to model
behaviours of independent players or agents that own and manage their own generation
assets. The background research highlights the emerging issue of increasing volumes of
renewable curtailment at several locations. Chapter 1 introduces curtailment rules and
elaborates on the need for private network upgrade investments, two key topics that form
the core research area of this work. Research aims and objectives are presented in detail
along with a summary of the novelty and main contributions of this research work.
Chapter 2 of this thesis presents relevant literature reviews on the topics of ANM,
curtailment strategies, grid infrastructure investment, game-theoretic modelling applied in
energy systems and blockchain technologies that could enable local energy markets with
direct consumer trading that could reduce curtailment by more better matching of locally
produced renewable energy to demand.
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Chapter 3 presents the work undertaken in this thesis to study the impact of curtailment
mechanisms in the economic performance of generators and on the aggregate generation
capacity investment at a particular location. Three curtailment mechanisms, widely used
in projects across the UK, were used for the analysis. A new round-robin rule was
proposed that ensures equal share of curtailment among generators of unequal rated
capacity. Chapter 3 studies desired curtailment rules properties such as fair allocation of
curtailment and proved that curtailment strategies that achieve equal sharing of curtailment
can actually maximise the generation capacity installed at a single location.
Chapter 4 presents a two-node network expansion model of a line investor and local
RES generators. The latter is analysed for two representative curtailment schemes and two
agent scenarios, one where the market participants act as ‘myopic’ agents and the other as
‘strategic’ players. The model developed is analysed as a Stackelberg leader-follower game
with the line investor having the ‘first mover advantage’ and local generators acting after
observing the leader’s actions. A closed-form, analytical solution of the game equilibrium
is presented starting from average case assumptions. Moreover, Chapter 4 introduces the
Kintyre-Hunterston grid reinforcement project, which is used for experimental validation
of the models developed in the thesis.
Chapter 5 of this thesis formulates a Stackelberg game model that captures stochasticity
of wind generation and variability of demand. A theoretical formulation of the problem is
presented along with an empirical algorithmic approach for game equilibrium estimation.
The approach followed utilises large datasets of wind speed and demand data that span
across 17 years.
Chapter 6 of this thesis uses Gibbs sampling and MCMC techniques to draw correlated
samples from the generation and demand distributions of available data, in order to
perform repetitive runs of the simulation analysis. The process is crucial for time series
data generation and for reducing uncertainties regarding decisions taken by investors on
optimal generation capacities to be installed.
Chapter 7 studies the added value of introducing energy storage to the game-theoretic
model. A three-player game is introduced in Chapter 7 of a line investor, local generators
and a third independent storage player, who is able to absorb part of the renewable
production that would otherwise have been curtailed. A comparison of the energy system
before and after introducing energy storage is also shown in this chapter.
Finally, the thesis is concluded in Chapter 8, where key findings of the work are
summarised. Directions on future work are also discussed in this final chapter of the thesis.
Additional information on the methodology and data used in this thesis are shown in
the Appendix.
Chapter 2
Background and related work
Chapter 2 elaborates on the most significant research works relevant to the scope of this
thesis, as found in the literature survey. Specifically, Chapter 2 presents the topics of
renewable generation curtailment, smart grid solutions that aim to reduce curtailment,
smart interruptible commercial arrangements and practices on curtailment rules. Moreover,
this chapter presents works on network expansion and grid reinforcement, and on the
application of game theory and agent-based modelling applied to energy systems. A review
on enabling technologies for curtailment and congestion management is also presented in
this chapter including energy storage and blockchain technology.
The first topic presented is generation curtailment applied by network operators when
there is an oversupply of renewable generation or when renewable production causes
technical violations that may put safe operation of power systems at risk.
2.1 Renewable generation curtailment
Generation curtailment is the total or partial reduction of the power production of a
renewable or distributed generator, due to oversupply or network constraints. Large
volumes of curtailment mean that an important part of potential renewable production is
actually wasted or rejected, as it cannot be absorbed by the power grid.
Predominantly, renewable generators, such as wind turbines or photovoltaic (PV)
generators have variable power outputs that primarily depend on time-variant weather
conditions. Therefore, renewable production is typically difficult to control and predict.
As a result, RES generators raise several challenges to the safe operation and management
of power networks. The challenges relate to limited network capacity, increased difficulty
in voltage and frequency control management, power quality and reliability issues. The
adoption of renewable generation also poses challenges related to the security of supply,
system balancing and backup reserve. These challenges can be briefly summarised and
are more widely known as network constraints. Network constraints refer to the thermal,
fault or voltage level violations that might occur during the operation of a RES generator
and might jeopardise the safe operation of the power network, and may refer to different
voltage levels. For example, curtailment might happen at a system level when constraints
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refer to the high-voltage transmission network or at a distribution level i.e. at medium or
low-voltage levels.
In more detail, system operators have limited control over the renewable production
and in general RES generators cannot be dispatched as other conventional generation assets.
This affects the operation and maintenance of electricity networks, markets and thermal
generators operation [48]. For example, conventional generators can be displaced by the
use of renewable energy, as the power supplied to consumers is significantly reduced,
especially in times when primary renewable resources are highly available, such as in
periods of high wind. Therefore, the load factor of conventional plants can be seriously
affected and reduced, leading to economical implications. Conventional power plants with
high marginal costs, such as gas-fired power stations, are mostly affected and displaced by
renewable generators.
Moreover, thermal generators are often used as backup generation to compensate for
variable RES production or sudden loss of renewable generation. Backup generation
is required to provide acceptable security of supply and power system reliability levels.
However, as a result, thermal generators are required to start up and shut down more
frequently and provide more flexible operation. This leads to higher fuel consumption and
increased operation and maintenance costs and CO2 emissions. Brouwer et al. [33] showed
how the efficiency of conventional generators is reduced by the deployment of renewable
energy. Specifically, thermal generators are affected by a 4% reduction in their efficiency
in the case when wind turbines represent an average of only 16% of firm generation.
Flexible operation of thermal and gas-fired power station depends on the technology type.
For example, combined cycle gas turbines are more flexible than coal or nuclear power
plants and thus more suitable for cooperation with renewable generators [199]. However,
flexible operation leads to increased running costs, increased downtime for maintenance
and reduced power plant lifetime. These implications might lead to loss of conventional
generation, if power plants investors are discouraged to build new power plants or extent
the lifetime of the existing ones, leading to unacceptable reliability levels.
RES intermittency and variability increases the requirements for short-term reserves.
An early study by Gross et al. [91] estimated the balancing costs of matching demand
to supply for the UK electricity system to £2-3/MWh generated, while the costs for
maintaining reliability and meeting peak demand were estimated to £3-5/MWh. According
to the same study [91], the cost of intermittency and the final contribution to the electricity
price was estimated to £10-15/MWh. The study however did not look above 20% of
renewable adoption into the UK’s generation mix. A more recent study by the same
authors revealed that costs can vary significantly across studies depending on the RES
penetration considered, hence costs are difficult to estimate. According to a study by
the UK Energy Research Centre [98], for RES penetration of up to 30%, short-term
system balancing reserve costs reported did not exceed £5/MWh and costs for maintaining
reliability were between £4-7/MWh. For 50% RES penetration however, the costs reported
were £15-45/MWh and £15/MWh, respectively. According to the same report [98] the
transmission and network costs were estimated between £5-20/MWh, for up to 30%
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penetration level for the UK energy system. Moreover, [98] reviewed research works that
studied the relation of curtailment to RES penetration levels. Studies from the UK and EU
suggest that curtailment levels are very low (i.e. below 5%) for low RES penetration and
can remain low until over 50% RES penetration. However, other US studies suggest that
curtailment can reach very high levels (in many cases surpassing 40%) even at moderate
RES penetration levels (around 25-30%). A potential cause for such reported differences
may be attributed to the different design characteristics and geographical distances between
the US and European grids.
A recent study by Joos and Staffell (2018) focused on the estimation of short-term
integration costs for RES generation in countries with high RES development and penetra-
tion, like Germany and the UK. In the UK, curtailment costs rose from £5.9m to £81.9m
between 2012 and 2016, according to the study. Curtailed energy for the same period
rose from 45 to 1,123 GWh. The largest part of curtailment was allotted to onshore wind
development located in Scotland reaching up to 32% of wind annual output curtailed over
the 5-year period. Similarly, in Germany wind curtailment increased 27-fold between
2010-2016 with a cost that reached e478m in 2015 (4,722 GWh) [116]. A study by Luo et
al. (2016) on wind curtailment in China showed a 10-20% curtailment on wind generation
that reached the quantity of 7.2 TWh in 2013 and put great strains in the profitability of
the projects themselves [147].
Such issues are even more imminent at remote or weak parts of the grid, such as
islands or remote areas far from industrial/population centres, where RES integration is
more challenging. Such remote areas can be completely autonomous or connected to the
main grid with constrained capacity transmission lines. Inertial response, fast balancing,
frequency or voltage control can be challenging in isolated systems, such as islands or
systems with large wind integration [103]. The effects of network constraints in remote
areas of the grid are widely discussed in [128] and [188].
According to Brouwer et al. (2014) [33], there are two main reasons for generation cur-
tailment, namely the saturated grid capacity or insufficient transmission ability along with
renewable generation oversupply. The dominant reason is currently network constraints,
while oversupply is responsible for a small percentage, only in areas where large-scale
development of renewable generators has already taken place, however this might signifi-
cantly change in the future as more renewable generation is deployed. Several geographic
locations in the UK fall into the latter category, such as the Orkney islands in the north of
Scotland. In Orkney, RES generation supplies over 130% of the island electricity demand.
However, at times, local demand in Orkney can be low compared to the renewable supply,
such as for example during the winter night hours when the wind is strong. Moreover,
Orkney is connected to the main grid with a transmission line of saturated capacity. These
two factors have led to large volumes of curtailment that surpass 50% of the available
RES power for several wind projects in the area. Apart from financial implications, large
curtailment in the area has also social implications, as many RES projects are owned
by residents from the local community. In addition, according to a recent study, Orkney
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consists the area with the largest percentage of fuel poverty in the UK with over 63% of
local households living in fuel poverty [184].
Aside technical issues with regards to the operation of power systems, new renew-
able projects are often rejected or delayed due to saturated grid capacity, costly and
time-consuming network upgrade projects. To mitigate such issues and accelerate fur-
ther deployment of renewable technologies, system operators are increasingly deploying
flexibility measures. Measures depend on the causes for curtailment (system-wide or
distribution level) and include smarter active network management (ANM) schemes, smart
grid techniques, adopting real-time thermal rating of power lines or exploring novel com-
mercial agreements and curtailment strategies. Such solutions are reviewed in the following
sections.
2.2 Flexibility measures
As shown in Section 2.1, fluctuations of power system supply due to increasing volumes of
RES generation and new peaks in the electricity demand caused by new type of loads, such
as heat pumps and EVs, are eventually leading to lower utilisation of power system assets.
The decreased utilisation of generation and network assets will eventually lead to increased
system costs, as larger capacity requirements are needed to maintain the same level of
system reliability [219]. According to Kubik et al. [133], more flexibility is required by
conventional generators in order to accommodate larger penetration levels of renewable
energy. According to a UK study the net benefit of flexibility services deployed in the UK
energy system are estimated in the range of £1.4-2.4 bn/year in 2030 [219]. In addition,
other technology solutions may be deployed to mitigate negative effects on system prices
including strategies summarised in Figure 2.1. These strategies include energy storage,
demand response, building interconnectors and additional grid capacity and application of
generation curtailment schemes. Another potential solution is the geographical dispersion
of RES generators that might lead to decreased availability uncertainty and can mitigate
part of the intermittency effects and costs.
As suggested in Figure 2.1, operational flexibility techniques are relatively low-cost
solutions. One such example is adopting smart curtailment strategies, typically deployed
within ANM schemes, that can potentially make better use of the available grid capacity,
especially at congested parts of the network. Curtailment strategies are the focus of this
thesis and are presented in the following sections along with several examples of ANM
schemes that operate in the UK. Other solutions, such as investing in energy storage assets
or network upgrades are promising and are reviewed in the following sections. Despite
recent reduction in storage costs, such as price reduction of Lithium-ion batteries, large
scale energy storage solutions still come with high costs, except from pumped hydro stor-
age, which has limited applicability due to geographical limitations. Reinforcing existing
power lines or building new grid infrastructure presents a long-term solution, however may
have prohibitively high costs and time-consuming procedures. In the following section,
operational practices are discussed such as the deployment of ANM schemes.














Fig. 2.1 Strategies to obtain power system flexibility adapted from [107]
2.3 Active Network Management Schemes
Integration of renewable energy resources can be increased if Active Network Management
(ANM) techniques are implemented. In the UK, ANM is used to increase renewable
energy penetration, as an alternative and less expensive approach to network upgrades or
reinforcement. In fact, ANM can be used to optimise efficient use of grid resources, before
any reinforcement or new network infrastructure is put in place.
A definition of an ANM can be found in a paper published by Liew et al. (2002) [143],
where ANM describes ‘a network where real-time management of voltage, power flows
and even fault levels is achieved through a control system either on site or through a
communication system between the network operator and the control devices’. To achieve
this, ANM relies on flexibility, monitoring, control, adaptability and automatic features
applied in the network that may not be restricted only to dealing with faults, but include
enhanced operation and optimisation of the power system [224]. A general review on
ANM schemes operating in the distribution networks, along with techniques of control,
monitoring and protection can be found in [272]. A list of several early research and
commercial projects implemented in the UK can be found in [151].
ANM strategies can be applied to areas with network constraints, where grid rein-
forcement cost are high, where there is a significant variation in demand, and where there
is diversification of different types of generators [224]. Mitigation of barriers to further
deployment of distributed generation has been, in fact, one of the main drivers for ANM
development in UK. From the generators’ perspective, participation in a ANM scheme
can provide a preferable economical solution [49], especially if the alternative of network
upgrade is extremely expensive.
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Smarter techniques for network constraint management can be part of an ANM strategy.
An example of such smart techniques being part of the ANM strategy can be generation
curtailment. The Transmission System Operator (TSO) or the Distribution Network
Operator (DNO) can control the generators output according to the system needs, in order
to ensure safe operation, power system stability and optimal power flows, with respect
to the system’s thermal limits and technical regulations. The DNO can not only switch
on and off the grid the generators, but can also utilise control techniques to set a desired
output, for instance by setting a power output set point to a wind generator. Curtailment
strategies are analysed in greater detail in the upcoming sections of this chapter.
An additional smart grid technique used by network operators is Dynamic Line Rating
(DLR). DLR uses rating technology and instrumentation to monitor the thermal state of
the lines in real time and may improve the estimated capacity between 30% to 100%,
according to several studies [60, 165].
The following sections focus on the most important ANM schemes deployed in the UK,
including ‘Orkney Smart Grid’ (see Fig. 2.2) and ‘Northern Isles New Energy Solution
(NINES)’, operated by Scottish Southern Energy (SSE) and ‘Flexible Plug and Play’,
operated by UK Power Networks. SSE and UK Power Networks are DNOs operating in
the UK electricity system.
2.3.1 Orkney Smart Grid
Orkney consists of a number of islands located just 6 miles away from the north coast
of Scotland. The islands are one of the best UK areas for renewable deployment, with
favourable renewable resources for wind, wave and tidal generation. Currently, RES
generation supplies 130% of the islands’ electricity consumption. The location represents
an area of high interest for further RES investment. However, the area also suffers from
large levels of renewable curtailment. The issue is exacerbated as renewable generators
need to share the limited grid capacity available, with resulting curtailment being highly
dependent on the cross-correlation and patterns of different renewable resources [24].
Orkney’s electrical network consists of a generation mix of gas, wind, wave and tidal.
44.55 MW of wind power generators are currently connected to the grid [209], 2.75 MW of
tidal and 2.8 MW of wave power generators [208]. The demand varies from 6 MW summer
minimum to 31 MW winter peak demand, respectively. The power grid is connected to
the mainland grid through 2×20 MW submarine cables of 33 kV. Moreover, there is a
reactive power compensation system consisting of ±8 MVAr D-VAR and 2×7 MVAR,
33 kV switched shunt capacitors. Due to increased volumes of RES deployed in the islands
and great variability of local electricity demand, large volumes of renewable generation
are curtailed.
To deal with the issues of curtailment, Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE) developed
an ANM project called ‘Orkney Smart Grid’ [224]. ‘Orkney Smart Grid’ (see Figure 2.2 for
a detailed project map) has been operational since 2012. Generators are separated in distinct
zones, according to the network topology, thermal limits and actual network constraints.
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Fig. 2.2 Power network (33kV) at the Orkney islands in the UK [224]
Demand and renewable generation may vary significantly on a minute-to-minute basis,
hence the ANM scheme was introduced, which has the capability of controlling the power
flow within a time period of a few seconds. Each generator is connected to a local ANM
controller, which receives a power output set point from the ANM scheme central controller.
Sensing devices in different parts of the network and a reliable communication system are
required to estimate and manage the network constraints.
The installation cost of the ANM scheme was estimated at £500 K, and was significantly
lower than the cost of a network upgrade solution estimated at £30m. According to official
figures, the ANM scheme allowed 20 MW additional renewable capacity to be connected
to the existing electricity grid.
2.3.2 Northern Isles New Energy Solution - NINES
‘Northern Isles New Energy Solution’ (NINES) is an ANM scheme located in the Shetland
islands and is operated by SSE, one of the UK distribution network operators [225]. The
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Shetlands form a complex of islands 130 miles to the north of the British mainland. The
islands are interconnected with each other, but have no have grid connection to the main
British network system. As a result, the electric system is islanded and relies entirely on
locally supplied generation.
Electric demand varies from a summer minimum of 11 MW to a winter peak demand
of 48 MW, mostly coming from the largest town of Lerwick. At winter time, there is a
large demand for residential and space heating, since the islands have no access to gas
resources. The demand for heating is currently met by electricity or oil generators.
The Shetlands are classified as one of most favourable sites in Europe for wind gen-
eration. A privately owned wind farm of 3.68 MW nominal capacity, Burradale Wind
Farm, and several smaller community wind projects are currently installed. There is high
interest in investing in renewable energy, both wind and marine, especially as Burradale
Wind Farm has one of the greatest capacity factors in European renewable projects, that
surpasses 50%. However, additional capacity is currently not possible due to limited
network capacity and ageing grid infrastructure. Further RES generation capacity would
lead to imbalances between local demand and supply. Electricity supply comes mainly
from diesel power stations. However, Lerwick power station is currently approaching its
end of operational lifetime and is mostly operated as a backup for wind generators, causing
very low efficiency rates.
The NINES project is led by Scottish Hydro Electric Power Distribution and aims at
introducing innovative smart grid technologies and thermal energy storage with the aim
to preserve and enhance the reliability and security of supply of the islands’ complex. A
long-term objective of the project is also the reduction of the system costs. Lerwick power
station will be equipped with a battery energy system that allows larger flexibility to deal
with the variability of local demand and renewable production. Demand side management
techniques will also be deployed. System assets and critical parameters will be monitored
and controlled through a communication system and advanced metering infrastructure.
Sensing and metering equipment form the core of the ANM scheme, which is able to
manage power flows in real time, by utilisation of real-time measurements in the network
and automated control [236].
2.3.3 Flexible Plug and Play - FPP
‘Flexible Plug and Play’ (FPP) is a project developed by UK Power Networks, located
in the south-eastern part of England [86]. The project aimed to exploit innovative tech-
nologies and new commercial arrangements to facilitate and accelerate the connection
of RES generators or DGs, at congested areas of the distribution network. The overall
implementation cost of the project reached £9.7m and the beneficiaries included an excess
of 50 MW of distributed generators. FPP deployed an ANM scheme, which identified all
critical constraints in the network exploring radio frequency mesh technology [86].
FPP and other ANM projects presented above used novel commercial arrangements and
curtailment strategies to allocate the available grid capacity. From the DNO’s perspective,
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smart grid techniques imply controlling DG power outputs, hence innovative commercial
agreements between generators and the system operator are required. Similar schemes
have been supported by the UK Government through funding mechanisms encouraging
DNOs to facilitate renewable connections [181] and are presented, in greater detail, in the
following section.
2.4 Commercial agreements and curtailment strategies
Depending on the size of a renewable development, RES generators are connected to the
transmission or distribution network. When connected to the transmission network, i.e. at
a system level, generators are centrally dispatched and aim to achieve a unity power factor.
Generator connections are legally described in commercial arrangements, in accordance
to the relevant Grid Codes and regulatory framework. In order to accommodate RES
generators in distribution networks, novel commercial agreements are being considered
and increasingly proposed by network operators. A traditional practice in several countries,
including the UK, is that when generators cannot fully access the network, such as in the
case of network constraints, they receive financial compensation. Similar practices affect
adversely electricity prices, meaning that the ultimate cost of curtailment is essentially
borne by all end-consumers.
One way to reduce such negative impact and accelerate RES connections, is grant-
ing non-firm connections or smart interruptible contractual arrangements to renewable
generators. In this occasion, RES generators agree to be curtailed at the discretion of the
system or network operator, as opposed to firm standard connections. Broadly speaking,
distributed generators can be offered different types of connection to distribution networks
at the discretion of the DNO, which generally fall into two broad categories, standard firm
connections or alternative, non-firm connections. Alternative connections represent all
cases when a distributed generator agrees to reduce their capacity during times of network
constraints. Examples of non-firm connections are [262]:
• Export limiting connection: Power output is restricted to a maximum agreed ex-
ported power at the point of connection.
• Timed connection: A constraint of power output is imposed on specific times of
day (typically off-peak day time hours) or seasons (typically during the spring or
summer), when demand is low.
• Soft Intertrip connection: Power output is constrained when a safe limit of the
network operation is breached.
• ANM connection: Power output is restricted and orchestrated through the deploy-
ment of an ANM scheme.
This work focuses on non-firm ANM connections. The rules for imposed curtailment
and order of dispatch are specified and dictated in the contractual agreement between the
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generator and the system operator and are widely known as Principles of Access (PoA).
Such commercial arrangements give the right to the power system operator not only to
switch on and off the power generators, but to control their real-time power output, by
specifying power output set points to generating units. This implies that RES generators
require additional control capabilities at a plant level. For older technology wind turbines
that rely on stall control for limiting the rotor power, curtailment may only be achieved by
shutting down completely one or more wind turbines of the wind farm. For pitch-controlled
wind turbines or models that permit more advanced power electronics control, curtailment
can be achieved by modifying the wind turbine’s control system, in order to accept a power
output set point, as defined by the system operator.
The terms and conditions of the applied curtailment scheme include the rules of
connection of a distributed generator to the power grid along with the order or frequency
of the imposed curtailment. Some early examples of wind curtailment practices on an
international level, mainly relevant to network management at the transmission level, can
be found in a study by Rogers et al. (2010) [213]. Apart from the level of curtailment
itself, the curtailment strategy and PoA selected by the system operator, can have severe
implications for the generators, the DNO and end-consumers, and may have economic
implications for current and future generation capacity investments.
Several curtailment schemes or PoAs have been recommended by researchers, each
providing distinct advantages and disadvantages. A general description of the most preva-
lent curtailment strategies found in the literature can be found in [49] and is summarised in
the following:
• LIFO: Last-in-first-out strategy curtails first the generator that was last granted the
right to connect in the ANM scheme. Clearly, LIFO provides a market advantage to
the generators that were connected earlier in time. This scheme is currently used by
SSE in the ‘Orkney Smart grid’ and ‘NINES’ projects.
• Rota: The generators are curtailed on a rotational basis or at a predetermined rota,
as specified by the system operator. An early example of the Rota rule applied
in a real-world context can be found in a project by Xcel Energy in the United
States [216].
• Shared Percentage or Pro Rata: The curtailment is shared equally between all non-
firm generators. Each generator is curtailed equally at a percentage that corresponds
to the rated capacity of the power plant or the actual power output at the time of
the network constraint. This strategy was used by UK Power Networks in the FPP
scheme. UK Power Networks assessed at a theoretical level, different commercial
arrangements to allocate curtailment. LIFO and Pro Rata were both considered,
with the company finally proceeding with a proportional to the actual power output
curtailment scheme [20].
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• Market-based: This method requires the establishment of a curtailment market.
The generators bid to get connected or to access the network capacity. Alternatively,
generators may offer bids to accept curtailment.
• Technical Best: This method curtails first the generators which contribute the most
in the network constraint. Alternatively, the generators with the most suitable
technical characteristics for curtailment at a time period of a network constraint are
curtailed first. The practical application of this strategy depends on the network
configuration and type of constrains.
• Greatest Carbon Benefit: Curtailment priorities are linked with carbon emissions
of the generators. More specifically, with this scheme, the generator with the largest
CO2/MWh emissions is curtailed first.
• Generator Size: The largest generator contributing to the fault is curtailed first. By
generator size, either the rated capacity or the actual power output at the time of
constraint can be considered.
• Most Convenient: The generator most likely to better respond to the network
constraint is curtailed first. This scheme relies on historic responses of generators
and practical knowledge of the system operator.
The determination of the most suitable strategy needs to account for technical, com-
mercial and regulatory implications of each approach. Consequently, several assessment
criteria can be used to evaluate the proposed strategies. The criteria as stated in several
research works [23, 49, 62, 124] can be summarised in the following:
1. Fairness and transparency
2. Simplicity and practicability
3. Provision of efficient network operation
4. Assurance of safe, secure and reliable power system operation
5. Minimal impact on existing connection agreements
6. Sustainability and robustness to ensure future application
7. Compliance with regulations, codes and standards
8. Incentives of investment and support from stakeholders
9. Facilitation of low carbon technologies
An extensive review of different rules can also be found in more recent papers by
Anaya and Pollit (2015) [7] and Kane and Ault (2015) [126]. Currie et al. (2011) [49]
suggest that LIFO and market-based strategies outperform other approaches, when it comes
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to the assessment criteria. Pro Rata offers transparency and equitability and can be used in
combination with other strategies. Greatest Carbon Benefit favours renewable generation,
as opposed to conventional or thermal-based generation. Therefore, on the one hand, it is
not fair for all types of generators, but on the other hand it might contribute to EU policy
about carbon emissions. In addition, the curtailment strategies were assessed in terms of
their suitability with regards to a time framework. LIFO and Pro Rata were found easy to
implement for a short-term basis, LIFO, Pro Rata and Market-based for the medium-term
and LIFO, Pro Rata, Market Based and Greatest Carbon benefit were found suitable for a
long-term basis due to their requirement for more complex and structural transformations.
The PoA options chosen by DNOs follow different approaches and each rule has both
advantages and disadvantages in achieving desired objectives, such as cost-effectiveness,
economic efficiency and social optimality [6].
Kane et al. (2013) [125] presented a review of PoAs focusing on ANM schemes
operating in distribution networks with wind generation. Four PoAs were compared, LIFO,
Pro Rata, Market-based and Technical Best. The authors presented numerical results that
compare different strategies based on figures from Orkney’s electricity system. Potential
discouragement for future deployment of renewable generation capacity installed was
particularly stated in this paper. For example, if the Pro Rata approach is used, the capacity
factor of generators was estimated to decrease as more capacity is installed, leading to
larger uncertainty on the viability of future investments in the long term.
In a subsequent work, Kane et al (2015) [126] presented a quantitative analysis of
curtailment strategies and their impact on the capacity factor (CF) of wind generators.
CF is a widely used parameter in electrical engineering, equal to the ratio of the actual
energy generated by a certain resource over the maximum energy it could generate, if
operating under nominal conditions. Note that the CF of a typical wind turbine (even if
output is never curtailed) depends on wind conditions at the site’s location with typical
values around 30%. Three arrangements requiring minimal changes in a regulatory level
were considered: LIFO, Pro Rata and Rota. As shown, the minimum CF can increase
significantly with the Pro Rata and Rota arrangements, as opposed to when compared
to a LIFO approach. LIFO arrangements favour early connections and can potentially
discourage future generation capacity expansion and investments.
In a study for UK Power Networks, LIFO was considered potentially inefficient since
it does not promote optimal network use, especially in comparison to Pro Rata. Locations
with favourable renewable resources are most likely to attract a larger pool of investors,
therefore it would be reasonable to optimise the potential and energy outputs of these
locations. Any PoA in favour of additional total generation capacity, can be beneficial from
a social optimality perspective. Estopier et al (2013) [68] proved that while the volume
of curtailment, or in other words the sum of curtailed energy at a certain location can be
similar for different PoA, the most important factor affecting the decision-making of a
future investor, was the capacity factor of the last generator to be connected at the ANM












Principle of Access/Curtailment order Advantages Disadvantages
LIFO: Last generator
Simple configuration Not equitable
No impact on existing connections Not favourable to RES generators
Easily computable capacity factor Inefficient use of distribution network
Consistent and transparent Generation capacity disincentivisation
Rota: Rotationally Smaller capacity factor reduction with increased units Greater impact for small-sized generators
Pro Rata: According to
rated capacity or power
output
Equitable Unknown long term impacts on capacity factor
Compliant with existing rules and standards Increased curtailment for additional units
Enhances competitiveness Possible need cap generation connected
Market Based: Bidding
for grid access or
curtailment
Sustainable and future proof Necessity of market development





Easy technical implementation Commercial implications
Not easy to determine carbon footprint
Needs regulatory changes
Generator Size: Larger generator Quick removal of constraint Possible discouragement of large generators
Technical Best: Most technically suitable DNO Encouragement for grid reinforcement Location dependable
Most convenient: Most
likely to respond
Simple method Discrimination on operator preference, size and location
Not fair, not transparent
Table 2.1 A summary of the main features of common curtailment strategies according to relevant literature: [49] provided an assessment of different PoAs
for interruptible contracts with respect to different criteria and stakeholders, [23] identified a range of different criteria for assessing the most suitable
PoA for ANMs, [62] focused on technical challenges caused by increased wind penetration and [124] provided a comprehensive review on PoAs quality
assessment for ANM settings
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In a technical report by Baringa and UK Power Networks [20], an extensive and detailed
comparison of different curtailment strategies was presented along with a comparative
study regarding the criteria of network efficiency, certainty, simplicity, fairness and learning.
Moreover, this study estimated to which extent an ANM is sufficient to allow more network
capacity before a grid reinforcement or new grid infrastructure is actually required. Initially,
a minimum capacity factor needs to be specified at a certain location, which allows the
investment to be viable. Then, a maximum curtailment is calculated. When the level
of curtailment exceeds this threshold, grid reinforcement is required. Throughout the
project lifetime, the costs of curtailment are due to increase, while the cost of infrastructure
decreases. The time period when these two curves meet is suitable for grid reinforcement.
This method is therefore used to defer or delay any grid expansion. A further comparison
between traditional connections with network upgrade to smart interruptible connections
was performed by Anaya and Pollitt (2015) [7] in the form of a cost-benefit analysis.
The most important features of the proposed PoAs are summarised and presented in
Table 2.1.
Novel commercial arrangements include also techniques to couple demand with dis-
tributed generation to achieve managed and controlled power export capability at specific
points in the grid. Most notably, SP Energy Networks trialled such concepts in the
south east region of Scotland through the ‘Accelerated Renewable Connections’ (ARC)
project [88]. The project tested several architectures for energy systems in distribution
networks comprising both of generation and demand:
• Physical private wire systems: Connection between generation and demand site
is achieved through privately owned grid assets, moreover the generation/demand
scheme is connected to the DNO-owned network through a single connection point.
• Virtual private wire systems: Connection between generators and flexible demand
(one large demand site or multiple smaller flexible demands) is achieved through the
DNO-owned network and operation of scheme needs to be managed behind a point
of constraint.
• Demand aggregators: Multiple flexible demand here is represented by an aggrega-
tor acting as a single point of contact for the ANM scheme.
• Local markets: Both generation and demand sites participate in local markets to
modify their energy profiles and avoid congestion.
Smart and interruptible connections can accelerate distributed generator connections,
however a long-term solution would be to invest in new grid capacity investments. The
following section focuses on relevant works found in the literature on network expansion
with specific focus on works that apply game-theoretic modelling and AI techniques.
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2.5 Network upgrade investments
Grid infrastructure development can provide an alternative to ANM in the mitigation of
network congestion and energy curtailment. Nowadays, power network upgrade is mainly
driven by increasing demand, energy market competition, requirement for security of
supply and renewable energy integration.
Network expansion provides curtailment reduction, while enhancing competition
in the deregulated electricity market. The generators can benefit from increasing their
efficiency [221], leading consequently to cost reduction and lower electricity prices. In-
terconnection of geographically dispersed areas of the network allows remote sources
integration and reduces uncertainty in forecasting of generation and demand, hence re-
sulting in greater security of supply. The probabilities of unserved load or generation
breakdown decrease with interconnection, leading to a significant improvement in the
reliability of the system. In addition, potential future uncertainties can add further value
to network capacity expansion investments [160]. Such uncertainties relate to fuel prices,
carbon prices, costs for transmission, capital costs for RES generation, changes in markets,
changes in regulatory frameworks and potential demand growth [102]. On top of strictly
financial or technical benefits, Chamorro et al. (2012) claimed that grid expansion adds
a strategic, environmental and social value, which is difficult to be counted in monetary
value [42].
Increasing network capacity is performed in two ways, by reinforcement of existing grid
infrastructure or by building up new distribution/transmission lines. The cost of increasing
network capacity can often be prohibitive. According to Saguan et al. (2014), transmission
investment is based on imperfect regulatory frameworks and forms a significant part of
the renewable energy cost in the EU [218]. Grid expansion investment is characterised by
high capital costs with Operation and Maintenance (O&M) cost depending on the power
line technology and location. For instance, sub-sea cables present higher capital and O&M
costs than overhead power lines.
Grid expansion is traditionally planned at a 5-15 years time horizon and performed by
network operators, such as the TSO or DNO. However, the increasing development of RES
generation have introduced private or merchant investors to grid infrastructure deployment,
who may charge congestion rents. Individual objectives and interests of line investors,
therefore, depend on their actual type and can be conflicting [222]. Network operators, the
operation of which is typically controlled by an independent regulator, aim to maximise
social welfare, while private investors aim to maximise their profits [157].
In this work, game-theoretic modelling is used to study the strategic decision-making of
private investors deploying transmission capacity investments. The interaction of different
market players along with externalities of technical, economical or regulatory factors dictate
the system behaviour or an economic market equilibrium. Several mathematical principles
can be used in modelling the electricity market, such as microeconomic models [47] or
game theory [41]. Game theory represents a field that can explain complex strategic
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behaviours that emerge by the interplay of different players. Relevant works related to this
vein are discussed in detail in the following section.
2.6 Game-theoretic modelling and optimisation in network
upgrades
Load forecasting techniques and generation capacity planning are utilised to design rein-
forcement or new power lines, which minimise financial and environmental costs, while
ensuring safe and reliable operation. The decisions are typically supported by simulation
analyses and load-flow models. Traditionally utilities have relied on intuitive approaches
for the decision making, rather than using optimisation techniques [102]. According
to Hobbs (1995), game-theoretic models were scarcely used by utilities since they add
complexity and use simplistic assumptions [102]. On the other hand, research has focused
in game-theoretic models, as a tool to demonstrate and simulate the effects of market
regulation or decision-making. An overview of game-theoretic modelling is presented
in [215] including Stackelberg game and Cournot game formulations, who form the core
research of this thesis.
Stackelberg game equilibria are classified as solutions to bi-level problems where a
dominant player has the market power to impose his strategies to smaller players and
influence the price equilibrium. A Stackelberg game is a noncooperative game, originally
played in two levels of hierarchy. The game consists of a leader or first-mover player,
who dominates the market, and one or multiple followers, and it is also known as leader-
follower competition. The players are rational and act to serve best their own interest,
usually represented by a goal to maximise a certain utility, quantity or objective function.
The leader decides its strategy by anticipating a certain response from the follower with
ultimate target to maximise its own utility or profit. On the other hand, the follower
observes the leader’s strategy and decides to act according to its best response, or best
strategy, which maximises the followers utility, given the strategy of the leader. The
solution of this strategy game is known by the name Stackelberg game equilibrium [252].
In a Stackelberg game, the follower has to observe the leader’s strategy and act as
expected, while in a Cournot game, no player has a market advantage, meaning that players
do not know their opponent’s strategy and act simultaneously. At a Cournot game, the
player anticipates to influence the market (typically represented by the supply-demand
curve) through the inverse demand curve [47].
Stackelberg game formulations are frequently used in the security domain to model
attacker-defender problems [191] or in other domains, such as efficient test designing [142].
In the energy systems domain, Stackelberg games have been used in several works for
modelling transmission upgrades. These works considered economic analysis with social
welfare [221], locational marginal pricing [228] or highlight the uncertainties introduced
by the adoption of RES technologies [249]. Other works in the renewable energy domain
used Stackelberg game analysis to study energy trading among microgrids [17, 139]. Lee
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et al. (2015) developed a game-theoretic model of strategic players that is modelled as
a multileader-multifollower Stackelberg game that converged to a unique equilibrium
solution, which maximises the pay-off of the participating microgrids [139]. Other works
in the same vein, aimed to minimise power line losses [217] or generation and transmission
costs [154]. Asimakopoulou et al. (2013) used leader-follower strategies for analysing
hierarchical decision making in competitive situations with multiple microgrids [17]. Zhu
et al. (2017) suggested a crowdfunding scheme for the development of EV charging
infrastructure, modelled as a three-level Stackelberg game between the utility company,
the charging infrastructure operator and crowdfunders [276]. A Nash-Stackelberg game
between two leaders and two followers is proposed in [146] for an energy system with
users that can engage in demand response. A multileader-multifollower game is established
in [261] to model multiple trading between distributed generators and consumers. DGs
declare their prices in the market and consumers determine the energy quantity consumed
according to supply prices. The majority of the aforementioned works assumes well-
defined cost functions and follows an analytical approach for the analysis of the game.
The work developed in this thesis follows a different approach that determines equilibrium
results by virtue of simulation analysis and real large-scale dataset analysis, and considers
energy flows, as dictated by control management schemes of the energy systems under
consideration.
Game-theoretic approaches can add value, especially in the context of deregulated
electricity markets. Once state-owned and monopolistic, markets are transforming to
being competitive [121]. Traditional cost minimising techniques are being substituted by
market models of self-interested private firms, which aim to maximise their profit while
also competing with other rival firms. Introduction of competition in power networks
remains challenging due to the nature and cost of the power network itself. However, as
market transition affects generation planning, consequently grid expansion investment
is also affected. Game-theoretic tools can be used by private investors to forecast future
prices, decide market strategies and capacity investments. Regulators can use these models
to assess players’ strategies, infrastructure investment and estimate strategic behaviours
and their effect on electricity prices and market efficiency. A detailed review on strategic
interactions in oligopolistic markets is presented in [51], including Cournot game and
Stackelberg equilibria used in this work. Moreover, several authors state that game-
theoretic models, non-cooperative and cooperative, can be used to assess market behaviour
of energy players, in a more realistic way [121]. This work aims to explore the feasibility
and value of game-theoretic tools in the energy systems context and in particular relevance
to grid capacity investment.
Van der Weijde et al. (2012) developed a two-stage bi-level optimisation model to
evaluate network expansion and grid reinforcement, in the UK. At the first stage, a line
investor decides on the transmission investment. Subsequently, the market response from
energy producers is observed, which accounts for risks at a technological, economical or
regulatory level. At the second stage the transmission investment is optimised according to
the anticipated market response. Decisions taken in the second-stage are subject to first-
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stage decisions. The model developed in [249] considers uncertainty and leads to lower
cost decisions than the ones taken under deterministic methods. Baringo and Conejo (2012)
claimed that stochastic mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) are
suitable for analysing wind generation and transmission investments [21]. Moreover, the
authors stated that small subsidies can potentially boost wind power investment. Chamorro
et al. (2012) developed a multivariate stochastic model and optimisation techniques that
can be used from utility companies or private investors to evaluate potential benefits of
network upgrades. The model developed captured uncertainties in the supply and demand
side [42].
The relation of grid investment to generation capacity is examined by Maurovich-
Horvat et al. (2015) in [157] through a bi-level model in which the line investor decides
the transmission capacity in the first level, followed by the investment decisions of the
producers at a second level. The model developed is stochastic and able to capture the wind
variability. Cournot equilibria and perfect competition market design are both examined
in the paper. The work used Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints
(MPEC) to solve power flows, but curtailment strategies were not considered in the work.
Other authors have formulated more complex models that are harder to solve, where
decisions are taken in three levels. At the first level, the TSO decides the network upgrade
investment with the objective to maximise social welfare. At a second level, self-interested
producers decide on their generation capacity, while market clearing is achieved at the
third level [221, 222]. Grid expansion at a national level was studied by Huppmann et al.
in [104], as a three-stage hierarchical Nash game.
Many works have focused on network expansion planning techniques that incorporate
multi-objective optimisation, such as in [81, 234] with special focus on distribution network
expansion. Arabali et al. (2014) [15] considered complex optimisation criteria that
combined consideration of investment and congestion costs, and the system’s reliability.
Akbari et al. [3] provided a stochastic short-term transmission planning model based
in Monte Carlo simulations, while Zeng et al. (2016) [270] considered a multi-level
optimisation approach for active distribution system planning with renewable energy
harvesting, taking into consideration grid reinforcement and operational constraints. In [80,
122], the authors studied distributed generation expansion planning with game theory and
probabilistic modelling with strategic interactions, respectively. Other works considered
an integrated model for both generation and transmission capacity [21, 95]. Motamedi et
al. (2010) [169] studied how generation capacity decisions may impact on transmission
planning. They used agent-based modelling to study energy producers’ behaviour with
respect to transmission investment decisions.
Traditionally, grid infrastructure investment is assessed by evaluation of the social
impact. Sauma and Oren (2006) recommended equilibrium models for the assessment of
the economic impact, taking into account competitive interactions between producers in
oligopolistic electricity markets that might emerge. Subsequent decisions on generation
capacity investments are highly influenced by transmission capacity projects and congestion
management protocols or curtailment mechanisms [221]. Game theory techniques for
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distribution network tariffs determination were discussed in [186] with the objective of
maximising social welfare.
Several works have discussed private investment in the field of grid infrastructure.
Contreras et al. (2009) [115] introduced an incentive scheme based on the Shapley value
to encourage private transmission investment. Maurovich-Horvat et al. (2015) [157]
compared two alternate market structures for grid upgrades (either by system operators,
such as the TSO, or private investors) and showed that they can lead to different optimal
results. The authors found that social welfare is maximised under the TSO, since the
private investor has a self-interest of withholding capacity to increase congestion rents.
Moreover, this implies that the generation capacity is lower in the private investor case
than in the TSO case. Perrault and Boutilier (2014) used cooperative game theory and
coalition formation to coordinate privately developed grid infrastructure investments with
the aim to reduce inefficiencies and transmission losses. Their findings point out there is a
risk of decreasing efficiency due to transmission losses, if grid infrastructure investment
is not controlled by the regulator or DNO, but performed by private investors [193]. The
main focus of their work was the group formation and its results in configurations of
multiple-location settings, not the effects of line access and curtailment rules, which form
the scope of this thesis.
Moreover, in the above works, curtailment strategies and line access rules were not
considered, albeit several works considered transmission congestion management protocols.
An early study by Fang and David (1999) analysed transmission congestion management
techniques for independent system operators in electricity markets [77]. Singh et al. (1998)
analysed transmission costs in congested areas of the grid and in two model scenarios,
a pool model based on nodal pricing and a bilateral model based on a game-theoretic
analysis [230]. Other works consider transmission planning or expansion at congested
areas of the power network. Joskow and Tirole (2000) analysed a two-node network market
behaviour for settings of players with different market power and allocation of transmission
rights [119]. The work analysed market behaviour and equilibrium prices in congested
areas of the network. The work presented in this thesis estimates optimal transmission,
generation and storage capacity investment decisions, as opposed to price decisions, at
network areas where curtailment is large. Gu et al. (2017) developed a methodology
for designing dynamic tariffs, imposed to generators participating in demand response
schemes, that considered network costs, computed as a trade-off between congestion and
investment costs [92].
The following section discusses research works that apply game-theoretic modelling in
other key areas of energy systems or the power sector.
2.7 Game-theoretic applications in energy systems
In recent years several researchers have begun to show the benefits of game-theoretic,
multi-agent modelling and artificial intelligence (AI) techniques applied to power markets,
including for studies of distributed or intermittent RES integration. One such prominent
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example in the multi-agent and AI community is the Power Trading Agent Competition,
also known as PowerTac [129]. PowerTac aims to explore and simulate strategic behaviour
of trading agents in real-time electricity trading markets. Game-theoretic models have
been utilised across a wide spectrum related to energy systems and markets, such as
the application of demand-side management [131, 141, 150, 267], virtual power plants
(VPPs) [210, 211, 231, 251] and cost-sharing in electricity purchasing [194].
In the demand response domain, Kota et al. (2012) suggested the formation of con-
sumer coalitions for demand side management using multi-agent mechanisms [131]. Li
et al. (2015) used a supply function bidding method to distribute demand response ac-
cording to the power system’s needs in competitive and oligopolistic markets [141]. The
method developed, took into account the supply uncertainties coming from the increasing
number of renewable generators. Allocation of demand side management requirements to
multiple consumers at minimum consumer utility loss was investigated in [267]. Ma et al.
(2016) proposed a mechanism design policy that rewarded reliability in demand response
schemes [150]. The work focused on uniform-price mechanisms and formulations of
Bertrand and Cournot market competition. The article showed that the proposed method-
ology achieved best results with regards to social optimality for a competitive market
structure. Castillo-Cagigal et al. (2018) developed an agent-based coordination algorithm
for demand side management in electricity grids with distributed energy resources [38].
Both cooperative [271] and non-cooperative [238] game-theoretic models were used
for the purpose of market clearing of deregulated electricity markets or to model operation
of microgrids [198]. Wu et al. (2016) [264] discussed coalition formation and profit
allocation of RES generators within a distributed energy network with controllable demand.
Min et al. (2013) [168] followed an approach based on the Nash equilibrium concept to
model generators’ strategies.
Cooperative game theory was utilised in [211], where several distributed generators join
coalitions in order to obtain similar characteristics to conventional generators, similarly
to the operation of VPPs, such as enhanced predictability that facilitated the system
supply schedule. Coalitional game theory was used for efficient tariff design in [212].
Robu et al. (2014) developed an efficient model of buyer groups using prediction-of-use
electricity tariffs. The model managed to increase the predictability of consumer aggregate
consumptions, and simultaneously encouraged consumers to abide to their predicted
consumption patterns.
Pricing and cost-sharing of electricity group buyers in smart grids were investigated
in [194]. Tools from cooperative game theory, such as the fairness metric of the Shapley
value [214] were utilised to achieve fair cost-sharing and facilitate coordination.
Finally, these models can also be used in designing novel funding schemes for renew-
able projects. For example, Zheng et al. (2015) developed a novel sequential game-theoretic
model for RES investment through crowdfunding [273]. The market participants involved
an electricity supplier, the RES project owner and the crowdfunders. It was concluded
that this innovative scheme can increase renewable energy penetration levels and reduce
electricity costs. Investment in transmission/distribution assets however was not in the
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scope of the work. In an similar fashion, Zhu et al. (2017) suggested a crowdfunding
scheme for the development of EV charging infrastructure [276].
The following sections are dedicated to discussion of enabling technologies that could
mitigate renewable energy curtailment and achieve better integration of renewables. A
promising solution in this context is energy storage.
2.8 Energy storage
Multiple sources identify Energy Storage Systems (ESS) as a key factor and integral
part of the agenda for low-carbon transition and sustainable future energy systems [100].
According to the US Sandia National Laboratories, up to date over 187 GW of energy
storage capacity has been deployed at a global level [220]. The largest contribution is by far
Pumped Hydro Energy Storage (PHES) accounting for over 96% of the total global storage
capacity installed. However, it is increasingly being reported that electrochemical storage
deployments have also risen in recent years and have reached approximately 3.3 GW of
installed capacity worldwide. Only in the US, by the end of 2017 approximately 708 MW
of large-scale batteries were connected to electricity grids [67]. A timely analysis on the
development of energy storage in the US predicted that annual energy storage deployments
will surpass 4.5 GW by 2024 and will reach a market value of $4.8 billion [263]. The
potential for energy storage, according to a study by McKinsey could exceed 1 TW
in the next 20 years [50]. In the UK, planning applications for energy storage projects
exceeded 6.8 GW in 2018, an unprecedented rise from only 2 MW contracted in 2012 [207].
According to the same source, more than 4.8 GW of battery energy storage has planning
consent and will be added to 3.3 GW of storage capacity already installed.
EES are diverse and each technology type has varying technical characteristics. EES
can store energy across different geographical and time scales. Arguably, the most impor-
tant technical characteristics of energy storage are the power capacity, energy capacity and
the rate at which energy and power can be stored in the system and extracted from [140].
Other technical features may be equally important depending on the use case and appli-
cation intended for storage, such as its useful lifetime, round-trip efficiency, response
speed, ramping rate, weight-to-energy ratio, availability of materials, scalability, safety
and reliability. Evaluation and apprehension of different technical characteristics and their
implications are key factors in the identification of most suitable technology types and
their potential applications. Moreover, ESS applications need to be beneficial and prof-
itable, hence the actual cost of storage represents a key factor determining ESS investment
decisions.
Well-known energy storage technology types for grid applications are Pumped Hydro
Energy Storage (PHES) and Compressed Air Energy Storage (CAES). Both technologies
are large scale and suitable for seasonal storage of energy. PHES represents the largest
category in storage capacity worldwide and is a mature technology that has been around
for over a century. Typically, PHES is used for load balancing. When energy demand is
low, energy surplus is used to pump water uphill into a higher elevation reservoir, while
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at times of peak demand, water is released and used to generate power through hydro
turbines. With PHES, energy is stored in the form of potential energy. PHES schemes
can be cost-effective, especially when natural reservoirs and elevation differences can be
exploited. However, there are geographical limitations on suitable locations for PHES
deployment and concerns about the environmental impact of such projects. CAES follows
a similar operating principle by storing low-price electricity or RES generation surplus in
caverns in the form of compressed air. CAES projects are limited however, with only three
projects currently being operational [220]. Similarly to PHES, cost-efficiency can only
be achieved in favourable geographical locations. For example, a study by Locatelli et al.
(2015) found that unsubsidised PHES and CAES are not cost-effective in the UK [144].
A different approach is Power to Gas (P2G) i.e. storing energy in the form of hydrogen
or methane. P2G is a promising solution especially in countries with already established
gas networks, like the UK, but the technology is still at a demonstration level. A detailed
recent review on large-scale storage and technology types can be found in [28].
Other systems store energy in the form of electrochemical storage, such as in Battery
Energy Storage Systems (BESS), like Lead-acid, Lithium-ion and flow (redox) batteries.
BESS are widely considered as a potential solution for further improvement on RES
integration, power system reliability and grid flexibility. Electrochemical storage represents
a category of storage with great diversity. Lead-acid batteries are one of the most mature
battery technologies, however they have a poor performance with respect to their expected
lifetime leading to large life-cycle costs. Lithium-ion batteries outperform lead-acid
batteries with respect to their expected cycle life. Moreover, Lithium-ion batteries have
high energy density, fast response capability, high round-trip efficiency, low self-discharge
rate and high weight-to-energy ratio. The latter is one of the main reasons for adoption
of Lithium-ion batteries for electric mobility applications, which has led to significant
cost reduction in the recent years in the range of $200 per /kWh of capacity installed.
Numerous sources predict further reductions of the cost in the following years. A survey
by Bloomberg, for instance, predicted an average Lithium-ion battery pack to cost around
$94/kWh by 2024 and $62/kWh by 2030 [31]. However, additional cost reduction
is required for further adoption of energy storage in power and energy applications,
especially for reaching full decarbonisation. A recent study [277] found that energy
storage costs need to reduce to $20/ kWh to be competitive and enable energy systems that
rely 100% on renewable generation. A promising technology for grid storage applications,
still at demonstration phase, is flow batteries, such as vanadium redox flow batteries.
Flow batteries have good life cycle performance, which does not depend on the depth of
discharge. Moreover, energy and power in flow batteries are decoupled [140]. On the other
hand, they require more complex and sophisticated control mechanisms for operation and
currently experience high costs. A detailed review on energy storage and batteries can be
found in [79].
In recent years, there has been a growth in interest of battery technologies for grid
operation. Historically, high costs have limited the extensive use of battery storage devices
for such applications, however different factors such as financial incentives, technology
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advances and economy of scale expected by the growth of electric vehicles (EVs), are
anticipated to be game-changing. Battery energy systems are a key pillar of smart grid
applications. Compared to other storage solutions, battery devices provide several advan-
tages such as high efficiency, fast response time, ability to scale and have no geographical
limitations. The potential for batteries and energy storage systems expands in multiple use
cases and applications and the value added to energy systems has ever been increasing in
line with increasing adoption of variable and intermittent RES generation [120].
Promising use cases and applications highlight the importance of storage for integration
of renewable generators in current and future energy systems [55]. ESS can mitigate some
of the challenges faced due to the stochastic nature of renewable generation, such as
to prevent voltage violations, match demand to supply and provide ancillary services
that enhance power quality and reliability. ESS can provide load support in cases of
power system contingencies or sudden increase of the energy demanded, playing the
role of reserve power plants. Moreover, battery storage can reduce transmission and
distribution losses [176]. Utilisation of storage devices can lead to network upgrade
deferral, enhanced utilisation of distribution assets and lower power supply costs [96].
Energy storage applications vary from power quality applications, grid services, regulation,
frequency response, voltage control [161], black start service provision and can also be
sued for investment deferral or voltage excursion support at distribution level. An ever
increasing challenge that network operators face are voltage excursions caused in residential
distribution feeders that can cause thermal wear of grid assets especially in sunny/windy
periods with insufficient local demand. For instance, the generation from PV arrays is at its
highest point at noon, when household consumption is low. Usually, the peak residential
demand is observed in the early evening, leading to a mismatch between generation and
demand that can lead to voltage excursions and undesirable reverse power flows [256].
Fluctuating power output from PV generators can be mitigated by small storage capacity
placed locally. In fact, the installation of distributed energy storage in the low-voltage
(LV) part of the network may be cost-effective, especially when PV penetration is high,
operation is close to the technical rating limits or in the case of unbalanced loads [25].
Additionally, batteries can be placed to support heavily loaded distribution feeders, by
reducing the peak demand of the distribution transformer and thus improving the useful
lifetime of distribution network assets [205]. Battery storage can be placed in several grid
locations at feeders or substations, at medium-voltage (MV) [106] or LV level [25].
Battery storage systems can also mitigate transmission congestion. Several research
works have considered battery storage systems in transmission expansion planning [1,
36]. Placing a storage system at congested areas of the grid can extend the lifetime
of transmission assets that operate close to their operational limits and enhance their
remaining useful lifetime. Transmission congestion relief can be achieved with ESS at a
much lower investment cost than investing in additional transmission capacity [140].
In addition, energy storage systems and batteries can be utilised to minimise undesired
curtailment. Vargas et al. (2014) combined wind power projects with energy storage
systems to achieve mitigation of curtailment in transmission congestion management
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systems and dispatching decisions [250]. By adopting a similar operating principle as an
energy arbitrage application, curtailment can be reduced. Energy arbitrage aims to charge
storage devices when prices are low (typically this occurs when demand is low or RES
generation is abundant) and export back to the grid when prices are high (typically at
peak energy demand times). Similarly, batteries can be used to store RES energy surplus
that would otherwise be curtailed. Crucially, the economic viability of such endeavours
depends on the cost of storage, but also on the ability to generate sufficient revenue, such
as the price of energy obtained when energy is exported to the grid. This application is of
particular interest for this study and an analysis of the topic is presented in Chapter 7.
Detailed reviews on battery and energy storage systems and their applications can be
found in [78, 148]. Key applications for BESS and their positioning with regards to system
ratings and time scale are shown in Fig. 2.3, according to a study performed by the Electric
Power Research Institute (EPRI). The classification highlights not only the importance of
the size of storage capacity, but also the response time a storage system can deliver its rated
power. The latter may vary from a few seconds for supercapacitors or superconducting
magnetic energy storage to several hours, weeks or months for PHES and CAES.
Comparison across different types of technology is difficult as storage systems may
differ significantly in their technical characteristics and operational conditions. A common
approach to deal with these difficulties has been to compare storage profitability for
particular applications. Different technologies are compared in the literature by utilising a
parameter called Levelised Cost of Storage (LCOS) or life cycle cost i.e. the discounted
cost of electricity per unit of discharged electricity. LCOS represents the real cost of
storage per energy discharged or delivered by the energy system throughout its lifetime.
Zakeri et al. (2015) presented a review on electrical energy storage systems and their
comparison on life cycle costs [269]. Other comparative studies on energy storage costs
can be found in [112, 138].
Cost of storage including LCOS depend highly on the expected lifetime and battery
degradation mechanisms. BEES experience reduced capacity with operation, due to
‘cell ageing’ and irreversible chemical reactions taking place during charging/discharging.
Complex factors affect the Remaining Useful Lifetime (RUL) of batteries such as the depth
of discharge and the ambient temperature during operation. Prediction of RUL of batteries
is possible by Physics of Failure models and increasingly by utilisation of data analytics
and machine learning techniques. Unlike model-based approach, data-driven approach
does not rely on the physical modelling of cell degradation. It uses historical data and
battery metrics (such as current, voltage, battery and ambient temperature) to derive a non-
parametric model and develop trends that can predict future asset behaviour [14]. Research
works use machine learning methods for asset health management of batteries, can be found
in [44, 177, 229]. In [14, 241] the RUL of Lithium-ion batteries was predicted by using a
machine learning technique, based on relevance vector machine (RVM). The data used for
the analysis was open-source, life cycle test data from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) battery repository. Results showed the proposed algorithm is able
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Fig. 2.3 Positioning of battery energy system technologies and their applications in relation
to their capacity and duration of rated power discharging according to EPRI [204]
to generate sufficiently accurate prediction results within 10 cycles of the actual RUL at
the inspection starting points and within 8.5% relative error [14].
Significant technological advancements and cost reduction have led independent storage
providers to invest in energy storage applications. The ownership of storage assets may
be different in each country depending on the regulatory framework. Storage systems
can be owned by utility companies or independent storage providers, who can either have
direct access and trade in the wholesale energy, capacity, balancing and ancillary services
markets or have a contractual agreement with a utility company or a third-party company
to whom they provide their services. However, network operators are mostly interested in
the services that energy storage providers can offer, such as the energy or reserve capacity
provided. Therefore, it is possible, in the context of the deregulated energy market for
independent and private storage providers to offer services such as peak shaving, load
levelling, frequency and voltage control. Ownership of BESS is in fact crucial as it may
inhibit healthy competition in the marketplace. OFGEM, the UK regulator, is planning to
take action in order to discourage ownership or operation of storage systems as flexibility
assets, by utility companies. Flexibility services may also be procured by aggregators
emerging in the marketplace that operate a portfolio of multiple smaller-scale storage
technologies that act as a single virtual storage provider. Advanced artificial intelligence
algorithms, data analytics and machine learning techniques are increasingly playing an
important role in managing distributed storage devices in such settings.
The UK has an abundance of independent storage providers, however the business case
for optimal storage ownership requires further exploration as the added value and benefits
of storage span to the wider range of energy system stakeholders, including consumers,
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DNOs and the system regulator. Another trend observed in the UK is the proliferation
of Community Energy Storage (CES), mainly placed at the distribution level. CES is a
good example of grid-connected, utility-owned or community-owned distributed storage
system. Distributed storage systems are modular storage systems that are located at or near
end-user homes and businesses.
ESS are expected to be a key enabler for sustainable energy systems. Recent pub-
lications in the literature also report the use of another novel enabling technology, the
blockchain used to facilitate local energy marketplaces that could lead to renewable energy
curtailment reduction and further RES integration. The potential of the technology is
discussed in the succeeding section.
2.9 Blockchain technology for RES integration
A potential solution for curtailment mitigation recently reported in the literature, is the
development of local energy markets in constrained areas of the grid that aim to alter
consumer behaviours in order to match demand to locally produced RES supply and
minimise curtailment. The practical implementation of local energy markets is being
supported by the advent of novel technologies such as distributed ledger or blockchain
technologies. A recent example is the ‘Cornwall Local Energy Market’, a £19m project
developed by Centrica, that aims to create a virtual marketplace and trading platform for
energy and flexibility services, including participation in the wholesale energy market [40].
The local marketplace aims to minimise renewable curtailment in the area, caused primarily
by a large number of roof-top PVs connected and saturated grid capacity.
Blockchain is a key factor contributing towards smarter energy management, however
blockchain technology is new and its full potential is not yet realised. Hence, an in-depth
discussion on the benefits that blockchain could bring in energy applications along with
technology limitations and barriers is required. This was achieved in a recent publication
by the author of this thesis that thoroughly discussed fundamental principles of blockchain
technology and identified promising use cases and applications for the energy sector.
Moreover, the study provided a systematic review of 140 research and pilot projects
testing the real potential of the technology [10]. The paper took a broader view on the
technology’s potential and showcased great diversity in potential applications that ranged
from decentralised energy trading to Internet of Things (IoT) applications and deployment
of EV charging infrastructure. A brief summary of the paper is presented here with focus
on applications that could reduce RES curtailment, such as smart local marketplaces and
peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading.
2.9.1 Potential of blockchain technology
Blockchain or distributed ledgers are an emerging technology that has drawn considerable
interest from numerous sources, such as energy supply firms, startups, technology devel-
opers, financial institutions, national governments and the academic community. Several
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Fig. 2.4 Visual representation of a blockchain transaction: users agree on a transaction
which is included in a block, its validity is confirmed by distributed nodes of the network
and the block is added to the growing chain of blocks before transaction is confirmed and
payments finalised.
studies coming from these backgrounds identify blockchains as having the potential to
bring significant benefits and innovation.
Blockchains are shared and distributed data structures or ledgers that can securely
store digital transactions without using a central point of authority. More importantly,
blockchains allow for the automated execution of smart contracts in peer-to-peer (P2P)
networks [239]. They can alternatively be seen as databases that permit multiple users to
make changes in the ledger simultaneously, which can result in multiple chain versions.
Instead of managing the ledger by a single trusted centre, each individual network member
holds a copy of the records’ chain. Agreement on the valid state of the ledger is reached
with consensus. The exact methodology of how consensus is reached is an ongoing area of
research and might differ to suit a wide range of application domains. New transactions are
linked to previous transactions by cryptography, which makes blockchain networks resilient
and secure (see Fig. 2.4). Every network user can check for themselves if transactions are
valid, which provides transparency and trustable, tamper-proof records.
Blockchain technology is primarily known from cryptocurrency applications. While
opinions on the long-term future of cryptocurrencies may be divided, several promising
applications are being reported in the literature. A report by the UK Government [257]
states that blockchains might have the capacity to ‘reform our financial markets, supply
chains, consumer and business-to-business services, and publicly-held registers’. Potential
applications spread from asset registries and transfer of ownership of hard assets [239] to
secure recording of intangible assets. Swan (2015) [239] envisions these assets as any type
of information, reputation or online voting systems. Research works from the financial sec-
tor discuss blockchain applications in the banking sector and state that blockchain-enabled
platforms can facilitate financial transactions between different financial institutions and
make payments faster by speeding up confirmation times [93]. Other applications may
improve transparency in supply chain records with certification of manufactured products
or diamond certification [145]. In fact, the variety of applications proposed is such that Tap-
scott and Tapscott (2016) [242] compare blockchains to the advent of the Internet and state
they could prove to be a technological breakthrough, bringing about significant process
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optimisation and novel business models. The potential lies on the fact that blockchain or
distributed ledger technologies (DLT) can redefine digital trust and can remove intermedi-
aries forming a new paradigm of management that can potentially disrupt traditional forms
of governance [130]. The disruptive nature lies on the potential of replacing top-down
control with consensus and also in the underlying philosophy of distributed consensus,
open source, transparency and community-based decision-making [257]. According to the
research institute of the Finnish economy (2016) [155], these characteristics could instigate
further societal changes and implications. According to a recent Gartner report [85],
blockchain technologies have already surpassed the peak of inflated expectations in the
hype cycle and are predicted to be 2-5 years from mainstream adoption.
Along with use cases in various sectors, the potential of blockchains in the energy
industry has just started to be realised as shown by the increasing number of startups, pilots,
trials and research projects. A survey of the German Energy Agency [34] on the views of
energy decision-makers shows that nearly 20% believe that blockchain technology is a
game-changer for energy suppliers. The survey was based on the views of 70 executives
working in the energy sector including utility companies, energy suppliers, network opera-
tors, generators and aggregators. More than half of survey participants plan or have already
undertaken initiatives for blockchain innovation. Several energy utility companies have
taken interest in exploring the potential benefits of distributed ledger technologies (DLT),
as an enabling technology for low-carbon transition and sustainability [156]. Moreover,
according to senior consultancy and commercial reports by Deloitte [90] and PWC [201],
blockchains have the potential of radically disrupting energy related products and com-
modities, as they become digital assets that can be traded interoperably.
Early research initiatives and startups indicate that blockchain technology could poten-
tially provide solutions to some of the challenges faced by the energy industry. Require-
ments for future energy systems can be summarised by three key principles: decarbonisa-
tion, decentralisation and digitalisation, with a shift to empower consumers, a pillar for
both EU [64] and UK policy [178]. However, the current structure of energy and electricity
markets is inadequate to achieving this vision, as small players’ participation in the markets
is practically excluded and incentives for active consumer participation have so far proved
not sufficient. Early blockchain developers are establishing transactional digital platforms
that can be completely decentralised and can enable P2P energy trading. They are devel-
oping local energy marketplaces and Internet of Things (IoT) applications that can play a
significant role in the vision of the smart grid [72, 248]. According to PWC [201], energy
firms are increasingly reporting higher energy costs and lower revenues. At the same time
utilities face demands for increasing transparency by the regulatory authorities [46]. As
a result, any possibility of cost savings and efficiency improvement in the operation of
energy systems and markets can prove significant and is worth investigating.
Moreover, potential gains in transparency and competition could benefit other key
policy targets related to energy affordability and fuel poverty [101]. According to a
UK government report by the Competition and Markets Authority [46], poorly designed
tariff prices and lack of mobility in the marketplace have led electricity consumers to
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Fig. 2.5 Centralised and distributed transactional platforms: a single trusted authority
manages the ledger as opposed to every member holding a copy of the ledger
pay £1.4 billion on average a year in excessive prices for the period 2012-2015. We
note that UK retail electricity prices have increased in recent years irrespectively of
wholesale electricity prices [35], indicating that there is significant room for improvement.
A commercial report by Deloitte [90] states that blockchain-enabled transactional digital
platforms could offer operational cost reductions, increased efficiency, fast and automated
processes, transparency and the possibility of reducing capital requirements for energy
firms. Cost savings potential is not restricted to utilities and can be relevant to energy
consumers and prosumers [9], who are facing increasing energy prices and removal of
RES incentives, respectively. Solutions promised by blockchains, such as P2P trading in
local or consumer-centric marketplaces [196] could potentially lead to cost savings for
energy consumers.
A substantial amount of current knowledge on blockchains comes not only from tradi-
tional academic sources, such as journals and conference proceedings, but forums, blogs,
wikis, white papers and industrial reports. Therefore, an overview of the fundamental prin-
ciples of blockchain technology is required to determine critical technical characteristics
of blockchain systems. The following section distills key information from these sources,
to provide the reader with an in-depth understanding of the broad blockchain topic before
moving into energy use cases.
2.9.2 Definition and overview of fundamental principles
A blockchain is a digital data structure, a shared and distributed database that contains
a continuously expanding log of transactions and their chronological order. The data
structure is in other words a ledger that may contain digital transactions, data records and
executables. Transactions are aggregated into larger formations, called blocks, which are
time-stamped and cryptographically linked to previous blocks forming a chain of records
that determines the sequencing order of events or the ‘blockchain’.
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Blockchains run on digital networks. Data transmission in such networks is equivalent
to copying data from one place to the other, e.g. in the cryptocurrency domain this is
equivalent to copying digital coins from one user’s electronic wallet to another’s. The
principal challenge in digital networks resides in the fact that the system needs to ensure
that there is no double-spending. A traditional solution is to use a central point of authority,
such as a central bank, who acts as the trusted intermediary between transacting parties
and whose job is to store and safeguard the valid state of the ledger and to keep the
records up to date. If multiple parties need to write in the ledger at the same time, a
central authority also implements concurrency control and consolidates changes in the
ledger. In several occasions, central management may not be feasible or desirable, as it
introduces intermediary costs and requires network users to trust a third party to operate the
system [156]. Centralised systems also have significant disadvantages due to a single point
of failure, which renders them more vulnerable to both technical failures and malicious
attacks [16].
The primary purpose of blockchain technologies is to remove the need for such interme-
diaries and replace them with a distributed network of digital users who work in partnership
to verify transactions and safeguard the integrity of the ledger. Contrary to centralised
systems, every member of the blockchain network holds their own copy of the ledger or can
access it in the open cloud (see also Fig. 2.5). As a result, anyone in the network can have
access to the historic log of the system transactions and verify their validity, enabling a high
level of transparency. If central management is removed, the challenge resides in finding
an efficient way to consolidate and synchronise multiple copies of the ledger. The exact
process of validation and ledger consolidation varies for different types of blockchains,
but in principle, network members compare their versions of the ledger through a process
intuitively akin to distributed voting [155], through which consensus on the valid state of
the ledger is reached. These validation mechanisms are known as distributed consensus
algorithms. Collaboration and honest behaviour of distributed nodes is established by
game-theoretic incentives or rewards [18]. In fact, it can be very difficult to tamper with
blockchains, without a significant part of the network colluding. Consequently, blockchain
systems can be secure and tamper-resistant.
Other elements that ensure enhanced security are hash functions and public-key cryp-
tography. Cryptographic hash functions are mathematical algorithms or one-way functions
that take an input and transform it into an output of specific length, e.g. a series of 256
bits, called the hash output. Their operation relies on the fact that it is extremely difficult
to recreate the original input data from the hash output alone (collision resistance). In addi-
tion, blockchains use public-key cryptography [58], an asymmetric cryptography protocol.
Each user holds two cryptographic keys consisting of numeric or alphanumeric characters,
a secret private key and a public key, which can be shared with other users in the network.
The keys are mathematically related in such a way that information encrypted by one
part can only be decrypted by its counterpart. The use of public-private key cryptography
ensures authentication, meaning that a transaction is initiated by the source it claims to be
from, and authorisation, meaning that actions are performed by users who have the right
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Fig. 2.6 An example of a hash function output for similar original messages
Fig. 2.7 An illustration of the operation of public-key cryptography
to do so. For example, the network can verify the sender’s identity, as only the sender’s
public key can decrypt the original message (encrypted and digitally signed by the sender’s
private key). A message processed with one’s public key can only be decrypted by the
intended recipient holding the secret private key. These and other standard communication
features such as data validity and security are achieved in blockchain systems by use of
P2P communication and advanced cryptographic techniques.
According to the UK Government Office for Science [257], the real potential of
blockchain technologies can be fully realised only when combined with smart contracts,
i.e. user-defined programs that determine the rules of writing in the ledger. Smart contracts
are executable programs that make changes in the ledger and can be triggered automatically
if a certain condition is met, such as if an agreement between the transacting parties
is honoured [239]. Contract terms are recorded in computer language encoding legal
constraints and terms of agreement. Smart contracts are self-enforceable and tamper-proof
bringing about significant benefits such as removing any intermediaries [90] and reducing
transacting, contracting, enforcement and compliance costs [257]. An additional benefit
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Fig. 2.8 An illustration of a smart contract in a blockchain system
is that low-value transactions can be made cost-efficient, while blockchains can ensure
interoperability between transaction systems [93].
Blockchain systems can be classified into different taxonomies according to information
access and other criteria. The classification determines at large key properties of blockchain
systems. Different system architectures and classifications for blockchain systems are
presented in the following section.
2.9.3 Taxonomies of blockchain architectures
A blockchain network or system can follow different rules and system architectures
depending on desired operation and specific use case. Blockchain systems typically consist
of network users and validators. User nodes can initiate or receive transactions and hold
a copy of the ledger. In addition to read access privileges, validators are responsible for
approving modifications of the ledger and reaching consensus throughout the network
regarding the valid state of the ledger. Depending on the system configuration, partial or
universal access rights and validations rights may apply. All Internet users can join a public
blockchain system. On the contrary, with private blockchains the access is restricted only to
authorised participants. Permissionless ledgers are completely distributed and censorship-
resistant as any member of the network can contribute to the validation of transactions. In
contrast, with permissioned ledgers only certain validator nodes hold write access rights to
modify the blockchain (see Fig. 2.9). With public and permissionless ledgers, users and
validators are completely unknown to each other, therefore the collaborative effort and
trust required for ledger management is induced by game-theoretic equilibria and rewards.
The structure of incentives typically involves spending resources such as computational
work, electricity or penalisation that aims to deter selfish behaviour [155]. With private
and permissioned ledgers the users’ identity is known similarly to know-your-customer
practices. Validator nodes are known and trusted to behave honestly, therefore artificial
incentives are not required to guarantee the system’s operation. Consequently, private and
2.9 Blockchain technology for RES integration 51
User node Validator node
Fig. 2.9 Classification of blockchain architectures, public permissionless ledgers (any user
can have join the network and validation process) and private permissioned ledgers (where
network access and validation process is restricted to authorised nodes) - figure based
on [83]
permissioned ledgers can be faster, more flexible and efficient, however, this comes at
the expense of immutability and censorship-resistance [155]. In addition, some ledger
architectures can be classified as consortium blockchains, i.e. hybrids that stand between
public and private blockchains [274].
Blockchains can also be classified according to their development purpose, i.e. in gen-
eral purpose or specific purpose blockchains. Typical examples are Ethereum, designed to
accommodate a wide range of use cases and applications, and Bitcoin, designed specifically
for cryptocurrency transactions, respectively. In terms of governance and protocol rules of
the system operation, blockchains can be classified as open-source or closed-source. Open-
source architectures are open to all network members and can benefit from continuous and
transparent peer review, public debate and community decision-making. Closed-source
blockchains operate similarly to private enterprises, where any changes in the rules of the
system operation are decided in private. It is important to understand that one blockchain
solution architecture does not fit all applications and use cases, therefore hybrid approaches
that lay anywhere in the spectrum between public and private blockchains and have vari-
ous degrees of centralisation can be explored. The resulting system architecture and the
consensus algorithm applied in the system environment are jointly responsible for key
performance features, such as speed, scalability and efficiency of the resources spent. A
review on different consensus algorithms is presented in the following section.
2.9.4 Distributed consensus algorithms
Existing literature describes many types of distributed consensus algorithms developed,
each providing distinctive features, advantages and disadvantages. The method used for
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reaching consensus in blockchain networks determines to a large extent key performance
characteristics such as scalability, transaction speed, transaction finality, security and
spending of resources such as electricity. Broadly speaking, every method requires a
procedure for generating and subsequently accepting a block. A block can be generated or
proposed by some node in the network, and it encodes a number of transactions (e.g. in a
cryptocurrency system, these are monetary transactions between different accounts). Next,
a key step is for the proposed block/corresponding transactions to be accepted by network
members, a process called reaching consensus. Once a block is accepted, it becomes part
of the blockchain, and newly generated blocks are cryptographically linked to it. After
a time (depending on the algorithm used), the block becomes a permanent part of the
blockchain, i.e. it reaches finality. Note that finality does not exclude the existence of small
statistical chance that the block is reversed, as part of a future fork, occurring by design or
as a result of an attack. The chance of reversal decreases with new appended blocks.
Reaching consensus on which blocks/transactions to accept as valid in a distributed
system is challenging. Consensus algorithms have to be resilient to failures of nodes, mes-
sage delays and corrupt messages, as well as unreliable, unresponsive or even deliberately
malicious nodes [19]. A large number of approaches for the consensus problem have been
proposed. Some authors [69, 105] broadly classify these as lottery-based and voting-based
(although note that some of the more complex consensus approaches have elements that fit
into both categories). The most important examples of distributed consensus algorithms
used in blockchain systems are presented below1:
• Proof of Work (PoW)
In PoW systems, the algorithm rewards participants who solve cryptographic puz-
zles in order to validate transactions and create new blocks. Validators or miners
compete with each other to add a new block in the existing blockchain by solving
a cryptographical puzzle of generating a hash output that starts with a number of
consecutive zeros in the most significant positions. The method used adds a nonce,
i.e. a random number that can only be used once, to the block, and calculates the
hash output of the block header. The block header contains information such as the
hash of the previous block validated and a special hash of all transactions contained
in the block. The goal for all miners is to achieve a hash output that is lower than
a specified target. Miners have no way to predict or influence the outcome, so the
only feasible action is that of trial and error. This brute-forcing procedure requires
computational effort that increases exponentially with the number of trailing zeros.
When a correct hash output is found, the block is returned to other nodes in the
network and is accepted, if all transactions are valid and unspent, and the successful
miner takes a financial reward.
Other miners accept the newly generated block by starting work on the consecutive
block. Crucially, all succeeding blocks contain hash outputs from all preceding
blocks. As generation of hash outputs is random and performed in parallel by many
1An extensive review of distributed algorithms is presented in a recent publication by the author [10].
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miners, multiple chains may appear. In this case, the network stores all resulting
chains. Network members eventually abandon all other chains but the longest, which
is assumed to have been produced by a network majority of computational power,
and therefore is considered to represent the most valid state of the ledger. As a result,
malicious attackers are constantly outpaced by the honest part of the network, unless
they can control more than 51% of the computational power in the network. In
the case of a 51% attack, malicious nodes could potentially rewrite all history of
transactions. Breaches in security can be introduced by users, miners, hackers or
man-in-the-middle attacks (a detailed discussion of these issues is provided in [170]).
PoW is the distributed algorithm used by the most mature cryptocurrency applica-
tion, Bitcoin. At first, Bitcoin mining relied on the computing power of standard
computers, so anyone could become a miner. Since 2014 however, mining has been
dominated by specially designed computer chips, known as application specific
integrated circuits (ASICs) [266]. Miners have increasingly joined coalition pools in
order to leverage risks and maximise returns. As a result, mining power is continu-
ously becoming more centralized in cartels or ‘mining pools’. This has generated a
direction of research that uses techniques from game theory and mechanism design
to discourage centralised cartels from forming and reduce their influence on the
Bitcoin system [75].
PoW strategies have proved they can scale to a large number of users, however
transaction rates and finality may not be suitable for certain use cases [195]. Another
main criticism point is that PoW is responsible for wasting large amounts of real
resources such as electricity. For example, Ethereum’s Wiki pages claim that Bitcoin
and Ethereum burn over $1 million worth of electricity and hardware costs per day
for running their consensus mechanism [69]. Pilkington (2015) [195] cites a media
release named the Bitcurrency calculator, which shows that Bitcoin could one day
consume up to 60% of global electricity production, equivalent to 13,000 TWh ore
equivalent to powering 1.5 billion homes. Other sources report that Bitcoin could
consume as much electricity as Denmark [54] by 2020, under the assumption that a
single Bitcoin transaction can currently consume 200 kWh of electricity [153]. This
cost may not be justified for low value or low-risk transactions where users can be
trusted or there are established methods to prevent malicious behaviour [18]. To
solve these issues alternative strategies have been proposed, such as a distributed
consensus algorithm called proof of stake.
• Proof of Stake (PoS)
PoS replaces computational work with a random selection process, where the chance
of successful mining with PoS is proportionally related to the wealth of validators.
The probability of generating a block depends on what stake the nodes have invested
in the system, i.e. coin ownership [39]. This approach can potentially result to faster
blockchains [195] that have much lower electricity consumption and a decreased
likelihood of a 51% attack [69]. In addition, there is no need to constantly generate
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new coins to incentivise validation. Instead, miners rewards are down only to
transaction fees and cannot achieve greater gains by investing in hardware equipment
for mining. PoS can make use of game-theoretic mechanism design to prevent
collusions and centralisation, often penalising dishonest and malicious behaviour.
The main vulnerability of PoS systems is known as the ‘nothing at stake’ problem
or in other words that voting/claiming financial rewards for multiple chains is
inexpensive. Several solutions have been proposed such as integrating a punishment
mechanism for validators that simultaneously create blocks in multiple chains and
automatically deducting coins owned or deposited. Another strategy is to punish
validators for creating blocks on the wrong chain, intuitively similarly to PoW, where
also validators incur the cost of electricity. Validating nodes are exposed to greater
risks in the latter case, but on the other hand, these nodes are not required to be
known ahead of time [69]. PoS-based algorithms come in great variety and can be
used in public blockchains, where validators are unknown and untrustworthy, or
in private/business-oriented settings, where validators form a known set of trusted
entities [69].
• Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT)
In trusted or semi-trusted environments, voting-based algorithms such as Practical
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) can be adequate solutions. In Byzantine fault
tolerance[135], nodes transmit votes for block acceptance in a multi-round process,
at the end of which validators agree on whether to accept a block as a permanent
part of the chain (finality). However, as votes are transmitted through a potentially
unreliable network, and some of the validators may be untrustworthy, the consensus
voting process requires careful design.
When a sufficient amount of signatures is collected, transactions are considered valid
and consensus is reached. PBFT provides instant finality, as blocks that have been
globally verified cannot be reversed. However, the algorithm requires at least 2/3 of
the network to behave honestly and messages overhead may increase significantly as
the size of the network increases, affecting both speed and scalability [19]. Many
variants of BFT-based protocols have been proposed (see [254] for a detailed review)
by key developers, such as Hyperledger, the open platform supported by the Linux
Foundation [105] and Tendermint [243].
• Proof of Authority (PoAu)
Block generation with PoAu requires granting special permission to one or more
members to make changes in the blockchain. For example, one member holding a
special key may be responsible for generating all the blocks. Essentially, PoAu can
be seen as a modified PoS algorithm, where validators’ stake is their own identity.
Network members put their trust into authorised nodes and a block is accepted if the
majority of authorised nodes signs the block. Any new validators can be added to the
system via voting [71]. Although the method represents a more centralised approach,
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it is most appropriate for governing or regulatory bodies and is also proving popular
with utility companies in the energy sector. The consensus algorithm may be useful
in special use cases where security and integrity cannot be put at risk [39]. An
example is the Energy Web blockchain that can achieve confirmation time of 3-4 sec
and can scale to several thousand transactions per second [65].
Each of these methods presents trade-offs between a set of advantages/disadvantages.
Methods that rely on random selection processes scale well to large dimensions. Good
scalability means that a system performs well as it grows in scale, for example it can
handle an increased number of transactions/blocks within a reasonable time frame and
for an increased number of network users/nodes. However, these lottery-based systems
may result in multiple chains at different nodes in the network that need to be consolidated
and resolved before finality is reached. This can also affect the speed that transactions are
recorded in the blockchain. On the contrary, methods based on voting are faster to achieve
finality, but may take longer to achieve consensus for a large number of nodes in the
network, because nodes need to exchange messages with each other and voting may last for
multiple rounds until agreement is reached. This results in a trade-off between scalability
and finality/speed [105]. It is worth noting that efforts to improve scalability and speed
of transactions are ongoing by the blockchain community. Several solutions have been
proposed including sharding (requiring only a subset of nodes to verify transactions) [70],
sidechains (only transaction data are stored in the main chain) [26] and utilisation of
payment channels (blockchain acts only as a control layer) [197].
Validation and cooperation within the network often requires spending resources, such
as computational power or coins. Honest behaviour of validating nodes is assured either
by financial rewards or countermeasures that take some form of punishment. Rewards may
include direct coin assignment or receiving substantial transaction fees. Punishment may
include losing money or deposits. Either way, the incentives’ mechanism design reflects
a form of resources expenditure, which can be money, computational power, electricity,
time, etc. Minimising resources or energy spent forms a significant criteria for evaluating
blockchain performance. PoW algorithms for example are known to be energy intensive
as they spend significant amounts of energy to validate transactions. While this is a
significant concern and wastage of resources needs to be minimised, it is also crucial for
not compromising blockchain system security. In fact, the design of validating mechanisms
and incentives can determine system vulnerabilities to malicious behaviour, potential cyber-
attacks or collusion. This results in a trade-off between security and waste of resources/cost.
Some authors argue that incentives and rewards form an integral part of blockchain systems
and are required to safeguard their security and integrity [240]. Other authors state that
the essence of blockchains is purely informational and process-oriented [195] and see
blockchain solutions as a technology that achieves consensus in P2P networks [89].
In addition, distributed consensus strategies are a direct consequence of the trust
within the environment blockchain networks operate and their centralisation risks. For
example, high cost strategies may be inevitable for public trustless blockchain applications
such as Bitcoin, however they may be redundant for private blockchains operating in
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Technical features Permissioned lottery-based Permissioned voting-based Permissionless PoW
Scalability Good Moderate Good
Speed Good Good Poor
Finality Moderate Good Poor
Security Moderate Moderate Good
Sustainability Good Good Poor
Table 2.2 Summarised distributed consensus strategies and main characteristics based
on [105] and our study findings
trusted environments. Applications of blockchain systems, such as in the corporate world,
call for various requirements depending on the specific case under consideration. Several
applications require real-time or near real-time transaction clearance and low latency. Other
applications need to have good scalability. Traditional PoW approaches support open and
censorship-resistant platforms, however they are not suitable for use cases that require
immediate transaction finality or high transaction rates. On the other hand, consensus
mechanisms developed for private blockchains may become inefficient when scaled to
a large number of participants (Table 2.2 provides a summary of key characteristics). A
detailed comparison of different algorithms can also be found in [19, 39, 105, 130, 274].
In the following section, blockchain use cases for the energy sector are presented
followed by a more detailed discussion on local energy marketplaces and P2P energy
trading.
2.9.5 Notable use cases for energy applications
Energy sector decision-makers [34] and utility companies [66] have asserted that blockchains
could possibly offer solutions to key challenges that the energy industry is facing. The
German Energy Agency [34] claims that blockchain technologies have the potential to
improve the efficiency of current energy practices and processes, can accelerate the devel-
opment of IoT platforms and digital applications and can provide innovation in P2P energy
trading and decentralised generation. In addition, they report that blockchain technologies
have the potential to significantly improve current practices of energy enterprises and
utility companies by improving internal processes, customer services and costs [34].
Energy systems are undergoing a transformational change triggered by the advancement
of distributed energy resources and information & communication technologies (ICT). One
of the main challenges is the emerging decentralisation and digitalisation of the energy
system, which requires the consideration, exploration and adoption of novel paradigms
and distributed technologies. Due to their inherent nature blockchains could provide
a promising solution to control and manage increasingly decentralised complex energy
systems and microgrids [130, 162, 173]. Integrating small-scale renewables, distributed
generation, flexibility services and consumer participation in the energy market is a
demanding task. Some authors [173] argue that blockchains could provide innovative
trading platforms where prosumers and consumers can trade interchangeably their energy
surplus or flexible demand on a P2P basis. Active consumer participation can be secured
and recorded into immutable, transparent and tamper-proof smart contracts. Enabling
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such automated trading platforms could be an efficient way of delivering price signals
and information on energy costs to consumers [162], simultaneously providing them with
incentives for demand response and smart management of their energy needs. Blockchains
can enable local energy and consumer-oriented marketplaces or microgrids that aim to
support local power generation and consumption [196]. One of the major benefits from
this approach is reducing transmission losses and deferring expensive network upgrades.
On the other hand, as energy is still delivered through the physical grid, demand and supply
need to carefully be managed and controlled to comply with real technical constraints and
power system’s stability. According to a recently published report by Eurelectric [71], the
physical exchange of electricity has so far inhibited larger adoption of blockchains in the
energy sector, as opposed to applications in the finance sector. Blockchains can securely
record ownership and origins of the energy consumed or supplied. As a result, blockchain
solutions could be utilised for smart charging arrangements and sharing of resources, e.g.
community storage or microgrids, but also for applications of data storage in smart grids
and cybersecurity [172, 174]. A key challenge as volumes of RES continue to increase is
maintaining the security of supply and improving network resilience. By facilitating and
accelerating IoT applications and enabling more efficient flexibility markets, blockchains
could improve network resilience and security of supply [173]. A report by the Research
Institute of the Finnish economy [155] argues that blockchains could assure interoperability
in smart grid and IoT applications by offering open and transparent solutions. According
to Deloitte [90], energy market operations could become more transparent and efficient.
As a result, this could improve competition and facilitate consumer mobility and switching
of energy suppliers. If cost savings opportunities are realised, we could leverage the
technology to improve on fuel poverty and energy affordability issues.
By virtue of advantages offered, blockchains could potentially provide solutions across
the energy trilemma: they could reduce costs by optimising energy processes, improve
energy security in terms of cybersecurity, but also act as a supporting technology that could
improve security of supply, and finally promote sustainability by facilitating renewable
generation and low-carbon technology solutions.
To identify potential use cases for the energy sector, a systematic review across 140
research initiatives and organisations that have undertaken blockchain projects for energy
applications, was undertaken and presented in great detail in [10]. Projects were classified
according to their field activity and application type into eight categories, as shown in
Fig. 2.10. Moreover, projects were classified according to the type of distributed consensus
algorithm used, as shown in Fig. 2.11. Most of the projects used PoW, especially for
preliminary results, however this is expected to change to PoAu or PoS algorithms, as
projects move from proof of concept to real-world implementations. According to the field
of application, the most popular category was decentralised and P2P energy trading, a
potential solution for curtailment. Such schemes and market models are discussed in more
detail in the following section.
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Fig. 2.10 Blockchain use case classification according to their activity field: results derived
from a study on 140 blockchain initiatives in the energy sector being pursued by a large
number of companies, startups and research institutions
Fig. 2.11 Blockchain use cases in the energy sector according to consensus algorithm
used: results derived from a study on 140 blockchain initiatives in the energy sector being
pursued by a large number of companies, startups and research institutions
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Fig. 2.12 P2P energy trading in local microgrids and community projects
2.9.6 P2P trading and decentralised energy
P2P energy trading and local energy marketplaces represent an application domain where
blockchain-enabled systems would fit most naturally, by enabling direct energy trading
between energy consumers (energy producers/prosumers and end-consumers), who can
use this approach to take control of their generation and demand. Local energy markets and
smart energy communities could potentially achieve better matching of RES generation
to local demand and have therefore been reported in the literature as a way to tackle
curtailment. A recent example is the ‘Cornwall Local Energy Market’ that aims to create a
virtual marketplace and platform for energy trading and flexibility services provision [40].
Moreover, the trading platform aims to minimise renewable curtailment in the area.
In general, local and community energy projects and microgrids are expected to play
an increasingly important role in energy systems. According to Berka and Creamer
(2018) [27] locally-owned energy projects have a great potential to deliver socio-economic
and environmental benefits for the communities involved. In microgrids, distributed
generators, storage devices, uncontrollable and controllable loads form an interconnected
system that can operate in synchronisation to the main grid or in complete autonomy,
if operating in island-mode [152]. From a control point of view, microgrids act as a
single system that has distinctive electric boundaries with respect to the main grid [244].
In addition to the formal definition, virtual microgrids can also be considered that can
provide aggregate control of supply and demand outside electrical and physical boundaries.
Microgrids promote localised energy production and consumption, which may lead to
significant distribution and transmission losses reduction [123]. When coupled with
sustainable resources, microgrids can enhance further integration of RES [166]. Local
microgrids can improve network resilience, provide ancillary services, such as frequency
and voltage support, to aging power systems with the potential to defer expensive network
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upgrade investment. In addition, they can provide energy services to consumers in the case
of grid contingencies.
Efficient microgrid operation on a technical level, such as optimal control strategies
and system architectures, has been extensively studied [59, 97, 127, 137, 175, 187, 237].
Trading in microgrid environments at a local level has also been proposed by several
researchers that utilise autonomous agents, such as in [134], where a flexible market
for coordination of self-interested energy users, suppliers and utilities in a smart grid
framework was presented. In [255], security of supply issues and limited network capacity
were taken into account. In [29], a market mechanism allocates electricity and heat
in microgrids with Combined Heat and Power (CHP). Other autonomous marketplaces
for energy trading paradigms in the wholesale market have been developed by the AI
community, such as TADA [30] and PowerTac [129]. Local and decentralised energy
systems need to overcome significant barriers, such as accounting for a large number of
independent and self-interested actors, how to record the energy produced and consumed
at different points in the microgrid, but also the issue of coordination between multiple
sources and the central energy system so that demand and supply are balanced at all
times [130]. An additional challenge that local or community-based energy systems need
to overcome is related to social acceptance [253].
In terms of academic research, blockchains in energy markets form a new research
area that has just started to be explored. One of the first works to consider the use of
cryptocurrencies for P2P energy trading is the work by Mihaylov et al. (2104) [167].
Energy injected into the grid is transformed to a virtual currency (NRGcoins) that enables
local energy trading of prosumers. The rate at which coins are produced depends on the
supply-demand conditions on the time of injection, so that real cost of energy is reflected
in the price. Coins can be traded in exchange markets or used to buy electricity from
the grid. Akasiadis and Chalkiadakis (2016) [2] present a cryptocurrency mechanism
that is adopted to achieve demand shifting by prosumer coalitions. Local marketplaces
rely increasingly on prosumers [9] and consumer participation and engagement [196].
Energy trading for microgrids in the developing world is discussed in [227]. In this work,
solar battery units form the validating nodes of the blockchain network. The distributed
consensus algorithm considered is proof of stake. A preliminary discussion on the use
of blockchains in microgrids can also be found in [130]. Mylrea and Gupta (2017) [173]
focus on technical characteristics (security, scalability and speed) of blockchains for
distributed energy resources (DER) transaction exchanges and enhanced resilience. Apart
from electricity, research work by Al Kawasmi et al. (2015) proposed a local market model
to trade carbon emissions [5]. Trading of green certificates was discussed in [109].
Blockchains in local energy markets can incentivise end-consumer participation [162].
As a result, consumers are exposed to the real cost of energy, which might result in
more rational energy consumption or suitable price signals for demand response [246].
Self-generating prosumers that have invested in PVs, small wind turbines or CHPs can
participate in local energy markets. Until now, prosumers have not had real access to the
energy market, which remains a privileged playing field for the institutionalised energy
2.9 Blockchain technology for RES integration 61
suppliers [257] due to high associated costs. Incentives for further RES investment, such
as FiTs or export fees for selling energy surplus back to the grid are often inadequate
or are being removed. Utility companies purchase this surplus at low prices and sell
it back to other consumers at standard tariff prices. If prosumers are allowed to sell
their surplus directly to other consumers without intermediaries, a potential for energy
cost savings emerges for all stakeholders. Prosumers can derive greater benefits from
their investment, as profits and value remains within the microgrid and local community.
P2P trading in local energy marketplaces can provide socio-economic incentives that
promote local renewable generation and therefore might form an alternative incentive
for prospective prosumers [162]. Consumers, who cannot afford investing in renewable
generation, either due to capital funding or limited space, can buy certified green energy at
affordable prices. Emerging platforms indicate that there might be a market for matching
consumers to renewable energy suppliers, such as in the case of Piclo and others (see [190]
for a detailed review). Often consumers are willing to pay a premium for buying green
energy, however currently there is no guarantee about the origin of energy purchased and
most likely the energy used by end-consumer is still sourced by the closest fossil-fuel
power plant. Current matching platform solutions are intermediaries that act as market
access points for RES generating units and demand service providers, however traceability
of energy flows is not currently possible. Blockchains on the other hand promise complete
transparency on the origins of the energy purchased, such as its type, generating unit
and exact location produced [34]. Community energy microgrids based on blockchains
essentially enable localised energy trading between consumers, which is recorded in a
secure and tamper-proof way.
An important question that local energy marketplaces need to address is the role to
be played by the transmission and distribution system operators (TSOs/DSOs) and the
Independent System Operators (ISOs). These players own the physical infrastructure of
electricity grids and are responsible for system stability. System operator recoup their
costs through system maintenance fees, but are also responsible for assuring that the
decentralised energy trades agreed between parties can actually take place, given the
physical system constraints.
Hence, TSOs/DSOs will have a key role to play in any blockchain implementation.
Their potential use of blockchains is twofold: First, they can use blockchains to record more
precise use of their network, hence allowing exact collecting of network fees corresponding
to each energy transaction. In the case of local energy marketplaces, tariffs or prices set
in P2P transactions need to account for grid charges, if the energy is transmitted through
the public grid. Second, they can use the information about the P2P transactions recorded
in blockchains to better manage the capacity and power flows on their network. This, of
course, would require new solutions being developed for managing the system that are able
to use the information recorded in the blockchain close to real-time. This is a challenging
area requiring further research going forward. In addition, if connected to the main grid, all
system users need to collaborate with the system operator and provide forecasts of energy
demand and supply. This requirement will also need to apply to any P2P marketplaces.
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Individual consumers are not expected to be able to do this, but this could be provided
in the future by third-parties such as future energy suppliers or local aggregators. The
size of emerging marketplaces and AI and ML algorithms can play a significant role in
this respect. In fact, the intersection of blockchain technologies with AI is an emerging
research area required to achieve such long-term visions.
In the following section, key conclusions and future outlook on the potential of
blockchain technologies, their challenges and market barriers are discussed.
2.9.7 Challenges for blockchain and future outlook
Blockchain projects and research initiatives reviewed in [10] showed that blockchains are
a promising technology for a wide area of services and use cases in the energy sector. The
large number of established energy companies and utilities that are currently involved in
blockchain projects, as well as the investor interest in this area, clearly shows the potential
value of this emerging technology for the energy industry. The real long-term value of
the technology is however yet to be proven, especially as most initiatives have trialled the
technology in relatively small-scale projects that are still in an early development phase.
As a result, several questions will need to be answered before mainstream adoption of
blockchains in the energy industry is materialised.
First and foremost, blockchain technologies need to prove they can offer the scalability,
speed and security required for the proposed use cases. Research efforts on distributed
consensus algorithms, which are crucial to achieving these objectives, are still ongoing,
however a solution that combines all desired characteristics cannot yet be achieved without
significant trade-offs. Early adopters of blockchain technologies face the challenge
of selecting the right consensus mechanism and system architecture, without having
a clear long-term picture of the advantages and downsides that each approach has to
offer. For many applications, including P2P energy trading, blockchain technologies have
already passed the proof of concept stage, but require further development to achieve
desired operational and performance objectives. Several recent developments, such as the
blockchain network developed by the Energy Web Foundation are promising as it can be
scaled up to thousands of transactions per second.
Blockchains face additional risks such as possible malfunctions at early stages of de-
velopment due to lack of experience with large-scale applications. Blockchain ecosystems
rely heavily on coding new algorithms, a procedure that can be prone to errors. Security
breaches are still highly likely before the technology becomes mature, which could result
in bad publicity and delays in acceptance from consumers. Resilience to such attacks is
of great importance, especially for applications in critical infrastructure, such as energy
systems.
Another important challenge is that blockchain systems have currently high devel-
opment costs [71]. Blockchains may realise significant cost savings by circumventing
intermediaries, however for several use cases, they might not have the competitive advan-
tage against already existing solutions in well-established markets. For example, energy
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transactions can be recorded in conventional databases, such as relational databases that
are designed to recognise relations between stored items of information [110]. These
solutions are already largely available and currently faster and less costly to operate [201],
albeit they cannot offer immutability of records or transparency. Blockchain systems may
require costly new infrastructure, such as custom ICT equipment and software, the costs of
which need to be outweighed by benefits achieved by data integrity, enhanced security and
elimination of the need for a trusted intermediary. In the energy sector, smart meters are
currently being rolled out without significant computational capabilities, hence integrating
the existing smart metering and grid infrastructure with distributed ledgers could come
with significant costs.
At present, information in blockchain systems can be transferred for very low costs,
but validation and verification of data comes with high hardware and energy costs [201].
Proof of stake or proof of authority algorithms may significantly improve this in the future.
In the field of grid communications however, blockchain systems would need to compete
with already established solutions such as telemetry, which is not only more mature, but
also significantly cheaper technology solution [71].
Significant barriers in the adoption of the technology are relevant both to the regulatory
and legal sphere. Regulatory bodies endorse the active participation of consumers in
electricity markets [64, 178]. In addition, several policy makers have established supportive
measures for local or community energy systems that aim to reduce costs for consumers,
promote low-carbon technologies and tackle fuel poverty. Blockchain technologies can
support or accelerate such objectives, therefore coordinate well with current regulatory
priorities, however regulatory frameworks would need to be amended to allow larger
adoption of blockchains. For instance, in general lines current regulatory frameworks do
not allow consumer to consumer electricity trading, such as in several P2P energy trading
projects. New contract types will be required to describe agreements between prosumers
and consumers, especially when counterparties make use of the public grid [201]. Most
importantly, a new framework would require new and potentially more flexible electricity
tariffs, which are currently heavily regulated. In general, local or microgrid energy markets
would need to be integrated with current regulatory practice.
P2P trading platforms are in early stages of development, therefore the scale of their
adoption is currently limited. However, they have the potential to radically change estab-
lished roles of incumbent energy companies, such as energy suppliers or grid operators,
who are in most countries are regulated monopolies and own the physical infrastructure. In
fact, regulatory bodies have granted special permission to pilot projects trialling such novel
marketplaces to examine potential benefits for consumers and energy system operation.
Blockchain technologies have started to prove their potential in decentralised microgrids,
however they face challenges in balancing, integration with central controls, and coordina-
tion with the main grid. Energy trading needs to be reconciled with the system operator
practice, and continuous decentralisation may lead to more complex management of energy
systems overall. P2P marketplaces and local microgrids may even accelerate grid defection
or lead to severe underutilisation of network assets. Such results would call for radical
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changes in the way network charges and energy services are offered to consumers. In the
case of P2P platforms granting access of consumers to wholesale energy markets, DSO
coordination of marketplaces might deliver greater benefits for the consumer, according to
a report from Eurelectric [71]. All these issues call for significant regulatory changes and
might lead to delays or lack of blockchain adoption.
In addition, regulatory authorities are responsible for setting the rules of consumer data
protection. A recent example is the new EU policy on consumer data or General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR). Blockchain system users should be identified to account for
their liabilities but at the same time, consumer or commercial sensitive information need
to remain confidential, such as the prices agreed between an energy supplier and consumer
within a smart contract recorded in a ledger. When information from multiple participants
are recorded in shared ledgers, solutions need to be found for data privacy, confidentiality
and identity management. Moreover, smart contracts need to be integrated into legal code
to ensure compliance with the law and protection of consumers. In a distributed system
architecture, it is not always clear who has the legal and technical responsibility for the
negative consequences of the actions of different parties. For instance, if a major attack
is successfully deployed because of a software or a hardware bug in the system, there is
no central authority to which a consumer may address their complaints to, as in current
practice. With blockchain systems, trust is put to the technology itself rather than in a
known authority.
Finally, another significant factor that might slow blockchain adoption is the lack of
standardisation and flexibility. Standards for blockchain architectures need to be developed
to allow interoperability between technology solutions. An additional challenge is that
once a blockchain system is deployed, any changes in the ruling protocols or code needs to
be approved by the system nodes. In blockchain ecosystems, this has historically led to
disagreements between developers and multiple system forks. If blockchains are largely
adopted in energy systems, these issues may lead to mistrust and fragmentation [71].
Moreover, blockchain adoption might, in some cases, be inhibited by the bad reputation
stemming from the early days of Bitcoin and its association with illegal activities - although
as blockchains mature, this aspect may become less relevant over time.
In summary, blockchain technologies need to address several issues before achieving
larger adoption. One key challenge is that of scalability and cost, while maintaining desired
properties of decentralisation and security. Other emerging issues relate to user anonymity,
privacy and the governance of blockchain systems, which often goes against traditional
practices adopted by governments and industry.
2.10 Key findings
Chapter 2 presented the literature review relevant to the topic of this thesis. At first, a
literature survey on renewable curtailment and strategies were presented. Curtailment
strategies can be part of ANM schemes being deployed that aim to facilitate renewable
energy connections and power system operation at areas of network constraints. Several
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works in curtailment have shown that the strategy selected may significantly impact
the profitability of generators and moreover may discourage new construction of RES
generation plants [7, 20, 125]. Theoretical assessments have been carried out to evaluate
curtailment mechanisms. However, effects of curtailment rules in renewable capacity
investments, but also in transmission capacity investments were not formalised and require
further investigation. These issues are further investigated in the following chapters 3-
4. A game-theoretic framework for the study of curtailment and its implications can
capture strategic decision-making of low-carbon technology investors. Review of the
literature on game-theoretic modelling for network upgrades and generation capacity
investments showed a gap in works that jointly consider transmission and generation
expansion, while also considering curtailment and line access rules. While other works
have studied transmission constraints and congestion, this work aims to study the effect
of commercial agreements and curtailment rules in settings of private grid reinforcement
by providing a novel formulation in modelling private investment in power network
infrastructure, that is increasingly required to further integrate renewable generation.
Contributions towards this objective are presented in chapters 5-7. Moreover, a literature
survey was conducted on technologies that could minimise curtailment, including energy
storage and blockchain technology. The potential of blockchain technology to act as
an enabler for P2P local energy marketplaces that would result in better matching of
RES supply to demand at a local level was identified. The literature review showed that
blockchain technologies could add significant value, however the technology needs to





Chapter 3 focuses on curtailment rules and flexible commercial arrangements between
distributed generators and network operators. Literature review on the topic was presented
analytically in the previous chapter (Section 2.4). As shown in Chapter 2, part of the
renewable capacity installed is subject to generation curtailment, a strategy where gener-
ators are granted non-firm grid access (interruptible RES connections) and are required
to adjust their production according to the system operator’s instructions, due foremost
to network constraints, low local demand and/or insufficient distribution or transmission
network capacity. Each location’s curtailment level (and the curtailment strategy applied)
can play a crucial role on the total generation capacity installed, due to their effect on
investor decisions, and might therefore discourage future RES investment, as shown in the
following sections of this chapter. This work provides the results of a simulation study on
three curtailment rules and their impact on the capacity factor of wind generators. This
chapter also studies the effect of spatial wind speed correlation on the resulting curtailment
and impact on lost revenues for distributed generators. The results provide useful insights
to DNOs searching to implement smart DG connections and optimal curtailment rules that
achieve desired operational objectives and share curtailment between generators in a fair
and equitable way. In this vein, a new curtailment strategy is proposed, which is fair and
causes minimal disruption to generators.
Parts of the research work presented in Chapter 3 were published in peer-reviewed
scientific papers [8, 12].
3.1 Research contributions
Research works on the topic of curtailment rules and PoAs were presented in detail
in Chapter 2 and Section 2.4. Generation curtailment rules and flexible commercial
strategies are deployed by network operators to deal with curtailment issues caused by
network congestion or excess renewable generation capacity. With respect to the literature
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presented in the previous section, the research work undertaken throughout the duration of
this thesis advances the state of the art in the following points.
As seen in Chapter 2, a large number of commercial and academic studies [20, 23, 49,
62, 126] have discussed issues around the application of curtailment strategies, with main
focus on their technical, legal and regulatory implications. However, few research works
have focused on their effects on the profitability of RES generators. Along with other
financial incentives provided to renewables, such as the level of the guaranteed feed-in-
tariff (FiT) price or the strike price agreed with the Contracts of Difference (CfD) scheme,
the curtailment rule selected in the PoAs and the curtailment level are key factors that
affect the investors decision-making on future projects. Our work specifically focuses on
the impact of different rules on the viability of RES investments and the decision-making
of investors about future generation expansion.
The main threads found in the literature are LIFO rules which do not affect existing
generation, Pro Rata rules that share curtailment equally amongst all generators, or Market-
based rules that require the establishment of a curtailment market. These rules were
discussed in [6] with regards to their risk allocation and social optimality, rather than their
effect on the viability of RES investments, which is the focus of this work. Specifically,
this dissertation focuses on the most representative PoAs, LIFO, Pro Rata and Rota. A new
type of strategy, called Fractional Round Robin (FRR), which guarantees equal curtailment
for generators of unequal rated capacity, is also proposed.
Similar to [126], the analysis takes a direct approach in quantifying the effects of most
commonly used PoAs to the capacity factor of wind generators by virtue of simulations. In
addition, our work demonstrates how wind speed spatial correlation affects the resulting
curtailment and how different PoAs affect the frequency of curtailment events, providing
useful insights to DNOs regarding the most efficient strategy. Correlation should not be
ignored as most generators responsible for a particular grid constraint have geographical
proximity and therefore correlated power outputs, resulting in a greater impact on the
resulting curtailment. In addition, results shown in this work formally prove that fair
strategies can maximise the total generation capacity installed at a single location.
In summary the research contributions of this work that advance the state of the art are:
• A simulation analysis on widely used curtailment rules, as found by the literature sur-
vey presented in Chapter 2, was developed. The results of the study demonstrate the
impact of three curtailment rules on the profitability of RES investments by showing
the long-term effects the rules have on the capacity factor of wind generators.
• A new round-robin rule is proposed that guarantees fair distribution of curtailment
amongst generators, while minimising individual generator’s disruption and individ-
ual number of curtailment events.
• The feasibility of the new rule is shown by simulation results that demonstrate
how the newly proposed rule compares to commonly-used curtailment strategies.
The results achieve a comparative evaluation by the criteria of fairness and social
optimality, profitability of investments and renewable resource spatial correlation.
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• Finally, the effect of curtailment on the RES capacity installed at a single/particular
location is formalised. Specifically, this thesis proves that fairness or equal shar-
ing of curtailment makes more efficient use of the available network capacity by
maximising the total generation capacity built at a single location.
The following sections present in detail the models developed for the analysis and their
underlying assumptions.
3.2 Curtailment rules analysis
In Section 3.2, the attention is drawn to curtailment rules and the presentation of the
methods developed in this thesis for the assessment of their potential effects on the
profitability of renewable generation projects.
3.2.1 Analysis for prevailing curtailment rules
While a larger number of curtailment rules is summarised and reviewed in Table 2.1 and
Chapter 2, in this work we focus our attention on three main schemes frequently applied in
commercial projects in the UK and other countries, namely:
• LIFO: Early connections have a clear market advantage. The LIFO rule was selected
by Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE) in two occasions as being transparent,
simple to implement and not affecting existing generators (’Orkney Smart Grid’ and
NINES).
• Rota: Generators are curtailed on a rotational basis or at a predetermined rota
specified by the system operator. An early example of the Rota rule applied in a
practical setting in the United States by Xcel Energy can be found in [216].
• Pro Rata or Shared Percentage: Curtailment is shared equally between all non-
firm generators, proportionally to the rated capacity or actual power output of the
generators. Pro Rata was the favourite choice for UK Power Networks and was
applied to generators participating in the FPP project.
To illustrate the effects and operation of these frequently used schemes, a simple
network of three wind generators of different rated capacities PN1 = 7 MW, PN2 = 2 MW
and PN3 = 3 MW was considered, where the subscript denotes the chronological order
of their connection to the power grid or the ANM scheme. For simplicity, we assume
there is no export capability and the demand is constant and equal to 6 MW. At a given
time t, if all generators are producing their nominal output power, the total renewable




PNi = 12 MW. Given that the available power
output exceeds the required demand, generation curtailment is enabled. The total power
curtailed is therefore equal to PC,t = 6 MW. How curtailment is applied in practice to wind
generators depends on their technology type. For pitch-controlled wind turbines or models
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that permit advanced power electronics control mechanisms, curtailment can be achieved
by modifying the wind turbine’s control system, in order to accept a power output set
point, as defined by the system operator. For wind turbines that rely on stall control for
limiting the rotor power, curtailment may only be achieved by shutting down completely
one or more wind turbines from the multiple wind turbines that consist the wind farm. The
allocation of the power curtailed to the renewable generators depends on the curtailment
scheme selected:
• With LIFO, 6 MW are curtailed by the the last generator connected to the power
system. In our example, this leads to the third and second generator completely
curtailed and the first generator curtailed by 1 MW.
• When Rota is implemented, the generators are curtailed one after the other, resulting
in 6 MW curtailed by the first generator. Other generators are not affected. When
the next curtailment event occurs, the second generator is curtailed, but as this is not
sufficient, the third generator is also completely curtailed and 1 MW is curtailed by
the first generator. In the next event, the second generator is first to be curtailed and
so on.
• By contrast, with Pro Rata, curtailment is allocated proportionally to each generator’s
output. In other words, curtailment is distributed evenly among the generators
according to their nominal capacity or actual power output (equal in the example
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power curtailed, respectively.
The curtailment rules have various effects on generators, system operators and con-
sumers. As imposed curtailment reduces the energy produced by generators, it causes a
reduction of the capacity factor (CF) of renewable projects, and therefore results in lost
revenues. Financial implications have the potential to discourage, in the long term, the
generation capacity investment at the location where ANM is applied, which may lead to
inefficient use of potential renewable and network capacity resources.
From the example above, it can concluded that the LIFO scheme discriminates ac-
cording to the order of connection. Thus, LIFO may disincentivise future renewable
development and makes inefficient use of the transmission capacity available. The Rota
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scheme follows a simple approach, which does not take into account the generators’ size or
their actual contribution to the network constraint. This results in disproportionate losses
of revenue, especially for smaller sized generators. Finally, Pro Rata shares curtailment
equally and is ‘fair’ 1 however, all participating generators are curtailed at all times when
curtailment is required, leading to increased disruption. For this reason, Pro Rata might not
always be desirable and might be technically preferable to curtail a larger amount of power
from one generator than smaller amounts from all generators when a curtailment event
occurs. For the reasons above, an equivalent Rota-type curtailment strategy is proposed
in this work, called Fractional Round Robin (FRR). FRR is presented in detail in the
following section.
3.2.2 FRR curtailment strategy
In this section, a new Rota-type curtailment rule called Fractional Round Robin (FRR) is
proposed. With FRR, the power curtailed is distributed sequentially on a rotation basis,
according to the number of rated capacity units installed, so that larger generators are
chosen proportionally more times and in direct relation to their size. Prior knowledge of
the curtailment order reduces the uncertainty of short-term power output prediction of a
generator, therefore any disruption to individual generators minimised. In more detail and
following the same illustrative example as in the previous section:
• Similarly to the Rota strategy, at first 6 MW will be curtailed by the first generator.
The generator will be first to be curtailed in all future events, up until a quota equal
to its rated capacity is reached. Therefore, in the subsequent curtailment event,
1 MW is curtailed by the first generator and the remaining 5 MW are curtailed by the
second and third generator. This means that on average, every 12 times a curtailment
of 6 MW is needed, the first generator will be curtailed 7 times, the second 2 times
and the third 3 times. In fact if multiple curtailment events are considered, the



















1As we show in the following sections, ‘fairness’ is significant as fair schemes maximise the generation
capacity built at a single location [8].
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Moreover, for a sufficiently long period of time (i.e. many years and like the typical
lifetime of a wind turbine) or for multiple curtailment events, the curtailment imposed to
generators under FRR converges to the proportional curtailment rate achieved with Pro
Rata.
As shown by the illustrative example, the curtailment strategy chosen can affect
significantly the power production of the generators, the energy produced, the revenue
earned and therefore the actual viability of the investment. Some strategies are fair in
the way they deal with network constraints and allocation of amongst generators (Pro
Rata, Fractional Round Robin), while others offer a significant market advantage to certain
generators. To further elaborate on the effects of the rules, a simulation process was
developed to show how different rules affect the CF of wind generators.
3.2.3 Simulation analysis
In this section, we turn our attention on the effects’ quantification of the selected curtailment
strategy. Several prior works have discussed the effect of applied curtailment strategies
on the installation of generation capacity. In [126], the influence that several curtailment
strategies have on the CF of wind generators based in Orkney, Scotland is examined. It is
shown that LIFO leads to lower CF for ‘later’ connections, when compared to Pro Rata
and Rota. Therefore LIFO might discourage investment in new generation capacity [125].
In fact, a related study by UK Power Networks observed that the most important factor
affecting the decision-making process of a new investor, especially when a LIFO scheme
is applied, is the CF of the last generator connected [68]. A LIFO scheme discourages new
investment by shutting out newer entrants, essentially leading to inefficient use of the grid
capacity available.
Based on the example network presented in the previous section, we implemented
a simulation process, in the course of one year, to compute the capacity factors of the
wind generators, under different schemes. However, since network constraints are usually
applicable to a particular geographical area of the grid, where wind conditions may be
similar, generator power outputs present a level of spatial correlation, which is a significant
factor for resulting curtailment levels at this area. To model correlation, we apply the
technique developed by Früh (2015) [84]. First of all, we generate 8760 wind speed data
points urand,i for i = 1...3 generators. Data points come from random and independent
samples of three Weibull distributions (one for each generator), using the typical UK
values of c = 9 m/s and k = 1.8. Wind speed at the first generator’s location ia set as a
reference uRe f , in order to produce random, yet cross-correlated wind data series ui for
each generator’s location, by the following equations:






























LIFO Rota Pro Rata FRR
Fig. 3.1 Curtailment mechanisms effects on the CF of wind generators under LIFO, Rota,
Pro Rata and FRR
where r is the Pearson’s correlation coefficient. The data series are then converted to power
outputs, using a generic model of a wind turbine2. If the aggregate power at time t exceeds
the power demanded, then curtailment is required, which is allocated to the generators
according to the strategy imposed.
Fig. 3.1 shows the CF results for each generator under the four different schemes for
conditions of perfect correlation (r = 1). LIFO clearly favours ‘early’ connections, while
the third generator suffers a reduction of 67.4%. Rota can disadvantage smaller-sized
generators. On the contrary, Pro Rata produces equal CF reduction for all generators, while
FRR produces similar results to Pro Rata, as expected.
A measure of fairness is the variance of the average CF for each strategy. In Fig. 3.2 we
illustrate for r = 1, this variance with the average number of curtailment events required.
LIFO presents a poor performance with respect to fairness, as opposed to Pro Rata, which
requires the largest number of curtailment events. The results show that FRR has similar
fairness properties to Pro Rata, but also reduces significantly the number of curtailment
events per generator. Finally, Rota is fairer than LIFO and requires the smallest number of
curtailment events than all other schemes.
Finally, as shown in Fig. 3.3 the required total curtailment increases as we proceed
from no correlation to perfect correlation, resulting in lower CFs.
In the following sections, we determine an upper level of tolerable curtailment at a
single location with network congestion, which enables renewable capacity investment
to be profitable. Moreover, we examine which types PoAs can be used to maximise the
capacity installed at this location.
2Based on the power curve of Enercon E44 commercial wind turbine.
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Average number of curtailment events









































Fig. 3.2 Fairness under different curtailment schemes
Pearson coefficient r





























LIFO Rota Pro Rata FRR
Fig. 3.3 Correlation effects on average CF under different curtailment schemes
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3.3 Generation capacity at a single location
Consider n renewable generators ⟨PN1,PN2 , ...,PNi, ...,PNn⟩ at a single location of the dis-
tribution network with network constraints. Generator i is expected to produce E(EGi,t)
energy units at time t and according to the available resource on site location, when no
curtailment is considered. It is important to note that while for a particular period such as
an hour or a day the expected generation is uncertain, for the overall lifetime of a renewable
project (typically 20-25 years), total expected generation can be estimated with relatively
high certainty from the weather and wind patterns at a particular location.
As this is the case in many countries, it can be assumed that the energy generated by
RES units generates revenue at a constant price, such as the FiT price for smaller capacity
generators or the CfD price for larger capacity generators, denoted here as pG [180] or
generation tariff price. Curtailment of the power/energy production is imposed in the
region due to network constraints. The expected curtailed energy units are denoted as
E(ECi).
The term E(), which symbolises the ‘expected’ value of the variable under consider-
ation, will be omitted from this point on, in order to simplify the notation. Hence, from
this point on this thesis, expected energy generated will be denoted by EGi,t , and ECi,t will
represent the expected energy curtailed.







where IGi is the installation cost of the renewable energy plant (initial investment), MGi is
the operation and maintenance cost and EGi the expected generation throughout the duration
of the project lifetime. When subscript t is omitted, the variable under consideration refers
to the project lifetime and is equal to the sum of energy produced at all time intervals t.
We will also define a new parameter, useful for the analysis, which measures and
quantifies the curtailment imposed to each generator. We define the curtailment rate of






Curtailment rate CRi is computed as the average of all CRi,t over a longer time horizon
equal to the project lifetime (e.g. all hourly time periods over the project lifetime). The
curtailment rate of generator i at time interval t is denoted as CRi,t and by definition is
3No depreciation was considered.
4In real-world settings and over a large time horizon, such as the project lifetime, curtailment may change
significantly due to numerous external factors. For example, curtailment may increase if additional RES
generation is installed in the area or if demand is reduced. On the other hand, curtailment may decrease if
grid reinforcement takes place. Such externalities and possibilities are ignored in this study and expected
curtailment is estimated based on current grid conditions.
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By definition the curtailment rate represents the percentage change of the CF of a
renewable generator, when comparing production with and without curtailment. For
example, a curtailment rate of 5%, is directly interpreted as a 5% reduction of the CF,
compared to the CF value when no curtailment is required. Moreover, when CRi = 0 there
is no curtailment, so all potential energy is produced and absorbed by the power system.
On the other hand, if CRi = 1 all potential generation is curtailed. Combining the latest
statements, the curtailment rate CRi is subject to the following condition:
0≤CRi ≤ 1 (3.7)
This parameter is crucial for the profitability of renewable investment projects, not only for
already established projects, but also for investment decisions on future renewable capacity
(see analysis in the following section).
3.3.1 Renewable generator profitability
The curtailment rate is a key parameter that determines the profitability of a renewable
project. The relation between CRi and the viability of the investment is formalised in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 3.3.1. A generation capacity investment is viable, if and only if the curtailment
rate of i generator CRi is smaller or equal to a threshold τGi






Proof. When no curtailment is required, the profit equation of i generator is equal to the
revenue earned from energy production minus the cost of energy or power generation
Πi = EGi · pG−EGi · cGi ≥ 0. Likewise, the profit function Π of generator i, when part
of renewable production is curtailed, is given by Πi = (EGi −ECi) · pG−EGi · cGi ≥ 0.
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The curtailment rate determines the profitability of i generator. Specifically, the
curtailment rate cannot exceed a threshold τGi that depends on the ratio of the generation
cost cGi over the energy production selling price pG. The smaller the generation cost
with respect to the generation tariff price, the larger amounts of curtailment a generator is
willing to accept.
Relaxing further Eq. (3.3.1), we assume that all n generators at a single location have
equal access to land and type of technology, therefore their marginal costs of generation
can be assumed equal. In this occasion, the threshold for investment viability can express
the tolerable curtailment at a single specific location.





Proposition 3.3.2 shows that the curtailment rate at a certain location can not exceed
a location-specific threshold that depends on the quantitative relation of the generation
cost with the selling generation tariff price. The lower the ratio the higher the amounts of
curtailment that can be tolerated by generators at this location.
The curtailment rate is directly linked to the capacity factor of a renewable project. As
shown in Section 3.3, CF depends on the curtailment strategy used. The strategy selected
remains under the control of the network operator and regulator, who play the role of the
mechanism designer. Hence, a natural question to ask is which curtailment rule maximises
the local generation capacity? Generation capacity needs to be maximised in order to
also maximise the utilisation of network assets before installing new grid capacity. This
question is of interest in itself, but it also plays a key role in modelling investment decisions
of grid expansion, as shown in Chapter 4.
3.3.2 Curtailment rule for generation capacity maximisation
The analysis so far showed that the viability of a RES investment depends on the curtailment
rate and consequently on the curtailment strategy chosen by the system operator. As shown
below, the generation capacity at a single location is maximised when curtailment is
distributed evenly between all generators.
To prove this, a perfectly competitive setting is assumed, in which no generator has
the market power to influence the price equilibrium. Using assumptions of competitive
equilibrium analysis (and more specifically Cournot equilibrium analysis [47]), any investor
or ‘player’ is able to install an additional generation unit, as long as the marginal profit
exceeds the marginal cost. As discussed in Section 3.3.1, since this is a single location
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setting (e.g. an island or some other remote location) where renewable resources and access
to available technology are roughly equal for all players, we can safely assume marginal
costs are also the same. Moreover, the decision to invest takes into account whether the
curtailment rate exceeds a certain location-dependent threshold τG, as in Eq. (3.10). Given
these assumptions, the curtailment strategy selected by the system operator, can affect the
total generation capacity installed.
Lemma 3.3.3. In a perfectly competitive equilibrium setting, the local generation capacity
installed is maximised under proportional curtailment strategies that distribute curtailment
evenly among generators of the same technology type.
Proof. The problem of maximising the generation capacity installed is equivalent to









= max(EG1 + ...+EGi + ...+EGn) (3.11)
subject to a set of n constraints (one for each generator), as derived from Lemma 3.3.1:
ECi
EGi
≤ τG,∀i = 1 . . .n (3.12)
Expected curtailment ECi is equal to the energy it could be generated, minus the energy
demand actually required, ECi = EGi−EDi . Furthermore, total generation purchased from
renewable sources at this location (or exported at another location) is bounded across all




EDi . The constraints
in Eq. (3.12), can hence be written as EGi ≤
EDi
1− τG
,∀i = 1 . . .n. The initial maximisation












max(EGi), and given the set of n constraints,
will be maximised when all the constraints are equal, i.e. EGi =
EDi
1− τG
,∀i = 1 . . .n.
Expressed back in terms of curtailment rate, the solution of the problem is given when all













Essentially, this condition will be satisfied by proportional or ‘fair’ curtailment strategies,
i.e. those mechanisms which allocate equally the demand or curtailment imposed.
In summary, fair curtailment mechanisms can lead to the maximum generation capacity
being installed at a specified location. Such fair rules can be expressions of either Pro Rata
or FRR type of strategy.
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3.4 Discussion and concluding remarks
Chapter 3 presented work on generation curtailment and curtailment rules. A literature
review on the topic of curtailment rules was presented in Chapter 2. In this chapter,
we focused on the study of most frequently used curtailment rules, such as LIFO, Rota
and Pro Rata, and showed how curtailment is allocated according to these rules. In
agreement to previous works published in the field, it was found that LIFO favours
early connections, Rota might disfavour smaller size generators, while Pro Rata requires
simultaneous intervention to all generators participating in the scheme. To satisfy the
criteria of even distribution of curtailment and minimising generator disruption, a new rule
called FRR was proposed. A simulation analysis, including all four curtailment strategies,
showed that FRR has similar effects on the CF of generators, as Pro Rata. Such effect
is achieved with reduced disruption for generators, as shown by the average number of
curtailment events per generator. The results also showed how curtailment strategies affect
the CF of generators, and consequently the viability of their investment. Under the LIFO
scheme, the CF of the last generator was severely reduced. Pro Rata or FRR on the other
hand, allow more capacity to be built. In addition, the simulation analysis showed how
CF is affected with regards to the wind speed spatial correlation. It was found that CF
reduction is linked to higher correlation. This highlights the importance of geographical
dispersion of RES resources, when possible, in order to minimise curtailment. In addition,
combination of different RES technologies and diversification of resources could also
minimise required curtailment. This was not studied in this thesis, since the work focused
on a single technology type (wind power), but is of great interest for future works.
Afterwards, the work focused on the curtailment effects on decisions about investment
in renewable generation capacity. In particular, we showed that a renewable project can be
profitable if the curtailment rate is smaller than a threshold that depends on the economic
parameters of the investment, and more specifically, on the ratio of the generation cost
to the selling tariff price. If marginal costs of generation at a single location are equal,
this threshold is the same for all generators and can characterise the location. Moreover,
under perfect competition analysis assumptions, it was proved that fair curtailment rules
such as Pro Rata and FRR can be selected by network operators and regulators in order
to maximise the generation capacity built at a single location. The generation capacity is
maximised when generators are curtailed at their maximum acceptable curtailment rate.
In real-world applications, some RES generators might have been installed in earlier
time periods and therefore might have larger generation costs. For example, in general,
similar technology solutions tend to be become cheaper over time. On the other hand,
renewable incentives and financial premiums have gradually decreased with time and in
some occasions they have been totally stripped off. Moreover in practice, RES investors
may not have perfect knowledge of the market or access to all the technology solutions
available. In other words, the assumption of equal marginal costs may not hold in most
practical settings. A proportional curtailment scheme, such as Pro Rata or FRR, does not
consider the real marginal cost of generation, which can be estimated with good accuracy,
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but normally it is not publicly known, as it is considered private information. Curtailment
with proportional rules is distributed evenly, however cheaper generators should be able
to tolerate larger amounts of curtailment. A method for dealing with curtailment more
efficiently is moving towards establishing a market for curtailment and required flexibility.
This would allow curtailment allocation according to real generator costs. A market-based
solution is compliant with the overall vision towards deregulated electricity markets, hence
market solutions are of great interest for future work consideration.
Chapter 3 studied the effect of curtailment on generation capacity and profitability
of RES projects. The following chapter focuses on how curtailment and line access
rules affect transmission capacity investments, such as installing new distribution and
transmission lines or reinforcing existing ones.
Chapter 4
Transmission capacity game with
distributed generation
Chapter 4 studies the problem of how line access and curtailment rules applied influence
the decision to reinforce existing transmission lines or build new transmission capacity.
In the context of this thesis, transmission capacity may refer to distribution/transmission
lines installed by independent investors. A game-theoretic modelling approach is used
to study the network upgrade investment and to model strategic interactions between
transmission and generation capacity investors. Two separate cases are considered to
model different agent behaviours, one with myopic players, who are not able to react
to other players’ strategies, and one with strategic players, where each agent is able to
estimate and forecast the opponents’ behaviour and is able to adjust his own actions
according to his individual beliefs. As shown in Chapter 4, the network upgrade problem
can be modelled as a Stackelberg game between a private investor (leader), who builds
additional grid capacity and new renewable generation capacity, and local renewable
investors (follower). Following average-case assumptions, an analytical solution of the
Stackelberg game equilibrium was formulated. These assumptions are relaxed in the
following chapters, where equilibria are found by empirical game-theoretic approaches.
Parts of the work presented in Chapter 4 were published in peer-reviewed scientific
publications [8] and [12].
4.1 Research contributions
A literature review on game-theoretic modelling in network upgrades and generation
capacity investments was analytically presented in Chapter 2. With respect to the scientific
publications found in the literature review, the main contribution of this work relates to
the use of game-theoretic and microeconomic models to the problem of transmission and
generation expansion, while also considering curtailment and line access rules. Other
works have studied transmission constraints and congestion, but the work presented in
this thesis aims to study the effect of flexible commercial agreements and curtailment
rules with private grid reinforcement. More specifically, the effects of curtailment rules
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on low-carbon technology investors’ decision-making about additional generation and
transmission capacity are studied. The methods developed provide a useful tool to network
operators that seek to incentivise privately funded grid capacity investment projects and
sustainable low-carbon technologies.
In summary, the research contributions of the work presented in Chapter 4 that progress
beyond the state of the art are:
• First, a two-location model was developed that studies the interaction between two
players, a line investor and local generators1. The model output is the determination
of the optimal generation capacities installed by the players, which maximise at
the game equilibrium, their utility functions, i.e. their profits. The model follows a
hierarchical, two-stage Stackelberg game formulation.
• Next, a market model is developed for optimal decision-making with regards to
investments on generation capacity and grid upgrades at regions that are already
experiencing significant volumes of curtailment. This model is analysed for two sets
of underlying assumptions, in the case of myopic agents that take decisions without
a foresight to the future, and in the case of strategic agents, where players have
the ability to forecast their opponents’ behaviour and take this into account when
making their own decisions. While other works have studied network upgrades in
areas with grid constraints and congestion, to the best of our knowledge, this work is
one of the first to study the effect of commercial agreements and curtailment rules in
settings of private grid reinforcement. This work provides a novel formulation in
modeling private investment in grid capacity investments that is required to further
integrate renewable generation.
• As a first approach, a simple model based on average and expected values of
renewable production and demand is studied. In the Stackelberg game formulation,
the line investor is the leader, as he has the first mover advantage and builds the
transmission line. Investors’ decision variables constitute renewable generation
capacities they need to install in order to maximise their profit. Decisions on optimal
(and interdependent) renewable capacities built by investors, affect the resulting
curtailment and profitability of projects and can be determined in the equilibrium
of the Stackelberg game. Average-case analysis assumptions and expected values
approach allowed for an analytical, closed-form solution of the problem and a
preliminary examination of the Stackelberg game equilibrium properties.
• Equilibrium results of the leader-follower game are examined for a wide range of
cost parameters. A feasible range of suitable charges for transmission is identified
allowing both transmission and generation capacity investments to be profitable. The
game-theoretic models developed enable network operators to bridge the knowledge
1Note here that players or agents are considered gender-neutral, however by convention male forms such
as ‘he’ and ‘his’ are used when referring to a single player.






Fig. 4.1 A simplified model schematic of the two-node, two-player network assumed: RES
generation capacity built by the line investor EG1 and RES generation capacity built by
local generators EG2 are connected at location B, while demand D is located at A
gap of incentivising privately funded grid infrastructure, especially in settings where
multiple generators can share their grid access and use the same transmission line.
• Finally, the theoretical models are demonstrated in practice, based on realistic
assumptions from a network upgrade project in the UK. The practical application
aims to showcase the value of the models in real-world settings with the ambition
that this work can easily be replicated and applied to other cases and locations, where
potential renewable production and demand are not co-located.
The following sections present in greater detail the models developed for studying the
network expansion game .
4.2 Transmission capacity game
The effects of curtailment and line access rules on transmission capacity investment
projects were studied in the context of a two-location game, the main features of which are
described in detail below (see also Fig. 4.1):
• Location A is a net consumer of D power demand. Location A can be thought of
as a mainland location with industry or significant population density. Meeting the
demand at location A would require energy produced and imported from different
locations. In practice, some generation capacity might be operating at A, part of
which could also be renewable generation. In this case, the net demand D would be
equal to generation at A minus the actual demand at A. However here, for simplicity,
location A is assumed to be a net consumer node, with a net power demand of D and
net energy demand of ED.
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• On the contrary, location B is assumed to be a net energy producer node and can
be thought of as a location where RES resources are favourable, for example such
as a remote region rich in wind resource. In practical settings, there would be
some local demand and supply considered here negligible. Nevertheless, due to
plentiful resources, high renewable generation potential and relative proximity to
A, renewable investors would be interested in installing new renewable generation
capacity at B, especially if a transmission link was carried out between the A-B
locations.
In addition, we consider two different types of investors or players, who intend to
install renewable generation capacity at B:
• Player 1 is a private investor willing to install a new transmission line T between
locations A-B and renewable generation capacity with a rated capacity of PN1 .
Installing PN1 leads to potential energy generation of EG1 over a larger time horizon.
Player 1, also called the ‘line investor’, can be a merchant-type or a utility company,
who is granted with a license to build the line. Note here that in reality, investments
on network assets are usually performed by DNOs or DNO-approved partners that
have the technical expertise to carry out such projects.
• Player 2 represents all other, than the line player, investors, i.e. local renewable
generators at location B. Local RES generators are keen to install a generation
capacity of PN2 , which can produce EG2 energy units, over a large time horizon. This
second player, also called ‘local generators’, can be thought of as investors from the
local community, who do not have the technical/financial capacity to build a line, but
may have access to cheaper land, find it easier to get community approval to build
turbines etc., hence may have a lower per-unit generation cost cG2
2. Recall here that
the per-unit generation cost is defined as the cost per unit of expected generation (see
Eq. (3.4), and depends on the renewable energy plant’s capital cost of installation, on
operation and maintenance costs and on expected generation over the duration of the
project. Individual behaviour of local renewable investors is considered negligent
and too small to have a great effect in the emerging game. In this model formulation,
local generators are considered to act as a single entity and in this context cG2 is the
weighted average generation cost of local players. The aggregated actions of local
generators can and do exert some market power in the outcome of the game.
Moreover, it is assumed that players or agents are rational, and are able to take initiative
and act in order to maximise their own utility function (in this work profit functions were
assumed hence agents seek to maximise their profits), and they have perfect knowledge
about the parameters of the game including opponent’s costs. Note that similar assumptions
are typical in game-theoretic formulations, although they may not always be representative
of real-world situations.
2Note that in Scotland, or other countries such as Denmark, local groups often act together to make land
available and invest in RES projects. Community Energy Scotland (CES) is an umbrella organisation of such
groups, supporting more than 300 community-owned projects in Scotland.
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The transmission line of capacity T can transport energy generated by both player types.
In fact, the line investor is granted the license to build the power line, as long as it provides
access to local generators, who do not possess the market power or financial means to build
the line themselves. This ‘common access’ principle is opposed to traditional practices,
when a renewable generator usually builds and pays for a ‘single access’ line with a
capacity large enough to meet his own needs. Instead, under a common access principle,
private investors are incentivised to build larger capacity lines that grant access to other
competing generators, who need to pay a transmission fee of pT for the energy transported
through the line.
The power line’s cost or transmission cost is denoted as CT and is equal to:
CT = IT +MT (4.1)
where IT represents the costs related to building the power line, summarised as initial in-
vestment required for transmission, and MT the costs related to operation and maintenance
of the power line. Note here the difference between the generation cost cG defined in
Eq. (3.4), which is divided by the expected generation, whereas CT , defined in Eq. (4.1),
refers to the total transmission cost over the project lifetime. The parameters are denoted
with a small and capital letter, respectively, to highlight this difference.
Energy curtailed, either because of RES overproduction when compared to the actual
demand or because the transmission capability of the line is exceeded, is denoted as EC1
and EC2 , i.e. the energy curtailed by the line investor and the energy curtailed by local
generators.
A question of interest in the transmission game is how curtailment and line access
rules affect the decision to build the power line. To answer this question, we consider
two separate models, distinguished by how local investors respond to the line player’s
actions. In the first model (Section 4.2.1), we study the effect of curtailment on the line
investor’s decision to build the line, but assuming the local players do not react to this
line being built, by building extra capacity themselves. In this model, local generators
are considered ‘myopic’ as they do not adapt their actions or strategy after the line is
built. This assumption cannot hold in realistic settings, where investors carefully and
strategically consider competitor actions and even the possibility of future demand growth.
A study on more realistic assumptions and strategic players is shown in the second model
(Section 4.2.2), where local investors react to the additional line capacity built by installing
new renewable generation capacity. In this occasion and under the ‘common access’
principle, the decisions rely interdependently on both player actions. The agents’ decision-
making process can be informed by modelling as a Stackelberg game, as shown in the
following sections.
4.2.1 Game with myopic players
This model setting studies how curtailment might affect the installation of new transmission
capacity. More specifically, the model allows for an inference of the decision to build the
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Fig. 4.2 Model schematic of the game with myopic players: RES generation capacity built
by the line investor EG1 and RES generation capacity built by local generators EG2 are
connected at location B, while demand D is located at A
transmission link A-B in relation to the curtailment rate and more concretely, how the
curtailment rate relates to the viability of the transmission capacity investment. Recall
here, the curtailment rate was introduced in Eq. (3.5) and is equal to the ratio of expected
curtailment to expected generation over the project lifetime.
To study these effects, it is assumed that local generators, motivated by advantageous
renewable resources potential, have already built significant amounts of RES generation
capacity at location B, prior to the installation of the line. Generation by local producers
exceeds at times the local demand or cannot be absorbed by the power grid because of
technical limitations and network constraints. As a result, power production is curtailed by
EC2 energy units.
The line investor is interested in building a transmission line that links A-B and
some renewable generation capacity of its own. The transmission link can export the
line investor’s renewable production EG1 and the energy previously curtailed by already
installed capacity of local generators EC2 . A model schematic is shown in Fig. 4.2. Recall
here that local generators are considered myopic and cannot react to the line being built by
installing additional generation capacity to the one already installed at B. Moreover, as
generation capacity installed by local generators exists prior to the line’s construction, it is
assumed that local producers take priority when serving local demand at B and can only
export EC2 via the transmission line.
Under these assumptions, the decision to build the power line depends on the curtail-
ment rate at location B, as shown in the following lemma.
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Lemma 4.2.1. At an area already experiencing curtailment, a transmission capacity
investment is viable if and only if the curtailment rate of local generators CR2 (before the
line is built) is greater or equal to a threshold τT
CR2 ≥ τT (4.2)
where
τT =
CT −ED · (pG− cG1)
cG1 ·EG2
(4.3)
Proof. Assuming that the demand at A is much larger than local demand at B, the line
investor will install a line with a transmission capacity that satisfies demand at A, and with
the ability to transport the energy generated by own renewable assets EG1 , and the energy
previously curtailed by local generators EC2 . In other words:
ED = EG1 +EC2 (4.4)
The line investor has two streams of revenue, the curtailed energy produced by local
generators and the energy generated from additional capacity installed at B:
Π1 = EC2 · pT +EG1 · (pG− cG1)−CT ≥ 0
By rearrangement, the profit function is:
EC2 · pT +EG1 · (pG− cG1)≥CT (4.5)
From equations Eq. (4.4) and Eq. (4.5):
ED · (pG− cG1)+EC2 · (pT − pG + cG1) ≥ CT
EC2 ≥
CT −ED · (pG− cG1)
(pT − pG + cG1)
(4.6)
The latter Eq. (4.6) divided by the expected energy of local generators at location B, prior
to the line installation, EG2
3, is equal to the curtailment rate at location B:
EC2
EG2
≥ CT −ED · (pG− cG1)
(pT − pG + cG1) ·EG2
(4.7)
CR2 ≥
CT −ED · (pG− cG1)
(pT − pG + cG1) ·EG2
(4.8)
For local generators, curtailed energy before the line installation is essentially wasted.
Recall that (see Lemma 3.3.1), the local generators’ renewable capacity investment is still
profitable, as long as CR2 ≤ τG2 . This means that the line investor can actually impose a
3 Note here, this does not include the new generation capacity of the line investor.
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large transmission fee to local generators. By definition, pT ≤ pG however, the line investor
can charge a fee that approaches the selling price pT → pG, in order to maximise its own
profits. Local generators would be willing to accept such a fee, as long as they are better
off and can increase their own profit, even by a marginally small amount. Considering this
in Eq. (4.8), we derive the desired conclusion.
CR2 ≥
CT −ED · (pG− cG1)
cG1 ·EG2
= τT (4.9)
As shown by Lemma 4.2.1, the viability of a new transmission capacity investment
depends on the curtailment rate at the location of renewable producers prior to the line
being installed. Specifically, the curtailment rate has to be larger or equal to a threshold τT
that depends on the demand served at mainland, the local generators’ capacity, the cost
parameter of the line, the line investor’s generation cost and the selling tariff price. Note
that the threshold does not depend on the cost of generation of local producers. In addition,
the line investor can take full advantage of the curtailed energy of other producers, as long
as he is able to charge a slightly lower transmission fee than pG. In real-world settings,
the transmission fee needs to be agreed between RES investors, hence, local generators
might find this difficult to accept, resulting in a better negotiated price4.
Model assumptions also considered that local investors cannot react by increasing
their own generation capacity, once the line gets built. Even in this simple non-strategic
setting, it can be seen that the volume of curtailed energy is a key factor for the decisions
regarding the installation of new transmission line. Conclusions from this section can be
utilised in areas experiencing high curtailment rates, however in practice, when building a
transmission line, additional generation investment from other stakeholders is anticipated.
In practice, the decision of the line investor must include an element of ‘strategic foresight’
to include the reaction of other investors or even demand growth in location A, when
deciding whether or not to build the line. Models in these lines can be formulated and
studied as Stackelberg game models formed between the line investor and local generators,
and are presented in the following section.
4.2.2 Game with strategic players
In the previous section, decision of local players did not consider the interplay of the
transmission line in future generation capacity investment decisions, instead, the line
investor would build the line, only if enough renewable generation existed to use it. In this
4A relevant setting in game theory is the ‘ultimatum game’. The game is played by two players, who
need to agree on the allocation of a monetary sum between the players. One of the two players makes an
offer to his opponent on how the reward should be split. Crucially, the second player can only accept or
reject this offer. If agreement is not reached, then the reward is lost and no player makes any gains. A
theoretic analysis of the game dictates an advantageous position of the first player. A very low offer would in
principle be accepted by the second player, as long as it creates some profit. However, experimental results
undertaken have repeatedly shown a significant deviation from pure theoretical results that also depends on
the participants’ social values and norms.
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section, we turn our attention to a much more relevant case when both types of investors
are strategic, meaning both the line investor and local renewable producers critically make
up their decisions by reasoning about each other’s actions. Local generators are able to
react to the new line built and the line investor can anticipate this reaction in order to reach
optimal decisions.
The strategic interaction formed between the line investor and local generators can be
formulated as a hierarchical, two-stage, Stackelberg game [252]. In Stackelberg games, one
player has the market power to influence the equilibrium result. Here, the line investor has
a ‘first mover’ advantage, as only he can build the grid infrastructure, which is expensive
and technically challenging and only a limited set of investors (such as DNO-approved or
DNO themselves), have the technical expertise and regulatory approval to carry it out. Both
players are self-interested and take decisions that would maximise their utility functions i.e.
maximise their profits. The line investor installs EG1 capacity and the transmission line T .
By building the line, the line investor will elicit a reaction from other renewable generation
investors, and must take into this reaction when considering their own investment decision.
Local generators react to the line being built by installing additional generation capacity
themselves. For simplicity, we can safely assume there is no renewable capacity installed at
location B prior to the construction of the transmission line and therefore local generators’
capacity can produce EG2 . Recall here that EGi represents the expected energy units which
could be produced over the project lifetime, according to the resource on the site’s location
of i generator, without encountering curtailment, while ECi is the amount of available
energy lost through curtailment under the adopted Principle of Access (PoA), as explained
in Chapter 3. A schematic of the model is shown in Fig. 4.3.
As the line is shared among the players under a ‘common access’ principle, profit
functions and therefore decisions on optimal generation capacities built are interdependent.
The line investor has two potential streams of revenue, one from own production and one
from the energy produced by other investors or local generators, transported through the
transmission line. The line investor’s costs are related to the installation and operation of
the generation capacity (generation cost cG1) and the installation of the power line CT .
Π1 = (EG1−EC1)pG−EG1cG1 +(EG2−EC2)pT −CT (4.10)
Similarly, local generators’ profits depend only on the energy they produce with some
generation cost cG2 and then transmit through the power line at an access charge of pT :
Π2 = (EG2−EC2)(pG− pT )−EG2cG2 (4.11)
Each player has to decide on his strategy, namely how much generation capacity should
one build. In the above expressions, profits as defined in Eq. (4.10) and Eq. (4.11) are
functions of the players’ own strategies, i.e. the rated capacity they install. Incurred
curtailment ECi however, is a function of both players’ strategies. Therefore, the line
investor or (leader) can assess and evaluate the reaction of other investors, to determine his
strategy, namely the level of renewable capacity to be installed, with the ultimate goal to










Fig. 4.3 Model schematic of the game with strategic players: RES generation capacity
built by the line investor EG1 and RES generation capacity built by local generators EG2
are connected at location B, while demand D is located at A
influence the equilibrium results and maximise his profits Π1. Local investors (followers)
can only act after observing the leader’s strategy and aim to maximise their profit Π2.
Taking these into consideration, the equilibrium of the game can be found by a well-known
technique in game-theoretic modelling called backward induction.
First of all, the leader estimates the best response of local generators, for every possible
strategy action. In other words, for every possible EG1 , the follower chooses to install
renewable capacity that produces EG2 and maximises his profit Π2. Hence, the local




Crucially, the renewable generation capacity installed by the follower will also be a function
of the generation capacity installed by the line investor.
Afterwards, the leader selects from the follower’s best responses, to build E∗G1 that
maximises his profit Π1. Given the best response capacity built by the followers E∗G2 , the






The line investor decides to install E∗G1 . At a second stage, the follower observes this
strategy and decides his generation capacity, according to its best response, i.e. maximising
his own profit, as anticipated and predicted by the leader. The solution of this process
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2) profits and satisfies both Eq. (4.12) and Eq. (4.13).
The network access arrangements and curtailment rules play here a crucial role for the
determination of the market equilibrium formed. We examine, in the following sections,
the effects of two representative curtailment rules, a LIFO-based rule and a proportional,
fair rule, which can be represented by either Pro Rata or FRR type of rules.
LIFO Scheme
Here, we study the results of the transmission capacity installed when a LIFO curtailment
rule is implemented.
Lemma 4.2.2. The transmission investment game between the line investor and local
generators, when a LIFO curtailment strategy is implemented, results in the following
expected generation capacities and profits at equilibrium:
E∗G1 = ED (4.14)
E∗G2 = 0 (4.15)
Π1
∗ = (pG− cG1) ·ED (4.16)
Π2
∗ = 0 (4.17)
Proof. The transmission line capacity is bound by the demand at mainland A, therefore
total generation capacity at location B installed by both players (EG1 +EG2), cannot exceed
ED. Under a LIFO scheme, any generation capacity built exceeding the demanded energy
has to be curtailed. Therefore:
EG1 +EG2 = ED (4.18)
Moreover, since EC1 = EC2 = 0, the profit functions defined in Eq. (4.12) and Eq. (4.13)
can be simplified as below:
Π1 = pT ·ED +(pG− pT − cG1) ·EG1−CT (4.19)
Π2 = (ED−EG1) · (pG− pT − cG2) (4.20)
Under a LIFO scheme the line investor (who acts first) is protected from any curtailment,
therefore has the absolute market advantage to build all generation capacity that satisfies the
demand ED himseld and maximise his profits. Local investors would suffer all curtailment
in the LIFO scheme, as they represent ‘late’ connections and have low priority, hence there
is no incentive for them to invest in new generation capacity. This concludes the proof.
In a LIFO curtailment strategy setting, the line investor has the absolute market advan-
tage, as LIFO always protects the line investor from any curtailment. This is not the case
under proportional curtailment rules that share curtailment equally between generators.
This case is examined in the following section.
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Pro Rata or FRR Scheme
The main difference from LIFO, is that Pro Rata or FRR rules are imposed to all generators,
regardless of their order of connection. Therefore, more total capacity EG = EG1 +EG2
than the energy demanded at A can potentially be installed, as long as the curtailment rate
or energy curtailed, allows the investments to be profitable. The total energy curtailed is
equal to the expected generation minus the expected demand:
EC = EG−ED (4.21)





Combining Eq. (4.21) and Eq. (4.22):
CR = 1− ED
EG1 +EG2
(4.23)
Using the curtailment rate from Eq. (4.23), the general profit functions of the players,
defined in Eq. (4.10) and Eq. (4.11) as functions of both players energy outputs i.e.
Π(EG1,EG2), can be written as:
Π1 = pG ·EG1 · (1−CR)+ pT ·EG2 ·
ED
EG1 +EG2













Respectively, the profit function of the follower is:









Estimation of the game equilibrium with backward induction requires the determination
of the players’ best responses. First of all, the best response of local generators is estimated
for a given EG1 .
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Proposition 4.2.3. Given the generation capacity of the leader EG1 , the best response of
the follower, which maximises his profit is equal to:
E∗G2 =
√
(pG− pT ) ·ED ·EG1
cG2
−EG1 (4.28)
Proof. As already stated the value of EG2 which maximises the profit of the follower is:
EG2
∗ = argmax Π2
EG2










By solving the above for EG2 , the desired equation is derived.
As shown above EG2 is a function of EG1 , i.e. EG2 = EG2(EG1). By a similar analysis
as above, the best response of the leader is found. The leader only needs to consider local
generators’ strategies that correspond to the follower playing his best response.
Proposition 4.2.4. Given the output of the follower E∗G2 , the best (i.e. profit-maximising)
response of the leader is:
E∗G1 =
(pG− pT ) · cG2 ·ED
4 · cG12
Proof. The value of EG1 , which maximises the profit of the follower is:
EG1
∗ = argmax Π1
EG1
Substituting Eq. (4.28) in Eq. (4.25) gives:
Π1 =
√
(pG− pT ) ·ED · cG2 ·EG1 + pT ·ED− cG1 ·EG1−CT (4.31)





(pG− pT ) · cG2 ·ED−2 · cG1 ·
√
EG1 (4.32)
Finally, setting the latest equation equal to zero gives the stated expression.
The Stackelberg equilibrium game needs to satisfy both best response equations. The
result is shown below.
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Lemma 4.2.5. The transmission investment game between the line investor and local
generators with Pro Rata, results in expected generation at Stackelberg equilibrium:
E∗G1 =










(pG− pT ) · cG2 ·ED
4 · cG1
+ pT ·ED−CT (4.35)
Π2
∗ =
(2 · cG1− cG2)2 · (pG− pT ) ·ED
4 · c2G1
(4.36)
Proof. Replacing Proposition 2 in Eq. (4.28), the optimum output of local generators
E∗G2,B is found, i.e. (4.34). Finally, substituting the energy outputs at equilibrium Eq. (4.33)
and Eq. (4.34) in (4.25) and (4.27), we derive the equilibrium profits Π1∗ = max Π1 and
Π2
∗ = max Π2.
By adding up Eq. (4.33) and Eq. (4.34), it can be observed that the total generation
installed at B depends on the energy demand, the transmission fee and the line investor’s
generation cost, as shown below:






Note here that Eq. (4.37) does not depend on cG2 .
Finally note that a curtailment scheme is required, if and only if the total generation
capacity exceeds the net demand at A, i.e. EG1 +EG2 > ED (otherwise there is no strategic
interaction and no game, as both players can sell all their generated power). This constraint
yields the following condition, which must hold for the setting to actually be game-theoretic





In addition, the follower’s generation cost needs to be smaller or equal to the difference of
the selling tariff price minus the transmission fee to satisfy the rationality criteria:
cG2 < pG− pT (4.39)
The latter derives from the requirement that Eq. (4.26) is positive when no curtailment is
imposed, i.e. CR = 0. By Eq. (4.39) is concluded that the follower can only make a profit,
if the followers generation cost is below (pG− pT ).
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Fig. 4.4 Hunterston-Kintyre project map: Power line connecting Scottish mainland (high
demand area) to the Kintyre peninsula (high renewable generation capacity) [235]
In the following section, the theoretical analysis results of the game with strategic
players and Pro Rata are applied to a practical example based on realistic figures from a
grid reinforcement project located in the western coast of Scotland.
4.3 Practical application example
In this section, we apply the theoretical Stackelberg model stated in the previous section
(c.f. Lemma 4.2.5), to a practical example based on a grid reinforcement project in the UK,
the Kintyre-Hunterston link. The project attracted considerable attention (being a national
consultation exercise) from both the National Grid (the UK’s system operator) and the
responsible DNO for this particular region, Scottish Southern Energy (SSE).
The power grid in the Kintyre peninsula was originally designed and built to serve a
typical rural area of low local demand. Wind energy development quickly led to substantial
volumes of renewable investment in the region. RES capacity in the region was estimated
to be up to 454 MW by 2015. Future renewable connections in this area were estimated
to exceed 793 MW. SSE, the regional DNO, proceeded to a grid reinforcement project
that aimed to connect the Kintyre peninsula to the Scottish mainland, in the location of
Hunterston, partially via a sub-sea link (see Fig. 4.4).
More analytically, the grid reinforcement project consisted of:
• Subsea cable installation works north of Arran and the installation of 2×220 kV
of 240 MVA HVAC subsea cables at a distance of 2×41 km from Crossaig to the
existing substation at Hunterston
• New substation 132/220 kV built in Crossaig
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• Power line upgrade over a distance of 13 km of 132 kV double circuit overhead
line between Carradale and the Crossaig substation and dismantling of the existing
overhead line
• Integration works to the existing substation in Hunterston
The project estimated the creation of 150 MW additional renewable capacity [235]
with an estimated cost of £230m. Note here that the capacity of network upgrades and
associated costs are largely determined by the rating, distance and characteristics of the
connection route. Underground cables and sub-sea interconnenctors have higher costs than
overhead power lines. For high voltage power lines e.g. 275 kV and 400 kV, underground
cables are reportedly 8 times more expensive than overhead lines, costing an additional
£10m per km [163].
Apart from facilitating renewable generation, the project also aimed to increase the
security of supply by increasing the export capability to the mainland grid. According to a
Sinclair Knight Merz (SKM) study, the grid reinforcement project is expected to deliver
significant value to consumers, since the project costs are lower than the projected costs for
congestion management, estimated at £18m per annum. SKM estimated the net lifetime
benefit of the project at £520m [232].
Realistic figures based on the Kintyre-Hunterston project were used for the practical
demonstration of the game-theoretic models developed in this thesis, starting from the
application of the Stackelberg game equilibrium results, as shown in the following section.
4.4 Practical demonstration results for analytical solution
Based on the Kintyre-Hunterston project figures, a simplified two-node network is con-
sidered. Scottish mainland, where the Hunterston substation is located, represents the
high demand location A and the Kintyre peninsula represents the high renewable gener-
ation or location B. The mainland energy demand met by generation in Kintyre, equals
the energy transmitted through the power line. With the majority of investment being
wind projects, the total energy demand is estimated as ED = 9,198,000 MWh, which
corresponds to 150 MW of wind capacity, with a typical CF of 35% and 20 years project
lifetime. Moreover, it is assumed that the energy generated by renewable production can be
sold for a constant generation price, reflecting financial support mechanisms for renewable
generation. Such support mechanisms are usually technology-specific and depend on the
RES capacity built. Typical support mechanisms in the UK are feed-in-tariff prices, usually
granted to smaller scale generators or CfD schemes designed to supplement and minimise
RES generator exposure to volatile wholesale electricity market prices. For the practical
example analysis a generation price of pG = £74.30/MWh was assumed, equivalent to the
support mechanism in the UK available at the time of study, such as the revenue generated
by a medium sized wind turbine with a feed-in tariff and export fee of £2.52/kWh and
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3-a Scenario 3-b
cG1 0.14pG : 0.02pG : 0.37pG 0.30pG 0.26pG 0.20pG
cG2 0.30pG 0 : 0.02pG : 0.74pG 0.20pG 0.26pG
pT 0.26pG 0.26pG 0 : 0.02pG : 0.48pG 0 : 0.02pG : 0.60pG
Table 4.1 Summary of cost parameters considered in scenarios for the analysis of the
transmission capacity game with distributed generation (in all scenarios the generation
price remained fixed at pG = £74.3/MWh and the transmission cost at CT = £230m
£4.91/kWh5, respectively [180]. Based on the Kintyre-Hunterston project figures, the
transmission cost of the line was assumed equal to CT = £230m.
Finally, the following scenarios were considered in order to study the effect of dif-
ferent cost parameters to equilibrium results. In each scenario, the cost parameter under
examination varies, while other parameters remain fixed. All parameters are shown in
relation to pG for easier interpretation of results. For each scenario, the range of the ‘free’
parameter (fixing the others) is determined from the constraints in Eq. (4.38) and Eq. (4.39).
A summary of cost parameters for each scenario is provided at Table 4.1.
4.4.1 Scenario results
To study the equilibrium results, we assume the following set of assumptions. In each case
or scenario, all parameters remain fixed except the parameter under study. Each scenario
aims to study the effects of a financial parameter to the game equilibrium results. Three
main scenarios were assumed:
• Scenario 1: Varying line investor’s generation cost: In this scenario, local gener-
ators’ cost and transmission fee are set equal to cG2 = 0.30pG and pT = 0.26pG,
respectively. The parameter under examination, varies from cG1 = 0.14pG to 0.37pG.
The equilibrium results for the optimal generation capacity installed and players’
profits are shown in Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6, respectively. We make sure Eq. (4.39)
conditionality is respected (in this occasion cG1 has to be smaller than 0.37pG and
within the accepted range for the model to be relevant). The energy generation
at equilibrium in Fig. 4.5, shows that cG1 has to be larger than 0.15pG for local
generators to be able to build any renewable generation capacity (EG2 ≥ 0). Fig. 4.5,
shows that the total capacity build at location B drops as the cG1 value increases.
Moreover, local producers’ capacity exceeds that the line investor’s capacity when
cG1 ≥ cG2). Players build the same generation capacity when cG1 = cG2 = 0.30pG.
5Note here that in the UK the feed-in-tariff mechanism is no longer valid for new onshore wind devel-
opments since March 2019. Depending on the RES capacity built, RES generators can generate revenue
from the electricity sold either through Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) with energy suppliers, through
participate in wholesale electricity markets and support by CfD schemes. For simplicity, a constant revenue
stream was assumed based on a medium wind turbine, valid at the initial time of this study, shown also in
the Appendix. Full information on the feed-in-tariff support mechanism can be found on Ofgem’s website:
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/environmental-programmes/fit/fit-tariff-rates
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Fig. 4.5 Scenario 1: Effects of line investor’s generation cost on energy production
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Fig. 4.6 Scenario 1: Effects of line investor’s generation cost on profits
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Fig. 4.7 Scenario 2: Effects of local generators generation cost on energy production
Profit functions present a similar behaviour, with higher profits when generation
capacity is high, and lower profits when installed generation capacity is low. Profits
are equalised for cG1 = 0.26pG, as shown in Fig. 4.6.
• Scenario 2: Varying local generators’ cost: In this scenario, the line investor’s
generation cost is cG1 = 0.30pG and the transmission fee is pT = 0.26pG, while the
local generators’ cost varies from cG2 = 0 to 0.74pG. Results are shown in Fig. 4.7
and Fig. 4.8. In this setting, Eq. (4.38) conditionality demands that cG2 < 0.74pG.
In fact, Fig. 4.7 shows that cG2 < 0.60pG for local generators to install any renewable
generation capacity at B (EG2 ≥ 0). Also, it can be seen that the total generation
capacity at location B is constant and independent of the local producers generation
cost cG2 . In addition, total generation capacity exceeds the generation demand
at location A, assumed equal to ED = 9,198,000 MWh. The generation capacity
of local generators is larger than the capacity of the line investor at location B,
when cG2 < cG1 . The two players build equal capacity, when generation costs are
equalised cG1 = cG2 . Profit functions follow similar a behaviour as in Scenario 1 and
are equalised for cG2 = 0.34pG, as shown in Fig. 4.8.
• Scenario 3: Varying transmission fee: For this scenario, two cases are examined
with different assumptions on the relation of players’ costs of generation.
In the first case, the line investor’s generation cost is cG1 = 0.26pG and the local
generators’ cost is equal to cG2 = 0.20pG. The transmission fee varies from 0 to
0.48pG, as derived by the prerequisite condition in Eq. (4.38). Results are shown
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Fig. 4.8 Scenario 2: Effects of local generators generation cost on profits
in Fig. 4.9 and Fig. 4.10. In the second case, the line investor’s generation cost
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Fig. 4.9 Scenario 3-a: Effects of transmission fee on energy production for cG1 > cG2
is cG1 = 0.20pG and the local generators’ cost is equal to cG2 = 0.26pG. The
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Fig. 4.10 Scenario 3-a: Effects of transmission fee on profits for cG1 > cG2
transmission fee varies from 0 to 0.60pG, as derived by the prerequisite condition in
Eq. (4.38). Results are shown in Fig. 4.11 and Fig. 4.12.
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Fig. 4.11 Scenario 3-b: Effects of transmission fee on energy production for cG1 < cG2
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Fig. 4.12 Scenario 3-b: Effects of transmission fee on profits for cG1 < cG2
Total generation capacity at location B decreases as pT increases, as seen in both
cases (see Fig. 4.9 and Fig. 4.11). When cG1 > cG2 , local generators build more
generation capacity than the line investor (EG2 > EG1). The opposite is valid when
cG1 < cG2 , i.e. the line investor builds more generation capacity than local generators
(EG1 > EG2).
For small values of pT , the line investor may not make any profit (Π1 < 0), as seen in
Fig. 4.10 and Fig. 4.12. Fig. 4.10 shows that a positive profit for the line investor is
achieved for pT ≥ 0.18pG. On the other hand, in Fig. 4.12, it is shown that positive
profits can be achieved for a much smaller transmission fee pT ≥ 0.02pG. However,
as the transmission fee pT increases, the line investor’s profit also increases, as he
benefits from charging a higher price for the energy transmitted through the line.
When cG2 > cG1 , the line investor builds more capacity than other local producers
at B, therefore profit figures are significantly improved (see a comparison between
Fig. 4.10 and Fig. 4.12). On the contrary, local generators see diminishing profits, as
transmission fee grows.
4.4.2 Discussion of results
Given a certain generation tariff price pG, the feasibility of the transmission capacity game
depends directly on the generation cost cG1 (see Fig. 4.5) and the transmission fee pT (see
Fig. 4.9 and Fig. 4.11).
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If the line is built and access to demand is therefore granted, it sets up a level of total
feasible generation investment at B which, combined with a proportional access rule, leads
to larger volumes of capacity being built than the actual demand (see Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.7),
as long as the curtailment rate is kept under reasonable levels and renewable investment
projects are viable. Recall here that from Eq. (4.37), total production or generation capacity
installed at the game equilibrium depends on the demand at location A ED, the transmission
fee pT and the line investor’s generation cost cG1 . ED determines an upper level for the
total generation that can be built at location B. By increasing the capacity beyond this level,
production could not be absorbed by the mainland grid, leading to unacceptable levels of
curtailment, hence, the investments would not be profitable. When pT is increased, total
generation capacity is expected to decrease, as shown in Fig. 4.9 and Fig. 4.11. Finally,
optimal generation is inversely proportional to the line investors generation cost cG1 . Note
that the total level of generation does not depend on the generation costs of local investors,
since they cannot act without the existence of the line (see Fig. 4.7).
For all scenarios, the comparative relation between cG1 and cG2 determines how the
exportable level of generation capacity, defined by the upper level of demand in A, is
shared among the two players. Cheaper generation has an advantage in all three scenarios
sets of results (c.f. Fig. 4.5-4.11), although as the graphs show, the dependency is not
necessarily linear. The players install equal generation capacities when cG1 = cG2 .
Profit equations depend on the generation capacity installed by each player and the
transmission fee. The relation between the profits and the generation capacity built presents
positive correlation. For the line investor the larger the transmission charges, the higher the
profits, while local generators experience lower profits as pT increases. In practice, local
generators may have smaller generation costs than the line investor due to cheaper access
to land and permit approval for final RES development. Consequently, results shown in
Fig. 4.9 and Fig. 4.10 tend to represent real-world settings in a more accurate fashion.
Another conclusion is that transmission charges, agreed by the line investor and an
independent regulatory authority, have to be set within a specific range. Low values of
pT may lead to transmission investment being aborted, somewhat larger values might
theoretically be sufficient to achieve profitability for the line investor, however, hide the
risk of ‘free-riding’ from local investors, who benefit from the leader’s investment at cost
much less than to leader’s himself. What the result in Fig. 4.10 shows is that there exists a
range in which pT can be set such as to assure the line gets built (i.e. when the leader’s
profits are above 0 – in this case, transmission charges need to be at least £13/MWh),
but also not discourage other local renewable investors. If the value of the transmission
fee is set too high, then this will prevent local producers from investing in renewable
energy, as their profit diminishes with increasing transmission fee. The line investor can
react by building the generation capacity himself. When cG1 > cG2 , this would lead to
the renewable capacity being built by more expensive generation. In the second case of
Scenario 3, transmission charges need to be at least £2/MWh) to allow any profit for the
line investor, as shown in Fig. 4.12. On the other hand, if the value of the transmission fee
is set too high, then this will prevent other RES producers to invest in further generation,
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as their profit diminishes with increasing transmission fee. The line investor can react by
building the generation capacity himself, but up to the level of decreasing total generation
capacity as pT values increase.
4.5 Concluding remarks
Chapter 4 studied how line access and curtailment rules can affect investment decisions
on new transmission capacity being built. Two agent settings were explored, myopic and
strategic agents.
In areas already experiencing high curtailment, the transmission line investment is
viable if and only if the curtailment rate (prior to the line construction) is higher than
a threshold τT . Moreover, it was shown that the line investor is able to charge in this
occasion a very expensive transmission fee, the theoretical limit of which can approach pG.
The reason being that curtailed energy is anyway wasted energy for local generators, who
would be willing to accept high charges, as long as they are (even marginally) better off.
It can be argued that in real-world situations, the model would have limited application,
as it presupposes high curtailment rates and high levels of generation capacity already
built. Furthermore, high charges for transmission might not be in practice accepted by
local producers, resulting in higher prices potentially reached through negotiation.
The analysis for strategic agents was performed for two cases of curtailment rules,
LIFO and Pro Rata/FRR. For the latter case, the work shows that network infrastructure
such as building new transmission/distribution lines can be built under a ‘common access’
principle, where a private investor is granted a license to build the line, subject to the
condition he grants network access to other competing generators, who pay a transmission
fee for the energy transported through the line.
Such shared-capacity line models can also be used settings, where power line infras-
tructure is privately-owned. For example, a large investor, who is financially capable of
funding a power line and required equipment to get connected to the main distribution
network, can also grant access to other smaller generators or demand consumers6, either on
a permanent arrangement or temporarily until their own project connection infrastructure
works are completed. In such a case, the line-sharing rules are arranged privately through
commercial agreements between RES investors. Transmission charges are also dictated in
private contracts. Grid infrastructure is managed privately up to the point of connection
with the DNO-owned network. As per normal procedures, the power coupling point needs
to comply with technical and regulatory rules. There are several observations here that
need to be noted. First, an investor would agree in sharing his grid access if there is
spare capacity on the line already installed, in which occasion a LIFO scheme would
make more sense. Second, these synergies are more likely to happen in cases when RES
6One example of a privately owned distribution network that is connected through a single point of con-
nection to the DNO-owned network is the eco-village of Findhorn, in the north of Scotland. The community
owns a private distribution network that connects residential consumers, commercial consumers and a wind
park. More information on Fidhorn can be found here: https://www.ecovillagefindhorn.com/
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projects have complementary natures and resources are not perfectly correlated, resulting
in unsynchronised use of the line. Finally, in real-world settings, investments on larger
capacity lines, in expectation that other generators might connect and use the line, may
come at significant costs and hide large risks.
The work presented in Chapter 4 examined the combined effects of curtailment strate-
gies and line access rules on network expansion. One aspect our study highlights is that
regulatory authorities who seek renewable facilitation can promote grid infrastructure
expansion, not only by providing subsidies or technical support, but by allowing ‘common
access’ rules, as a tool to attract private investment and improve the profitability of line
investors.
The Stackelberg game equilibrium results also show that there is a range of acceptable
transmission charges that the line investor can impose. If the transmission fee is too small,
then it is not profitable for the line investor to construct the power line. On the other hand,
if the transmission fee is set too high, then the local producers are prevented from any
feasible renewable investment.
The assumptions in the model presented in Chapter 4 allowed for an analytical closed-
form solution of the game. However, the model does not take into account the stochastic
nature of wind resources nor the variability of demand. This would allow for more accurate
estimation of the incurred curtailment and equilibrium results. These issues are further
explored in Chapter 5. The following chapter improves this work, by formalising the
Stackelberg game solution as a stochastic problem and by utilising real wind speed and
demand data for the estimation of the game equilibrium.

Chapter 5
Transmission capacity game with
stochastic generation
Chapter 5 presents an extension of the model developed in Chapter 4. The model presented
in Chapter 4 followed an approach based on average or expected values of RES resources
and demand over a large time horizon equal to the project lifetime. In practice however,
expected curtailment depends on variable renewable resources and their relation to the
power demand. The model developed in this chapter takes into account the stochastic
nature of RES resources, such as wind speed, and the variability of the demand. The
first part of Chapter 5 provides the theoretical foundations of the extended model leading
to the estimation of the Stackelberg game equilibrium. The theoretical formulation and
analysis requires knowledge of the distributions of the wind resource and demand for
the locations under study. However, even when distributions can be inferred by available
historic data, incurred curtailment, which depends jointly on the wind resource at each
investor’s location and demand, cannot always be computed analytically. The same holds
for the Stackelberg game equilibrium estimation process. This limitation can be avoided
by using an empirical and algorithmic approach that directly utilises available historic
data, such as wind speed and demand data. As previously, the Kintyre-Hunterston grid
reinforcement project was used to demonstrate a practical and empirical solution approach
for equilibrium estimation.
The stochastic model and parts of the work presented in Chapter 5 were published in a
peer-reviewed journal article [13].
5.1 Research contributions
Research work presented in Chapter 5 builds on the game-theoretic model of Chapter 4
and work published in [8, 12]. More specifically, the model focuses on the two-location
Stackelberg game, formed between the line investor (leader) and local generators (follower)
when a transmission line is installed, the use of which is shared by both players under a
‘common access’ principle. Most crucially, any curtailment incurred is also shared equally
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between the players following the principle of a fair curtailment scheme, such as Pro Rata
or FRR.
Relevant publications to the work presented here were discussed in Chapter 4. In
addition to those works, most relevant to the model presented in this chapter is the
work from Anaya & Pollitt [7]. They provided a cost-benefit analysis, which compared
traditional connections i.e. network upgrades to smart interruptible connections, however
their results were based on static assumptions of the generation mix and curtailment levels.
The results from the work presented in this chapter are based on hourly data of RES
resources and demand. In more detail, the specific contributions of the work presented in
Chapter 5 that advance the state of the art are:
• Work published in [8, 12] and Chapter 4 followed assumptions on expected gen-
eration and curtailment that led to a closed form solution of the Stackelberg game
equilibrium. The model presented in Chapter 5 extends previous work by developing
a stochastic game formulation and by formulating a theoretical analysis of the game.
The analysis can be used to estimate the equilibrium of the leader-follower game
when distributions of RES resources and demand are known, and curtailment can be
computed directly from these distributions. However, in practice this is difficult to
achieve without the use of an empirical or algorithmic solution.
• An algorithmic approach that utilises real renewable resource and demand data
is shown. This empirical solution dictates how curtailment can be computed in
practical settings and captures stochastic variation of wind resources and variability
of demand in the equilibrium results. This forms a new solution concept that is based
on empirical or simulation analysis for payoff estimation. Similar approaches can be
used in various settings with RES generation analysis, as a generic way to estimate
payoff functions and game equilibria. Moreover, we show a data analysis approach
for estimation of wind power generation and demand.
• Next, the algorithmic approach is applied to a practical application based on realistic
assumptions from the Kintyre-Hunterston grid reinforcement project in Western
Scotland. Real wind speed measurements and demand data that spanned over
the course of 17 years were used for equilibrium estimation and determination of
optimal generation capacities built by players along with their associated profits at
the equilibrium of the game. An additional contribution of the work is the wind
speed data analysis process and estimation of wind power generation presented in
this chapter.
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5.2 Stackelberg game with stochastic generation and vari-
able demand
This section investigates the combined effects of fair curtailment strategies, such as Pro Rata
or FRR, and ‘common access’ line rules on grid reinforcement and renewable generation
capacity installed.
Similarly to the model introduced in Chapter 4, a two-location model is assumed, where
a transmission line is built between locations A-B. The line investor installs renewable
generation capacity at B, equal to a rated capacity of PN1 , and a local player, who represents
the local renewable generators at B, installs PN2 . The demand at location A is represented
as D. Note here that D represents the demand at location A, while PD represents the
demand that is served by RES generators located in the area of high renewable generation
or B. Demand served by the renewable capacity of the leader or line investor is denoted as
PD1 and demand served by local generators/investors is denoted as PD2 . If a larger time
horizon is assumed, generation and curtailment can be expressed in energy terms, i.e. EGi
represents the generation, ECi the curtailed energy and EDi the demand served by the i
player. A simple schematic of the model is shown in Fig. 5.1.
With respect to profits, the line investor earns revenue from the energy generated
by his own capacity and serves demand at A or ED1 , and the energy generated by local
generators and transmitted through the line or ED2 . The line investor incurs the renewable
capacity installation cost and the cost of building the line. Local investors earn revenue
when serving demand ED2 and pay a cost for building the renewable generation capacity
at B. For each player, the demand served is equal to the potential generation minus the
curtailment incurred:
ED1 = EG1−EC1 (5.1)
and
ED2 = EG2−EC2 (5.2)
The profit functions for the line investor and local generators can be expressed as in
Eq. (4.10) and Eq. (4.11), respectively. The equations are repeated here for the convenience
of readers:
Π1 = (EG1−EC1)pG−EG1cG1 +(EG2−EC2)pT −CT
Π2 = (EG2−EC2)(pG− pT )−EG2cG2
Similarly to the analysis presented in Section 4.2.2, the estimation of the Stackelberg
game equilibrium, answers the research question of the optimal generation capacities that
players need to install, in order to maximise their profits, given that the line investor has
a first mover advantage over smaller generators and investors at B. A player’s strategy
action is the rated capacity he can install (PNi). Therefore, the research question can be
rephrased as ‘Which are the optimal rated capacities players install at the equilibrium of
the game, so that profits are maximised?’ The Stackelberg game equilibrium can be found
by backward induction, where the line investor first estimates the local generators best










Fig. 5.1 Model schematic of the game with stochastic generation and variable demand:
RES generation capacity built by the line investor PN1 and RES generation capacity built
by local generators PN2 are connected at location B, while demand D is located at A





Next, the line investor selects from the follower’s best responses P∗N2 , the strategy that






The game equilibrium (P∗N1,P
∗
N2) must satisfy both Eq. (5.3) and Eq. (5.4).
Note here that profit functions refer to a longer time horizon and are expressed in
energy terms over this time period. Crucially, however, energy quantities depend on the
rated capacities installed by players i.e. EGi can be expressed as a function of PNi , and
in the case when curtailment is shared equally between players (Pro Rata or FRR type
of curtailment strategy), curtailment ECi can be expressed as a bivariate function of both
players’ strategies (PN1 ,PN2). Generation and curtailment depend on the wind resource at
the project’s location and variable demand. As a result, it is possible to derive expressions
of these quantities with respect to known distributions of renewable resources and demand,
as shown in the following theoretical analysis. First, a theoretical formulation of the model
is shown for a single player, to ease understanding, and next, the formulation is extended
for the two-player game.
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5.2.1 Single player analysis
This section shows how generation and curtailment quantities in the general profit equations
can be expressed as functions of a player’s strategy, namely the rated capacity he chooses
to install. To ease understanding, a single player i or generator is at first assumed. The
per unit or normalised power that can be generated by the player, if no curtailment is
required, is defined as a stochastic variable xi = PGi/PNi , where PGi is the actual power
output of generator i, and PNi is the rated capacity. Crucially, xi depends directly on the
renewable resource, such as the wind speed distribution, and a generator’s power generation
curve. The generation or power curve describes the relation of the power output to the
renewable resource available. The largest power output a generator can produce is equal to
its rated capacity, therefore xi is bounded in the region xi ∈ [0,1]. If xi follows a probability
distribution function f (xi), then
∫ 1
0
f (xi)dxi = 1. By definition, the expected generation,
when curtailment is not considered, is equal to:
E(PGi) = E(xi) ·PNi =
∫ 1
0
xiPNi f (xi)dxi (5.5)
Curtailed power depends on the power that can be generated, given the wind resource,
and the actual demand at the mainland location. Assuming Dt is the demand at time t,
which can be predicted with great accuracy from historic demand [158, 159] and weather
data available, generation curtailment is required for all t that generation exceeds the
demand PGi −Dt > 0 or expressed in relation to the normalised power output, for all t
that xi > Dt/PNi . In practice, the time interval t can be defined as a reasonable time step,
e.g. one hour or any other suitable metric that can easily coordinate with the resolution of
available historic data, either wind speed or demand data.
The expected power curtailed (for time interval t) can then be expressed as the differ-
ence between the conditional expectation of the power generated minus the demand, under
the condition that generation exceeds that demand, multiplied by the probability that the
power generated exceeds the demand. In other words, the expected curtailment is equal to
the expected value of the generation given that generation exceeds the demand (a posteriori
expectation) minus the power demanded times the probability that generation exceeds the
demand:





The conditional expectation, as in the first term of the previous equation, is by definition
equal to:
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Eq. (5.5) and Eq. (5.8) represent the expected power generated and curtailed at t,
respectively. For a longer period of time, e.g. equal to the project lifetime, the total
energy produced is equal to EGi = ∑
t
E(PGi,t ),∀t, as derived by (5.5). In a similar fashion,
by Eq. (5.8) the energy curtailed is given by the summation of the expected curtailment
for each t, hence ECi = ∑
t
E(PCi,t ),∀t. A similar theoretical analysis can be applied in a
two-player setting as shown in the following section.
5.2.2 Two player analysis
This section estimates the expected power produced and curtailed for a setting comprising
two players. Let’s assume two types of generators, the leader (player 1) and follower
(player 2), both located at an area of favourable RES potential B, but at different sub-
regions of this location. The wind resources at these sub-regions differentiate from each
other, but experience a degree of spatial correlation, due to the proximity of the locations.
The generators aim to satisfy the same aggregate demand at A.
Following the same intuition as in the previous section, production of players can be
modelled as correlated stochastic variables xi, where x1 and x2 follow a joint probability





f (x1,x2)dx2dx1 = 1. A
joint probability distribution is required to model the correlation between wind resources,
e.g. wind projects deployed at proximate areas (sub-regions of B) are most likely charac-
terised by simultaneous time periods of high and low wind speeds. The aggregate expected






(x1PN1 + x2PN2) f (x1,x2)dx2dx1 (5.9)
Following the same analysis as in Section 5.2.1, production needs to be curtailed
at times when generation exceeds demand or for all t that x1PN1 + x2PN2 −Dt > 0. By
rearrangement, the latter results in x2 >
Dt− x1PN1
PN2
. Total expected curtailment is equal to
the expected generation, given that generation exceeds the demand (a posteriori expectation)
minus the power demanded, and multiplied by the probability that generation exceeds the
demand:
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By definition, the conditional expectation of generation during a curtailment event (i.e.
when RES oversupply occurs) is equal to:





























Eq. (5.9) and Eq. (5.12) represent the aggregate expected power generated and cur-
tailed at t, respectively. If a longer time period is assumed, the total energy produced
by both players is equal to EG = ∑
t
E(PGt ),∀t, as derived by Eq. (5.9). Moreover, the
total energy curtailed is equal to the summation of curtailment for all t and is equal to
EC = ∑
t
E(PCt ),∀t, where PCt is given by Eq. (5.12).
The general profit functions (as in Eq. (4.10) and Eq. (4.11)), however, require expres-
sions for individual production and curtailment. The energy production by a single player i,




E(PGi,t ),∀t as in Eq. (5.5).
The energy curtailed by i player is equal to ECi = ∑
t
PCi,t ,∀t. Assuming the implementation
of a curtailment strategy that shares curtailment evenly between generators, and according
to their actual power output at the time of curtailment, the power curtailed by i player





where −i denotes other players or opponents. As shown in Chapter 3, such ‘fair’ curtail-
ment strategies lead to approximately equal CF reduction, in the long term. Therefore, the
energy curtailed by each player throughout a longer time horizon can be approximated





This concludes the analysis, as profits can be expressed as functions of the players’
strategies. Specifically, EGi is a function of PNi and crucially, ECi is a function of both
players’ strategies or generation capacities the players may install (PN1,PN2). The equi-
librium of the Stackelberg game can be found following the procedure and best response
estimations, as in Eq. (5.3) and Eq. (5.4).
The theoretical analysis shown here, requires knowledge of historic data on wind
resources and demand. Moreover, a solution of the Stackelberg game equilibrium requires
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solving the integral expressions and estimation of distribution functions. In the following
section, we show how the methodology can be applied in a practical setting, such as the
Kintyre-Hunterston grid reinforcement project.
5.3 Theoretical analysis application to a practical setting
The previous section presented the theoretical analysis of the leader-follower game and
the equilibrium emerging from the strategic interactions of the players in this game.
Application of the theoretical results requires the utilisation of historic data on wind
resource and demand, in order to accurately estimate the probability distribution functions
required for generation and curtailment estimation.
A practical application of the theoretical results is shown here based on realistic
assumptions of a real grid reinforcement project in the UK, the installation of the Kintyre-
Hunterston link. In a similar fashion to previous analysis, Hunterston is assumed to be
the location of high demand (Location A) and Kintyre the location of high renewable
potential (Location B). Moreover, it is assumed that both players may install new renewable
generation capacity at B, albeit in different sub-regions of B. Equilibrium estimation
requires the analysis of available wind speed data and demand at the two-location setting.
5.3.1 Wind resource data analysis
The analysis is based on wind speed datasets containing historic data on UK mean wind
speed, which were obtained by the Met Office Integrated Data Archive System (MI-
DAS) [164]. The data analysis process in Section 5.3.1 describes the steps followed to
analyse the wind speed data and estimate the wind power generation data. Datasets contain
observations on mean wind speed collected by numerous weather stations across the UK.
In order to accurately represent the wind resource at the two sub-regions at location B,
two weather stations were selected from the MIDAS repository. Located in the Kintyre
peninsula, the data collected from the station with ID 908 are used to model the production
of the renewable capacity installed by the line investor. The weather station with ID 23417,
located in Islay and approximately 44 km away, is used to model renewable production by
local generators. The criteria for station selection were based on their availability of data,
alignment across the same period of time and their proximity, so that a degree of spatial
wind speed correlation can be captured by the model. The weather stations selected have
common available data across a 17-year time period, from 1999 to 2015. The duration
of the time period is approximately equal to a typical project lifetime of a renewable
development, which is usually around 20 years.
Wind speed observations ua consist of hourly data entries of mean wind speeds,
computed as the hourly average across 10-min measurements, measured at anemometer
height za. Let the wind speed historic data be represented by ua,i, where i = 1 denotes the
wind resource of the line investor and i = 2 denotes the wind speed at the local generators’
project location. Observations are measured at an anemometer height of za = 10 m for
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Fig. 5.2 Wind speed histogram and best Weibull fit 9:00 in Autumn (local generators’
location)
both stations and are rounded to the nearest knot (1 kn = 0.5144 m/s). Data is already
preprocessed and cleaned by the dataset provider. To improve on the alignment of available
data across the two weather stations, any missing data for a shorter than a 6 hr duration
were replaced by a linear interpolation of the nearest available wind speeds, rounded to
the nearest knot. This practice is not expected to introduce a large error, as large variation
of wind speeds is unusual within short periods of time. In addition, the data interpolated
represent a small part of the total observations available. Any missing data of a larger
duration were removed from both players datasets and were not taken into consideration
for the analysis.
The first step for the data processing was to extrapolate wind speed observations ua
taken by the measuring equipment at weather stations to the wind turbine’s hub height. A





where w is the wind speed extrapolated at hub height, ua is the wind speed at anemometer
height, za the anemometer height, zh the hub height and zo the surface roughness of the
environment where measurements were taken. A typical wind turbine was considered, such
as the Enercon E821 with 2.05 MW rated capacity, cut-in wind speed of 3 m/s, cut-out
wind speed of 28 m/s, a rated wind speed of 13 m/s at which the turbine is able to generate
its nominal power output and a hub height of zh = 85 m. Moreover, similarly to other
works [84, 260], the surface roughness was chosen to be short grass, which represents a
typical environment for the weather stations and therefore a suitable value for the parameter
zo was chosen as zo = 30 mm.
1http://www.enercon.de/en/products/ep-2/e-82/
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Fig. 5.3 Power curve of Enercon E82 and best Sigmoid fit function
Weibull distributions are often used to represent actual wind speed distributions and
are commonly used in the literature. Typical examples from wind speed forecasting papers
include [61, 245]. Using the extrapolated values of wind speeds at hub height, derived
from Eq. (5.15), and at each player’s location, the probability distribution function of w














To achieve greater accuracy, different Weibull distributions may be assumed that
capture hourly and seasonal variations of wind speed. Wind conditions depend highly
on the time of day and season. Assuming 24 hours and 4 seasons, a total of 96 Weibull
distributions were generated, one for every hour (1−24) and season (1−4). It is assumed
that hour 1 refers to 00:00 and hour 24 to 23:00, March, April and May refer to Spring,
June, July and August to Summer, September, October and November to Autumn and
December, January and February refer to Winter. Fig. 5.2 shows the wind speed histogram
and best fit of a Weibull distributions for 09:00 in Autumn at the location of the local
generator’s renewable project. The parameters of the Weibull distributions are found by
use of the ‘fitdist’ function in MATLAB.
Given the wind speed w, renewable production can be estimated by use of a generic
power curve. The power curve represents the relation of wind speed at hub height with
the power output of a wind turbine. Several values of the power curve are known by the
wind turbine manufacture, as shown in Fig. 5.3 for the E82 wind turbine. The power
output is normalised according to maximum power output of the turbine achieved under
nominal conditions Ppu = P/PN . The intermediate values can be approximated by a
sigmoid function with parameters α = 0.3921 m/s and β = 16.4287 m/s found by the
‘fitdist’ MATLAB function (see Fig. 5.3):
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Fig. 5.4 Power output histogram and best fit Beta curve 9:00 in Autumn (local generators’
location)
As seen in Fig. 5.3, generation is negligible for very low wind speeds and equal to maximum
output for higher values than the nominal wind speed. In the intermediate area, generation
varies with the third power of the wind speed.
The normalised power output is bounded in the closed interval [0,1] and can be
represented by a standard Beta probability distribution function. A similar approach is
followed in numerous works such as in [76, 84, 259]. 96 standard beta distributions can be














Fig. 5.4 shows the histogram and best Beta fit, found by function ‘fitdist’ in MATLAB, at
09:00 hour, in Autumn. Note here, the discreteness in the available observations (datasets
obtained by the MIDAS repository are discrete values of wind speed, rounded to the nearest
knot), combined with the fact that for wind speeds lower than the nominal, wind speed
generation varies with the third power of the wind speed, may create empty bins in the
power output histogram.
Aggregate power production of both players captures correlation between wind re-
sources and can be represented by the joint probability distribution of power outputs.
Note here that correlated outputs mean that the aggregate power output from both players
is not equal to a two-dimensional Beta distribution. If there are sufficient wind speed
measurements for both players locations, then the joint probability distribution can be
estimated directly from the available data. For example, Fig. 5.5 shows the joint generation
histogram at 09:00 hour in Autumn. Most observations are concentrated at zero power
output (no wind) or close to rated power (wind equal to or above nominal). Moreover,
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Fig. 5.5 Joint power output histogram at 09:00 in Autumn
many observations appear around the diagonal, which indicates partial correlation between
the outputs generated by each player.
Results from such an analysis can feed into Eq. (5.9) and Eq. (5.12) to compute
expected generation and curtailment. However, a similar analysis is required also for the
demand data, shown in the following section. Note here that analytical expressions of the
joint distributions and consequently solutions and calculation of integrals are difficult to
achieve. To overcome such challenges an empirical approach based on simulations can be
used to compute expected generation and curtailment, as shown in the following sections.
5.3.2 Demand data analysis
The analysis is based on the UK National Demand data obtained by the UK’s system
operator, i.e. National Grid 2. The data used for the study span from 2006 to 2015. The
observations include national demand data in half-hourly settlement intervals. The national
demand is the sum of generation, as recorded by operational metering managed by the
National Grid, plus the estimated embedded generation from wind/solar generators, plus
imports from interconnectors linked to the Great Britain system. Actual demand may
differ from this estimation, as some demand is not visible to the system operator, due to
embedded generation or microproduction that is connected to low-voltage and distribution
networks. Half-hourly demand data were averaged to create hourly data that have the
same granularity as wind speed data. Fig. 5.6 shows the hourly average of the UK national
demand data and yearly variation for a 10-year period. As shown in Fig. 5.6, the demand
is low during the night and presents a morning and an afternoon peak in coordination with
human activities throughout the day.
UK national demand data were analysed in a similar manner to wind speed data in
separate distributions for every hour and season. The demand at location A was taken
2http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Industry-information/Electricity-transmission-
operational-data/Data-Explorer/
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Fig. 5.6 Hourly average of the UK national demand and variation across different years
to be equal to the average national demand for every hour and season, scaled down by
a factor, such that peak load would be equal to the capacity of the power line, assumed
to be 150 MW. Fig. 5.7 shows the average seasonal demand at location A as well as the
minimum and maximum hourly demand. Fig. 5.8 summarises the seasonal effect on the
average hourly demand.
From the demand distributions and joint power distributions, expected generation
and curtailment can be found as in Eq. (5.9) and Eq. (5.12). However, it is clear that
analytical solutions of the expected generation and curtailment are difficult to compute.
These challenges can be overcome by following an empirical simulation approach that
can significantly simplify the computation of expected generation and curtailment. The
proposed solution is presented in the following section.
5.4 Empirical approach for equilibrium estimation
When sufficient data is available, an empirical approach based on simulation analysis can
be useful for equilibrium estimation. This section describes the methodology applied based
on a data analysis and simulation approach. Hourly wind speed data wi from each player’s
location and average demand per hour and season D (as in Fig. 5.8) were used for the
following analysis.
The general methodology steps are shown in Fig. 5.9. The first step deals with the
evaluation and processing of the available data. Next, determination of a feasible strategy
space for both players is required. Recall here that a strategy action is the generation
capacity a player can install, namely PNi . A player can choose to install generation capacity
within the bounds of zero capacity PNi = 0 and a maximum capacity PNmax above which
any player would not achieve any profit. The feasible strategy or action space is defined
as ⟨PN1 ,PN2⟩= ⟨0 : δPN : PNmax ,0 : δPN : PNmax⟩, where δPN is the incremental generation
capacity that a player can build. For every possible combination of actions from the
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Fig. 5.7 Seasonal average demand with minimum and maximum values during (a) Spring
(b) Summer (c) Autumn and (d) Winter
Hours


























Fig. 5.9 Summarised methodology steps for transmission capacity game with stochastic
generation
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Fig. 5.10 Power and energy estimation flow chart
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Algorithm 1 POWER & ENERGY ESTIMATION
1: PNmax ◃ max rated capacity in search space
2: PNi ← [0 : δPN : PNmax ] ◃ strategy space i=1,2 player
3: α , β ◃ power curve sigmoid parameters
4: for all PN1 ∈ {0, ...,PNmax} do
5: for all PN2 ∈ {0, ...,PNmax} do






·PNi ◃ i player generation
8: RD← D− (PG1 +PG2) ◃ residual demand
9: if RD > 0 then ◃ no curtailment
10: PDi ← PGi





◃ curtailment gen i







PGi ◃ total gen i
20: EDi ←∑
t
PDi ◃ total demand served i
21: EC1(PN1,PN2)←∑
t
PC1 ◃ total curt 1
22: EC2(PN1,PN2)←∑
t
PC2 ◃ total curt 2
23: return (EG1,EG2,EC1,EC2 ,ED1,ED2) ◃ EDi = EGi−ECi
strategy space of ⟨PN1 ,PN2⟩, potential generation (no curtailment) PGi , curtailed power
PCi and actual power used to serve the demand PDi are estimated for all t under a fair
curtailment rule such as Pro Rata or FRR. The total energy production and curtailment
over a larger time horizon and project duration is given by the summation of the estimated
quantities for all t. The procedure is shown in Fig. 5.10 and in greater detail in Algorithm 1.
Energy quantities of expected curtailment and generation are estimated. Profits are
computed for different cost parameters, as shown in Algorithm 2.
The next step is to estimate the Stackelberg game equilibrium, by backward induction,
as in Algorithm 3. In more detail, the equilibrium is estimated from the normal form of
the Stackelberg game. Profits or expected payoffs are computed for every possible action
in the strategy space ⟨PN1 ,PN2⟩. The algorithmic procedure is shown in Fig. 5.11. For
every PN1 i.e. for every row in Fig. 5.11, the rated capacity P
∗
N2 is found that maximises
the follower’s profits Π∗2. In other words the follower’s best response is found for every
PN1 . Line investor profits that correspond to the follower’s best responses are also recorded.
Next, from this set of recorded solutions, the leader selects to install P∗N1 that maximises
his own profit. The pair (P∗N1,P
∗
N2) constitutes the equilibrium of the game.
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Algorithm 2 PROFIT ESTIMATION
1: pG, pT ◃ generation tariff, transmission fee
2: CT ◃ cost of line
3: cGi ◃ i player’s generation cost
4: for all PN1 ∈ {0, ...,PNmax} do
5: for all PN2 ∈ {0, ...,PNmax} do
6: Π1← (EG1−EC1)pG−EG1cG1+
7: (EG2−EC2)pT −CT




Algorithm 3 STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM ESTIMATION
1: for all PN1 ∈ {0, ...,PNmax} do ◃ best response gen 2
2: Π∗2←maxPN2
Π2(PN1 ,PN2)







N2) ◃ best response gen 1












(Π1, Π2) (Π1, Π2) ... ... (Π1, Π2)
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... ... (Π1, Π2) ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...








Fig. 5.11 Stackelberg game equilibrium estimation process
In the next section, we provide the solutions of the empirical and algorithmic approach
for varying parameters and discuss the main findings of the practical example application
based on the Kintyre-Hunterston project.
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
cG1 0.14pG : 0.02pG : 0.50pG 0.30pG 0.26pG
cG2 0.30pG 0.06pG : 0.02pG : 0.52pG 0.20pG
pT 0.26pG 0.26pG 0 : 0.02pG : 0.76pG
Table 5.1 Summary of cost parameters considered in three scenarios for the analysis of
the transmission capacity game with stochastic generation (in all scenarios the generation
price remained fixed at pG = £74.3/MWh and the transmission cost at CT = £230m)
5.4.1 Scenario assumptions
One of the first assumptions to consider is defining a feasible search space that includes all
possible action strategies of both players. Based on several trial runs, the upper limit of the
solution search space was set as PNmax = 415 MW. Note here that PNmax is larger than the line
capacity (150 MW) divided by the minimum CF experienced by any player at all hours and
seasons, to guarantee that all feasible solutions are included in the search space. Moreover,
the incremental generation capacity a generator can install is set to δPN = 0.5 MW,
therefore the solution search space was defined as [PN1 ,PN2] = [0 : 0.5 : 415,0 : 0.5 : 415].
All possibilities were considered, even the case where demand is served by a single player.
For every action in the feasible strategy space ⟨PN1,PN2⟩, we estimate the power
generated and curtailed for both players under a fair curtailment rule such as Pro Rata or
FRR (Algorithm 1). For example, for a specific pair of ⟨PN1,PN2⟩, we estimate the power
generated at each hour given the wind speed, and estimate the power curtailed given the
demand. Next, we estimate the aggregate power generated and curtailed by each player for
the time period of 17 years and therefore derive the energy that would have been generated
(if no curtailment) and the energy curtailed, as the summation of 145,077 valid data points
(hours in the 17 years that wind speed and demand data are available). Next, the profits can
be estimated (see Algorithm 2), if cost parameters are known (cG1 ,cG2, pT ). The procedure
is repeated for all strategies in the search space and the results describe the normal form of
the Stackelberg game. Finally, the equilibrium of the game is found as shown in Fig. 5.11.
Different scenarios are used to study the interplay between the Stackelberg equilibrium
solution and varying cost parameters (cG1,cG2, pT ). Similar to the analysis presented in
Chapter 4, the selling tariff is set equal to pG = £74.3/MWh. All other cost and tariff
parameters are expressed as a percentage of pG for easier representation of the results.
Varying one cost parameter at a time, while other parameters remain constant, three
different scenarios emerge. Scenario 1 shows how the equilibrium results depend on the
generation cost of the line investor, Scenario 2 shows the dependence on local generators’
cost and Scenario 3 shows the dependence on the transmission fee. The step size of varying
parameters is set equal to 0.02pG for all scenarios considered. Precise values of cost
parameters considered are summarised in Table 5.1.
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Cost of line investor c
G1







































Fig. 5.12 Scenario 1: Generation capacity installed and dependence on the line investor’s
generation cost
5.4.2 Scenarios results
Scenario 1: Varying cG1
The first scenario shows how the equilibrium results depend on the line investor’s generation
cost cG1 . Other cost parameters remain fixed at cG2 = 0.30pG and pT = 0.26pG, while cG1
varies from 0.14pG to 0.50pG.
Fig. 5.12 shows the generation capacity installed by the players for varying generation
costs of the line investor. Fig. 5.13 shows the profits at equilibrium and Fig. 5.14 shows the
energy that could have been generated and the energy curtailed. Total generation capacity
decreases as cG1 increases with other parameters remaining equal (Fig. 5.12). For low
leader’s generation cost, the line investor installs more generation capacity leading to larger
profits. However as cG1 increases, less capacity is installed by the line investor. This leads
to decreasing profits. At cG1 ≃ 0.292pG the profits of the players become equal (Fig. 5.13).
From cG1 ≃ 0.292pG to 0.36pG, the line investor continues to install more capacity up to
cG1 ≃ 0.36pG, where players install equal generation capacity (Fig. 5.12).
Scenario 2: Varying cG2
The second scenario shows how the equilibrium results depend on the local generators’
generation cost cG2 . Other cost parameters remain fixed with cG1 = 0.30pG and pT =
0.26pG, while the local generators’ cost varies from cG2 = 0.06pG to 0.52pG.
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Cost of line investor c
G1

































Fig. 5.13 Scenario 1: Profits and dependence on the line investor’s generation cost
Cost of line investor c
G1































Fig. 5.14 Scenario 1: Energy generated and curtailed and dependence on the line investor’s
generation cost
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Cost of local generators c
G2




































Fig. 5.15 Scenario 2: Generation capacity installed and dependence on the local generators’
generation cost
Cost of local generators c
G2




































Fig. 5.16 Scenario 2: Profits and dependence on the local generators’ generation cost
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Cost of local generators c
G2

































Fig. 5.17 Scenario 2: Energy generated and curtailed and dependence on the local genera-
tors’ generation cost
Fig. 5.15 shows the generation capacity installed by the players for varying generation
costs of the local generators. Fig. 5.16 shows the profits at equilibrium and Fig. 5.17 shows
the energy that could have been generated and the energy curtailed. The total generation
capacity installed decreases as cG2 increases due to the reduction of PN2 installed, as shown
in Fig. 5.15. We can observe two critical points, cG2 ≃ 0.255pG where players install
equal generation capacities PN1 = PN2 (Fig. 5.15) and cG2 ≃ 0.312pG, where profits for
both players are equal Π1 = Π2 (Fig. 5.16). For cG2 < 0.255pG, local generators install
more generation capacity than the line investor. For cG2 = 0.255pG to 0.312pG although
PN1 > PN2 (Fig. 5.16), the leader’s profit is lower, due to the additional cost of installing
the line CT . If cG2 increases further, then local generators decrease their installed capacity,
which eventually leads to equal profits and sequentially to the leader’s overcoming the
follower’s profit (Fig. 5.16).
Scenario 3: Varying pT
The third and last scenario shows how the equilibrium results depend on the transmission
charges imposed pT . Other cost parameters remain fixed with cG1 = 0.26pG and cG2 =
0.20pG, while the transmission fee varies from pT = 0 to 0.76pG.
Fig. 5.18 shows the generation capacity installed by the players for varying generation
costs of the local generators. Fig. 5.19 shows the profits at equilibrium and Fig. 5.20 shows
the energy that could have been generated and the energy curtailed.
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Fig. 5.19 Scenario 3: Profits and dependence on the the transmission fee
130 Transmission capacity game with stochastic generation
Transmission fee p
T


































Fig. 5.20 Scenario 3: Energy generated and curtailed and dependence on the transmission
fee
The total generation capacity decreases as pT increases, due to local generators in-
stalling less capacity. The leader’s generation capacity is relatively constant with varying
pT . Note here that the leader may react to the decreasing capacity of the local generators
as pT increases, both by decreasing or increasing their own built capacity, as pT increases
(Fig. 5.18).
When the transmission fee is pT < 0.42pG, followers install more capacity as a result
of the transmission fee and cheaper generation cost. However, as pT increases, the revenues
drop for local generators, who install less PN2 , up to pT ≃ 0.42pG where players install
equal capacities (Fig. 5.18). Local generators have larger profits until cG2 ≃ 0.36pG where
profits break even, mainly due to the high power line installation cost CT (Fig. 5.19).
For this setting, the transmission fee needs to be at least pT ≃ 0.15pG. Charging a
transmission fee below this amount would make it uneconomical for the line investor to
install the line, given the expected response by local generators. Morever, the line investor
needs to install roughly as much generation capacity as local generators to achieve similar
profit, in this scenario. In contrast, if pT is set too high, it is not feasible for local generators
to invest in renewable energy at this location (Fig. 5.20).
5.4.3 Discussion of results
As shown in the results, for every set of cost (cG1 , cG2) and revenue parameters (pT , pG),
there is an upper limit of total generation capacity being installed at Location B, which
is equal to the sum of rated capacities installed by each player. In all sets of scenarios,
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the total capacity installed decreases as the tested parameter value increases (Fig. 5.12,
Fig. 5.15 and Fig. 5.18). Each player installs less capacity as their generation cost increases,
while the other player benefits by increasing their capacity (Fig. 5.12 and Fig. 5.15). The
cost of local generators has a larger impact on the capacities installed for both players, as
shown by comparing Fig. 5.12 and Fig. 5.15, as local generators face the additional cost of
transmission charges. Profits have similar behaviour to the generation capacities built in
Scenarios 1 and 2, while in Scenario 3, the line investor’s profit increases because of larger
revenues from transmission (Fig. 5.19). Note here that the players profits are not equal
when PN1 =PN2 (which over a long time window means EG1 ≃EG2 and EC1 ≃EC2 as shown
when comparing Fig. 5.12 with Fig. 5.18, or Fig. 5.13 with Fig. 5.19 and Fig. 5.14 with
Fig. 5.20), because of transmission charges pT , but also because of different generation
costs and CT .
If the followers’ generation cost is much smaller than the line investor’s (assuming for
example that local generators might have access to cheaper land or favourable licensing
approval), then the line investor will need to charge a high transmission fee to have positive
earnings (Fig. 5.19). On the other hand, if the leader’s cost is much smaller, the generation
capacity will mostly be installed by the line investor, as there is no room for profitable
investment of other renewable producers. Moreover, in Scenario 3 it is shown that the
followers’ generation capacity decreases as pT increases, but this does not always result
in the leader increasing their own capacity (see Fig. 5.20). Estimating the best response
is a complex procedure which depends on the curtailment imposed and varying demand.
In a similar way, if we assume that local generators increase their installed capacity, it
is possible for the line investor to slightly increase their own generation capacity, as this
strategy move may minimise the profit losses incurred, as long as the increased cost of
installing the additional generation capacity units leading to larger energy curtailed is
counter-balanced by the revenues generated by satisfying a larger demand at times when
no curtailment occurs.
As shown in Scenario 3, pT ≃ 0.15pG is the minimum value of the transmission fee
that allows profit for the line investor. Similarly, if the transmission fee is set too high,
then local investors will not invest in renewable generation, as their profit diminishes with
increasing transmission fee. As pT is set by the system regulator, this method determines a
feasible range that allows both transmission and generation investments to be profitable
(Fig. 5.19).
The model developed in this work can study grid reinforcement projects performed
by private investors, who aim to maximise their profits instead of typical cost minimising
techniques or maximising social welfare objectives, that exist when network upgrade is
performed by the system operators. Typical settings, where this model can be applied in
practice, include numerous locations where demand and generation are not co-located.
Finally, the model developed offers good insights to the strategic game formed between
the players, for varying cost parameters. Conclusions can be reached either directly on real
data measurements or their distributions.
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5.5 Concluding remarks
The work in Chapter 5 showed how private network upgrades developed for RES inte-
gration can lead to a leader-follower game between the line investor and local generators.
Curtailment and line access rules play a key role in the strategic game, the equilibrium of
which can be used to determine optimal generation capacities installed in such settings
and their associated profits. The model developed can capture the stochastic nature of
renewables and the variation in demand. A method for estimation of the game equilibrium
was presented and also it was shown how optimal capacities installed at the equilibrium of
the game depend on players’ generation costs and the transmission fee. Most crucially,
the latter can be used by regulators to assess a feasible range for the transmission fee, that
allows both network upgrade and local renewable generation investments being realised.
A methodology for the equilibrium of the game that utilises real data, both on the supply
and demand side, was developed and applied to an example case in Western Scotland. The
practical application used a big dataset analysis that spanned over the course of 17 years.
However, a challenge that needs to be addressed is that often data for a large time period,
may not be available or may present significant gaps. In addition, the approach shown in
Chapter 5 follows a single-shot analysis for equilibrium estimation and decision-making.
To improve on these issues, in the following chapter, a method that generates useful data
for simulation analysis was developed that draws samples from historic observations and
is based on Gibbs sampling. This also allows for multiple iterations of the equilibrium
estimation that reduces uncertainty on future decisions.
Chapter 6
Gibbs sampling for multiple simulation
of possible future events
Work presented in Chapter 5 utilised real data over a 17-year time period to estimate the
equilibrium of the Stackelberg game. However, in most occasions real data that span over
such long periods might not be available. Even when data is available, such as for shorter
time periods like one year, data may not be clean or may have significant gaps. A solution
to such issues is to find a methodology that can generate multiple series of data from
available historic observations. To do so, we follow a Markoc Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methodology that is based on a particular case of the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm, and
more specifically, Gibbs sampling. This method allows for equilibrium estimation across
several time series of synthetic wind speed and demand, and therefore can reduce the
uncertainty in the decision-making process, as opposed to getting results only by following
a single-shot approach. The methodology suggested is shown in the following sections.
Work presented in Chapter 6 was published in a peer-reviewed study [11].
6.1 Research contributions
Work presented in Chapter 4 consisted one of the first research works to introduce Stack-
elberg game formulations in settings that combine decision-making about network re-
inforcements, renewable generation and line access rules. The model however did not
take into account the stochastic nature of the primary renewable resources or variability
in demand. The model presented in Chapter 5 improved on this work and utilised real
data to evaluate and estimate the equilibrium results. This approach however consists of a
single-shot approach, where the equilibrium is estimated once and is based on the historic
observations available. Utilisation of MCMC methods or Gibbs sampling to generate data
based on historic observations allows modelling multiple renewable investment scenarios
that reduce the uncertainty of future generation and demand.
Models presented in previous Chapters are extended here by developing a principled
framework, based on game-theoretic and state-of-the-art sampling techniques, i.e. Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). MCMC is a class of methods for simulation of stochastic
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processes. More specifically, a MCMC is a class of methods in which one can simulate
draws that are slightly dependent and approximately from the posterior distribution [94].
Gibbs sampling can be thought of as a particular case of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
used for MCMC [82].
The Gibbs sampler uses the conditional distributions as proposal distributions with
acceptance probability equal to 1 [87] and can be easily implemented in various applications
when conditional distributions are available. In general, iterative samplers are an attractive
option when drawing samples from high dimensional multivariate distributions due to their
inexpensive cost per iteration and small computer memory requirements [82].
Using this technique we can generate, from historic data, observations that are depen-
dent. Wind data samples from the project locations form a Markov chain (MC). Sampled
data are then used for simulation analysis. Several authors used MCMC for modelling
of wind speeds or wind power outputs [189, 265]. This creates a framework that allows
modelling multiple renewable investment scenarios that reduce the uncertainty of future
generation and demand. Multiple scenarios are required to model uncertainty regarding
future events.
In more detail, the main contributions of the work are:
• A new methodology that generates observations from renewable resource data is
developed. While historic data, such as wind speeds may be available, they might
have considerable gaps and joint distributions cannot be expressed in simple, closed-
form equations. For this reason we develop a MCMC methodology (Gibbs sampling)
that can draw samples from available data and run multiple scenarios of potential
futures.
• We establish a methodology that can determine optimal generation capacity invest-
ments through use of real demand and wind speed data. This work is one of the first
to combine Stackelberg equilibria to a large-scale realistic game with MCMC tech-
niques. Our model designates players’ actions, depending on RES output correlation
and expected curtailment, and studies the cost parameters effects on the equilibrium
of the game.
• The model is applied and validated through a practical application based on realistic
assumptions of a grid reinforcement project in Britain.
In the following sections, the Gibbs sampling methodology is presented.
6.2 Gibbs sampler
In practical settings the joint distribution of stochastic renewable resources is often un-
known, but historic data may be available. In addition, due to the interdependency in
resulting curtailment and multiple parameters a closed-form solution is difficult to find
and cannot be expressed analytically. In Chapter 5, an empirical algorithm was presented
utilising real data for the computation of the game equilibrium solution on a single-shot
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Fig. 6.1 Histogram of available wind speeds at project’s location
basis. However, in real-world applications large-scale data may not be available or may
experience important gaps. In this chapter, we show how we can utilise real data to simulate
scenarios that approximate the real distribution with a state-of-the-art MCMC technique
called the Gibbs sampler.
The Gibbs sampler uses the conditional distributions as proposal distributions with
acceptance probability equal to 1 [87]. Using this technique one can generate, from historic
data, observations that are dependent. Wind data samples from the project locations form a
Markov Chain (MC). We can experiment with the length of the chain or sampling size n
and we can repeat the process for multiple MCs or number of realisations N. In practice,
n and N need to be determined in such a way that the resulting MC converges to the real
distribution, is ergodic and computationally efficient. Ergodicity means that all possible
states of the MC can be visited and are independent of the starting state [87]. In other
words, the resulting MC after Gibbs sampling is applied, needs to converge to the real
distribution. The satisfaction of these criteria depends on the sampling size n and the
number of realisations of the experiments N. Longer and multiple runs are possible, but
this is computationally expensive and therefore the right balance must be found.
In previous chapters, we showed that an empirical approach can be used to estimate
the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game formed between the line investor and the local
generators. A challenging issue that inhibits the analysis is the estimation of the joint
probability distribution of wind speeds and subsequently the players’ generation outputs.
Fig. 6.1 presents the histogram of the wind speeds at each project’s location for the
practical example demonstration of the Kintyre-Hunterston project. Fig. 6.1 shows that
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Fig. 6.2 Line investor view derived by joint wind speed histogram
a mathematical expression for the joint distribution of wind speeds is difficult to find.
However, prior knowledge of the joint distribution is available. For example, the individual
wind speed distributions can be approximated by a Weibull distribution, as shown in
Fig. 6.2 and Fig. 6.3.
If wind speeds were independent, the joint distribution could be approximated by a
bivariate Weibull distribution, however in our occasion the two distributions experience
some level of correlation, shown by the fact that the majority of observations occur
around the diagonal at Fig. 6.1, and therefore this assumption cannot hold. Crucially,
the individual distributions for each player exhibit a degree of correlation due to similar
weather patterns in neighbouring locations. In practice, this means that the joint distribution
is not explicitly known, but we can generate data from the joint distribution if sufficient
historic observations and wind speed measurements are available.
The technique of Gibbs sampling can be used to generate large datasets of wind speed
at each project location, which next can be used to simulate multiple scenarios of different
future events. The methodology applied in the practical example application is summarised
in Algorithm 4. The ultimate goal is to generate synthetic data series (time series) of wind
speeds at each RES project location and demand. These data form a Markov Chain (MC),
where each sample represents a state and future states (samples) depend on the condition
of the previous state.
The method starts with the wind speed observations for each player’s project location
denoted as wi. Wind speed historic observations are shown in Fig. 6.4. From available
historic data (Line 4 in Algorithm 4), a joint distribution table of wind speed observations
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Fig. 6.3 Local generators view derived by joint wind speed histogram
Algorithm 4 GIBBS SAMPLING
1: w1,w2,D ◃ wind speed 1,2, power demand
2: n ◃ sampling size




(k)⟩, k ∈ {1,2, ...,kmax} ◃ historic data












(t)⟩ ← sample(w1,w2,D) ◃ initialise
9: repeat
10: w(t+1)2 ← sample F(w2 |w(t)1
)
11: w(t+1)1 ← sample F(w1 |w(t+1)2
)








13: t← t +1
14: until t > n
15: return ⟨w(t)1 ,w
(t)
2 ,D
(t)⟩, t ∈ {tburn, tburn +1, ...,n}
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Fig. 6.4 An illustration of the Gibbs sampling technique
is created. More specifically, for every wind speed w1, we record the subset of w2 wind
speeds, and vice versa (Line 5 in Algorithm 4). These subsets correspond to the distribution
of w2 conditional on w1, and vice versa, and can be used to estimate future states of the
MC. Different subsets are shown in Fig. 6.4.
Note here that in practice the probabilities for certain combinations of wind speeds can
be low (e.g. it is unlikely to have extremely high wind at one location and low wind speed
to a proximal location), therefore some subsets can be sparse. Sparsity of several subsets
is caused by the joint effect that some observations represent rare events and correlation.
We overcome this difficulty by merging sparse bins of rare events and outliers, and ensure
ergodicity of the MC.
The MC is initialised by randomly selecting a sample from the joint distribution table
(Line 8 in Algorithm 4). An example with a starting point of ⟨w(1)1 ,w
(1)
2 ⟩= ⟨9,8⟩ is shown
in green color in Fig. 6.4. The Gibbs sampler can be used to generate n samples via an
iterative procedure. Each iteration step involves replacing the value of one variable by a
value selected randomly by the conditional F(wi |w−i(t)). In the example shown in Fig. 6.4,
since w(1)1 = 9, a random sample is drawn from F(w2 |w(1)1 =9
), equal to w(2)2 = 6. In Fig.6.4
this corresponds to moving vertically from the starting point. Next, we randomly draw a
sample from F(w1 |w(2)2
) = 6, equal to w(2)1 = 7. This corresponds to moving horizontally
in Fig. 6.4. The new state is ⟨w(2)1 ,w
(2)
2 ⟩ = ⟨7,6⟩, shown in Fig. 6.4 in blue color. The
process is repeated for n samples. The procedure for n = 100 samples is shown in Fig. 6.4
to facilitate understanding.
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Table 6.1 Sampling results for N = 100 realisations and an increasing number of sampling
size n
Sample size w̄1 σw̄1 WCI w̄1 ME w̄1 w̄2 σw̄2 WCI w̄2 ME w̄2 D̄ σD̄ WCI D̄ ME D̄
n = 1,000 12.1321 0.6569 0.2607 18.91% 12.2297 0.6226 0.2470 17.61% 108.5722 0.7859 0.3119 2.63%
n = 5,000 12.0853 0.2903 0.1152 6.65% 12.1762 0.2797 0.1110 6.47% 108.6271 0.3395 0.1348 1.49%
n = 10,000 12.0929 0.2262 0.0897 4.63% 12.1842 0.2187 0.0869 4.36% 108.6000 0.2403 0.0953 1.03%
n = 50,000 12.1125 0.0874 0.0347 2.02% 12.2028 0.0857 0.0340 1.97% 108.5979 0.1033 0.0410 0.73%
n = 100,000 12.1155 0.0631 0.0251 1.28% 12.2075 0.0602 0.0239 1.16% 108.5954 0.0663 0.0263 0.70%
n = 200,000 12.1065 0.0441 0.0175 0.80% 12.1986 0.0427 0.0169 0.76% 108.5915 0.0453 0.0180 0.62%
n = 500,000 12.1049 0.0272 0.0108 0.68% 12.1968 0.0262 0.0103 0.62% 108.5930 0.0288 0.0114 0.57%
Table 6.2 Sampling results for n = 5,000 sampling size and an increasing number of
realisations N
Realisations w̄1 σw̄1 WCI w̄1 ME w̄1 w̄2 σw̄2 WCI w̄2 ME w̄2 D̄ σD̄ WCI D̄ ME D̄
N = 100 12.0850 0.2774 0.0840 6.64% 12.2017 0.2671 0.0809 6.01% 108.5703 0.3037 0.0919 1.34%
N = 170 12.1120 0.2217 0.0879 5.35% 12.1812 0.2145 0.0851 5.15% 108.6275 0.3279 0.1301 1.26%
N = 500 12.0867 0.2709 0.0476 7.22% 12.1764 0.2618 0.0460 7.16% 108.5932 0.3052 0.0536 1.47%
N = 1,000 12.1097 0.2764 0.0343 8.20% 12.2025 0.2666 0.0331 7.57% 108.5949 0.3198 0.0397 1.47%
N = 5,000 12.1044 0.2793 0.0155 9.06% 12.1966 0.2717 0.0151 8.81% 108.5951 0.3244 0.0180 1.58%
N = 10,000 12.1032 0.2754 0.0108 9.41% 12.1956 0.2672 0.0105 8.60% 108.5917 0.3268 0.0128 1.70%
N = 50,000 12.1022 0.2787 0.0049 9.87% 12.1943 0.2707 0.0048 9.26% 108.5901 0.3241 0.0057 1.70%
Hourly demand data D were also used to generate the synthetic data series. Demand
is randomly selected by the conditional distribution of demand over the average wind
speed (Line 12 in Algorithm 4). When demand D is included, a single sample refers to
time interval t and can be displayed as the tuple ⟨w(t)1 ,w
(t)
2 ,D
(t)⟩. The procedure is cycled
through the variables forming n samples of ⟨w(t)1 ,w
(t)
2 ,D
(t)⟩, t ∈ {1,2, ...,n}. Each sample
represents a state of the MC, where future states depend on the previous state. Note here
that the resulting MC forms a data series of samples that depend on values at the previous
state, but samples are not time-dependent. This is sufficient to accurately estimate energy
generated and curtailed as the summation of power generated and curtailed over a longer
time horizon. However, if other energy system assets such as energy storage devices are
introduced, their operation depends on the time variable. Hence, the method would not
produce suitable results for such an analysis. This issue is addressed by modifying the
Gibbs sampling technique in Chapter 7, where energy storage is introduced.
To ensure that the MC converges, we run Algorithm 4 for several sampling sizes n
(small, moderate, large) and repeat the procedure for N realisations. Results are shown
in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. Table 6.1 shows results for N = 100 realisations and different
sample sizes n = 1,000−500,000. Table 6.2 on the other hand repeats the Gibbs sampling
procedure for a varying number of realisations N = 100−50,000 and a fixed sampling
size of n = 5,000.
If χ is the variable under consideration, then the table columns represent the mean of
the sampling distribution of the sample mean χ̄ , the standard deviation of the sampling
distribution of the sample mean σχ̄ , most commonly known as standard error of mean,
the width of the 95% confidence interval (WCI) and the maximum error (ME) of the
sample mean, when compared to the mean of the original distribution derived from historic
data. The mean values of the original distribution derived from the historic data are
µw1 = 12.1029, µw2 = 12.1950 and µD = 108.1830.
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As shown in Algorithm 4, n samples are drawn by the original distribution. Note
here that the expressions of n samples or n sampling size are equivalent. For example,
for w1, the Gibbs sampler is used and n samples are derived. Every time the sampling







. The process is repeated N times. From the frequency distribution of
the sample means after N realisations, also known as the sampling distribution of the
sample mean, the mean of sample means can be estimated as the average of all sample






. In addition, from the sampling
distribution, the standard deviation of the sampling distribution of the sample mean can








. This is alternatively known as the standard error of
the mean. The table columns also show the width of the 95% confidence interval (WCI)
of the sampling distribution and the maximum error (ME) of the sample means, when
compared to the mean of the original distribution. The latter is an indication of the largest
deviation of the sample means derived for N realisation from the real mean of the original
distribution.
According to the central limit theorem, the mean of sample means follows a normal
distribution (w̄i,σw̄1). As the sampling size n increases, the mean of the sample means
converges to the mean of the original distribution and the standard error decreases (Ta-
ble 6.1). Therefore, a large sample size is a key factor that allows accurate representation
of the original distribution. The other aspect to investigate is the effect of the number of
realisations or repetitions of the sampling procedure. Crucially, each realisation uses a
different starting point. Table 6.2 shows that a relative small number of realisations is
sufficient for the sampling procedure. More realisations (large N) means smaller width
of the confidence interval. However, in all occasions the maximum error increases as
N increases, due to a potential effect from the different and random starting point. The
MC formed need to be independent of the starting state, therefore a common approach is
not to include the initial samples of the sampling algorithm. To deal with such issues, a
burn-in or warm-up period of 20% of samples is adopted, to make sure that our results are
independent off the starting state [87]. This is shown in Line 15 in Algorithm 4 with the
adoption of tburn.
Appropriate selection of suitable n and N is crucial when considering practical appli-
cations of Gibbs sampling. Computational limitations dictate that a balance needs to be
found between multiple shorter runs (large N and small n) and one-shot longer runs (small
N large n) [87]. The results from Table 6.1 and 6.2 show that for the MC to converge to the
original distribution, a large n is required, but N can be chosen to be relatively small. For
this reason and driven by computational limitations, for the Stackelberg equilibrium esti-
mation and further analysis a sampling size of n = 50,000 with a burn-in period of 10,000






Fig. 6.5 Summarised methodology steps
samples (i.e. 40,000 data points were used for the analysis) and N = 170 realisations were
selected.
6.3 Stackelberg equilibrium estimation
The estimation of the Stackelberg equilibrium is similar to the procedure presented in
Chapter 5. The Gibbs sampler is used to generate data series of wind speeds and demand.
Next, data is used to estimate the power generated at each t and the energy values for a
larger time horizon (see Algorithm 1). The maximum feasible strategy action for a single
player was set equal to PNmax = 500.5 MW and the incremental capacity to δPNi = 0.5 MW.
For every possible combination of the rated capacities installed (PN1,PN2), the power
generated and curtailed for each player on an hourly basis was estimated. Next, the
aggregate energy generated and curtailed by each player was estimated as the summation
of 40,000 data points. After energies were estimated, profit equations were computed
for each possible PN1,PN2 and varying cost parameters (cG1,cG2, pT ), as in Algorithm 2.





2) at the equilibrium of the game, as in Algorithm 3. The steps are summarised in
Fig. 6.5.
The process in Fig. 6.5 can be repeated several times (here for N = 170 realisations).
Recall here, that every realisation corresponds to a completely different MC, which allows
for multiple runs of the Stackelberg game equilibrium estimation. Simulation results are
shown in the following section.
6.3.1 Results for varying realisations N
The methodology described in the previous section is executed for several runs or reali-
sations. Every realisation represents a completely different MC generated. For a given
set of cost parameters cG1 = 0.30pG, cG2 = 0.28pG, pT = 0.26pG and pG = £74.3/MWh
and several realisation runs N = 170, the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game is estimated.
Rated capacities built at the equilibrium of the game by the players are shown in Fig. 6.6.
The results are satisfactory and show a 10 MW range in the estimated solutions for optimal
rated capacities. Fig. 6.7 shows the players’ profits at the equilibrium of the Stackelberg
game. Similarly to the generation capacities solutions, profit results are satisfactory and do
not present a wide range.
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Fig. 6.6 Optimal generation capacities of each player for several realisations (cG1 = 0.30pG,
cG2 = 0.28pG, pT = 0.26pG and pG = £74.3/MWh)
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Fig. 6.7 Optimal profits of each player for several realisations (cG1 = 0.30pG, cG2 = 0.28pG,
pT = 0.26pG and pG = £74.3/MWh)
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3-a
cG1 0.16pG : 0.02pG : 0.68pG 0.30pG 0.26pG
cG2 0.30pG 0.08pG : 0.02pG : 0.54pG 0.20pG
pT 0.26pG 0.26pG 0 : 0.02pG : 0.80pG
Table 6.3 Summary of cost parameters considered in scenarios for the analysis of the
transmission capacity game with Gibbs sampling (in all scenarios the generation price
remained fixed at pG = £74.3/MWh)
Cost of line investor c
G1
 (£/MWh)






















Line investor Local generators
Fig. 6.8 Scenario 1: Generation capacity installed at equilibrium and dependence on the
line investor’s generation cost
6.3.2 Cost parameter scenario results
Similarly to previous analyses in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we study how the equilibrium
results depend on varying cost parameters. Simulations were executed in a state-of-the-
art and high-performance computing facility, funded by EPSRC (Cirrus UK National
Tier-2 HPC Service at EPCC (http://www.cirrus.ac.uk) and the University of Edinburgh
(EP/P020267/1)) with MATLAB software environment and 36 parallel workers. The exact
cost parameter assumptions are shown at Table 6.3.
Scenario 1: Varying cG1
The first scenario shows how the equilibrium results depend on the line investor’s generation
cost cG1 . The line investor’s generation cost varies from cG1 = 0.16 . . .0.68pG, while other
cost parameters remain constant and equal to cG2 = 0.30pG and pT = 0.26pG.
Fig. 6.8 shows the generation capacity installed by the players for varying generation
costs of the line investor. Fig. 6.9 shows the profits at equilibrium. The results show the
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Cost of line investor c
G1
 (£/MWh)
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Fig. 6.9 Scenario 1: Profits at equilibrium and dependence on the line investor’s generation
cost
average equilibrium solution and min-max solutions found for N = 170 realisations of the
simulation procedure.
Scenario 2: Varying cG2
The second scenario shows how the equilibrium results depend on the local generators’
generation cost cG2 . Other cost parameters remain fixed cG1 = 0.30pG and the transmission
fee is pT = 0.26pG, while the local generators’ cost varies from cG2 = 0.08 . . .0.54pG.
Fig. 6.10 shows the generation capacity installed by the players for varying generation
costs of the local generators. Fig. 6.11 shows the profits at equilibrium.
Scenario 3: Varying pT
The third and last scenario shows how the equilibrium results depend on the transmission
charges imposed pT . Other cost parameters remain fixed with cG1 = 0.26pG and cG2 =
0.20pG, while the transmission fee varies from pT = 0 to 0.80pG.
Fig. 6.12 shows the generation capacity installed by the players for varying generation
costs of the local generators. Fig. 6.13 shows the profits at equilibrium.
6.3.3 Discussion of results
In all sets of scenarios, the total capacity installed by all players decreases as the tested
parameter value increases. Each player installs less capacity as their generation cost
increases, while the other player benefits by increasing their capacity. The cost of local
generators has a larger impact on the capacities installed for both players. Profits have
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Cost of local generators c
G2
 (£/MWh)
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Fig. 6.10 Scenario 2: Generation capacity installed at equilibrium and dependence on the
local generators generation cost
Cost of local generators c
G2
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Line investor Local generators Total profits Profit=0
Fig. 6.11 Scenario 2: Profits at equilibrium and dependence on the local generators
generation cost
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Fig. 6.13 Scenario 3: Profits at equilibrium and dependence on the transmission fee
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similar behaviour to the optimal rated capacities, but local generators face the additional
cost of transmission charges. If the followers’ generation cost is much lower than the
line investor’s (assuming for example that local generators might have access to cheaper
land), the line investor needs to charge a high transmission fee to have positive earnings.
On the contrary, if the leader’s cost is much lower, the generation capacity will mostly
be installed by the line investor, as there is no room for profitable investment from local
renewable producers. As shown in Scenario 3, pT ≃ 0.16pG or≃ £12MWh is the minimum
value of transmission charges that allows profit for the line investor. Similarly, if the
transmission fee is set too high, then it is not profitable for local investors to invest in
renewable generation. As pT is set by the system regulator, the methodology can be useful
to determine a feasible range of charges that allows both transmission and generation
investments to be profitable.
6.4 Concluding remarks
Chapter 6 extended the analysis of the Stackelberg game for multiple runs. It was shown
how when real historic data is available, MCMC and Gibbs sampling can be used to
simulate multiple future scenarios and reduce the uncertainty of the investment decisions.
Equilibria solutions from multiple iterations, do not show great variance from the average
solution. Moreover, optimal generation capacities and profits at equilibrium displayed
similar behaviour to results shown in Chapter 5.
Energy storage can represent a promising solution to reduce curtailment. In Chapter 7,
we extend the analysis of the game and show that if an independent storage player is
introduced, the model evolves into a Stackelberg game between the line investor (leader),
and local low-carbon technology investors, i.e. local generators and energy storage player
(followers). Local generators and storage share the available capacity by playing a Cournot
game. The Gibbs sampling procedure developed for Chapter 6 creates samples that are
independent of the time component. This technique is adequate for analysing the game
with generation, transmission and demand, however when energy storage is added to the
game, a modified Gibbs sampling procedure is required and this is presented in Chapter 7.

Chapter 7
Transmission capacity game with
energy storage
In Chapter 6, Gibbs sampling and MCMC techniques were used to simulate multiple future
scenarios for estimation of the Stackelberg game equilibrium. The methodology developed
achieved a reduction in uncertainty with regards to generation and transmission capacity
investments in locations with network constraints and high generation curtailment. In this
chapter, we turn our attention to developing a new model that incorporates energy storage,
as a way to partially avoid and reduce curtailment. In this context, the model presented in
Chapter 7 consists of three different player types: a line investor, local generators and an
independent energy storage player, who is willing to install energy storage capacity that
reduces curtailment. The model aims to determine optimal capacities installed by players
at the equilibrium of the game. In this setting, the line investor has a first mover advantage
over all other players. Local generators and the energy storage provider are players, who
compete for the available capacity in the network. It is shown here that a Cournot game
can describe competition and strategic behaviour of local investors. This leads to a bilevel
game-theoretic model that can be described as a Stackelberg-Cournot game between the
leader (line investor) and all other local investors (local generators and storage player).
In addition, results from work in Chapter 7 aim to evaluate the contribution of energy
storage in improving the energy system’s operation and aim to study the evolution of the
game-theoretic model. This is achieved by comparing the operation of the energy system
before and after the introduction of the storage player.
7.1 Research contributions
The models presented in previous chapters considered only generation and transmission
capacity investment decisions and did not include energy storage. However, energy storage
can reduce curtailment and can play a significant role in the dynamics of the resulting
game. Energy storage can store excess energy from renewable generators that can be used
for later use. Moreover, energy storage can defer expensive network reinforcement and
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help with the integration of large volumes of renewable generation at a particular location,
as shown by the literature review conducted in this work (Section 2.8 in Chapter 2).
In more detail, the research contributions of this work to the state of the art are:
• Previous work is extended by developing a model that consists of three player
types: the line investor, local generators and an independent storage player. A game-
theoretic model (Stackelberg-Cournot game) is applied to study this formulation.
It is shown that optimal transmission, generation and storage capacities installed
by players can be determined at the equilibrium of the Stackelberg-Cournot game.
At a first level, the line investor, who has the first mover advantage, decides the
transfer capability of the transmission line and the RES capacity to be installed. At a
second level, local generators and the energy storage player decide on generation
and storage capacities, respectively, by playing a Cournot game.
• An algorithmic approach is introduced to determine the capacities built by each
player (transmission capacity built by the line investor, generation capacity built
by the line investor and local generators, and storage capacity built by the storage
player) and corresponding profits at the equilibrium of the game. The approach
shown here is an example of empirical game-theoretic modelling applied in energy
systems with distributed generation and energy storage.
• A practical application of the models is shown by use of realistic figures based on
the Kintyre-Hunterston network upgrade project. Previous modelling approaches
are extended also by considering local demand at the location of high renewable
generation B (previously considered negligible).
In the following section, the general framework of the Stackelberg-Cournot game is
analytically discussed along with the model assumptions.
7.2 Game-theoretic model with energy storage
The objective of the extended model presented in Section 7.2 is to assess the value of
energy storage investments, which can be used to minimise renewable curtailment. In
models presented in previous chapters, despite the installation of transmission capacity,
a percentage of available RES generation is still curtailed at times, due to renewable
oversupply or the inability of the power system to absorb the excess energy produced. In
fact, it is shown in previous chapters that RES investors may tolerate some curtailment, as
long as their investments are still profitable. However, the energy curtailed is essentially
wasted. If energy storage is introduced to the system, part of the otherwise curtailed
energy can generate revenue and value for investors and the energy system overall. More
specifically, a three-player game-theoretic model is assumed that consists of a line investor,
local generators and a third independent storage player, who can purchase from RES
investors excess energy that would otherwise have been curtailed. As a result, RES
generators could potentially install more generation capacity than previously, because
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they can now earn some additional revenue from selling their excess energy to storage.
Moreover, curtailment may be reduced. In Chapter 7, we investigate these issues and the
dynamics of the game when energy storage is added to the system and study how profit
equations are affected after storage comes into play. Model assumptions with regards to
energy storage are presented in the following section.
7.2.1 Energy storage model
The behaviour and operation of energy storage is described by a generic model suitable for
a wide range of energy storage devices and technology types.
An energy storage investor installs a system of S storage energy capacity at a favourable
location for renewable generation or location B. The storage investor aims to purchase
energy from renewable generators at B, at times when there is an oversupply of RES
production and when renewable energy cannot be used to satisfy the energy demand.
During its operation, the storage device needs to follow several operational constraints.
The energy stored in the storage device at time t depends on the previous state and is given
by the following equation:








ES,t is the energy stored in the storage device at time t
δ t is the duration of time between two consecutive time intervals used in the analysis
ESt−δ t is the energy stored in storage device at time t−δ t i.e. in the previous state or
simulation step
sdch is the storage system’s self-discharge rate, i.e. the energy lost when the storage
system is at idle state (this quantity varies significantly for different technology types and
is usually given in a percentile form per month of stored energy lost, which can easily be
transformed into energy lost per time interval t of analysis)
Pch,t is the charging power at t
Pdch,t is the discharging power at t
ηch is the charging efficiency, which accounts for the energy losses during the charging
process, and
ηdch is the discharging efficiency, which accounts for the energy losses during the
discharging process of the storage system.
The energy stored at time t in the storage device is often represented by the State of





The minimum SOC allowed is a limitation to the storage device operation that needs to be
accounted for. For example, useful lifetime and capacity of battery energy storage systems
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is significantly reduced, when the battery is operated at small SOC or equivalently when
the battery is frequently discharged beyond a certain Depth of Discharge DOD. The depth
of discharge DODt at time t is directly linked to SOCt and is equal to:
DODt = 1−SOCt (7.3)
As a result, energy storage system’s operation is usually bounded between a safe minimum
state of charge and a maximum that is equal to the storage capacity:
SOCmin ≤ SOCt ≤ SOCmax (7.4)
where SOCmax = 100%. The equation above can also be expressed in DOD terms:
DODmin ≤ DODt ≤ DODmax (7.5)
where DODmin = 0 (equivalent to SOCmax) and DODmax = 1−SOCmin.
Moreover, there are power constraints on the energy storage operation that restrict the
maximum power that can be charged to or discharged from the energy storage device:
0≤ Pch,t ≤ Pchmax (7.6)
0≤ Pdch,t ≤ Pdchmax (7.7)
The analysis in this work focused on battery energy storage systems (BESS), such as
Lithium-ion batteries, increasingly being reported as one of the most promising technolo-
gies for integration of RES technologies in electricity grids. For battery storage systems,
the following simplifying assumptions hold:
• Energy losses due to self-discharge can safely be ignored, hence sdch = 0. Self-
discharge losses represent a very small percentage of the energy lost over a month
and can be ignored for battery systems. On the other hand, if other technology types
were to be considered such as flywheels that store energy in the form of kinetic
energy, self-discharge losses can be significant and should not be ignored.
• The round-trip efficiency ηrt can be defined, which represents the energy losses
in a full cycle, i.e. it includes losses during both charging and discharging. This
parameter is usually known from technical specification sheets given by battery
manufacturers. Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that charging and
discharging efficiencies are equal and therefore ηch = ηdch =
√
ηrt .
By adopting these simplifying assumptions Eq. (7.1) can be rewritten as:
ES,t = ES,t−δ t + rtηδ t (7.8)
where:
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PN1: Gen1
PN2: Gen2













Fig. 7.1 Model schematic of the game with three players: a line investor, local generators
and a storage investor: RES generation capacity built by the line investor PN1 , RES
generation capacity built by local generators PN2 , storage capacity S and local demand d
are connected at location B, while demand D is located at A
rt is the power charged or discharged from the storage device, i.e. when rt > 0 then
rt = Pch,t > 0, else when rt < 0 then rt =−Pdch,t < 0 and









, if rt < 0
ηch =
√
ηrt , if rt > 0
(7.9)
In the following section, the three-player game-theoretic model is introduced and model
assumptions are discussed.
7.2.2 Three-player Stackelberg-Cournot game
Similar to previous work presented in chapters 4-6, we consider two locations, location A
representing a location with high energy demand requirements, and location B representing
a location with high renewable potential. The demand at location A is denoted as D. In this
model, we also consider some local demand at B, denoted as d. Three type of investors are
involved in the game:
• Player 1 or the ‘line investor’, who is interested in building PN1 renewable generation
capacity at location B and a transmission line of capacity T that links A to B1.
• Player 2, also called ‘local generators’, represents all small-scale generators at
location B, who install renewable generation capacity of PN2 .
1Note here that players or agents are considered gender-neutral, however by convention male forms such
as ‘he’ and ‘his’ are used in this thesis when referring to a single player.
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• Player 3, also called the ‘storage investor’ is a third, independent storage player,
who builds storage capacity S at location B.
The model schematic of the game is shown in Fig. 7.1, along with the energy flows between
energy system components installed by the players.
Following a similar notation to previous work, first the potential energy production EGi
is defined, which depends on the RES resource at each project’s location and the installed
generation capacity PNi . Renewable generators can serve either local demand d at B or
remote demand D at A via the transmission line. Part of EGi is used to serve the local
demand at B and is equal to Edi . Another part flows through the transmission line to serve
demand D and is equal to EDi . Demand D represents the remote demand at location A,
which can be served when the transmission line capacity T is taken into consideration. In
other words, if demand at A is represented by a generic demand profile of PL, then:
D =
PL, if PL < TT, otherwise (7.10)
In addition, renewable generators can sell excess energy that cannot be absorbed locally
or transferred by the transmission line to the storage system S installed at B. The energy
sold to storage by i player is denoted as ESini . Finally, part of the renewable production is
curtailed, either because it cannot serve any of the demand (D or d) or cannot be stored in
the energy storage system (e.g. the energy storage system may already have reached full
capacity). This energy is essentially wasted and is equal to ECi . Taking all possible energy
flows for renewable energy production, the following must hold for the line investor and
local generators, respectively:
EG1 = Ed1 +ED1 +ESin1 +EC1 (7.11)
EG2 = Ed2 +ED2 +ESin2 +EC2 (7.12)
Similarly, the energy stored in the storage system can be used to serve demand d at
location B or D at A. These are denoted as ESd and ESD , respectively. Hence, local demand
d at B can be served directly from renewable generators Ed1 and Ed2 , from storage ESd or
other sources from the main grid that are external to the system under study, denoted as
Edoth . This results in the total energy demand at location B equal to:
Ed = Ed1 +Ed2 +ESd +Edoth (7.13)
In a similar manner, remote demand D located at A is served by any combination of
renewable production generators ED1 and ED2 , storage ESD or other sources in the main
power system EDoth , therefore:
ED = ED1 +ED2 +ESD +EDoth (7.14)
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Note here that Eq. (7.11) - (7.14) are valid for energy flows at t, but also hold for
energies in a larger time period, such as an annual period, the project lifetime or the sum of
energies over all t in a larger time period. Total energy quantities referring to a larger time
horizon and tariff prices determine the players’ profit equations. Similar to the analysis in
previous chapters, every player’s objective function is to maximise their own profit.
Renewable energy production used to serve the demand (local or remote) is sold at a
fixed price equal to pG. Renewable energy traded with the energy storage system is sold
for a tariff price equal to pS. Energy transported through the transmission line originating
from local generators or the storage investor needs to pay a transmission fee of pT . In
addition, renewable generation installation costs cGi in £/MWh, as defined in Eq. (3.4).
The line investor can build a power line with a transmission cost of cT in £/MW per unit
of transmission capacity installed. Note that cT refers to the transmission cost per unit of
line capacity installed and is different than CT , defined in Eq. (4.1), which refers to the
total transmission cost over a larger time period. Finally, the storage player also incurs a
cost of cS in £/MWh per unit of storage capacity installed.
Crucially, when energy storage is introduced, the model evolves into a Stackelberg-
Cournot game. The line investor is the leader of the game, as he moves first by building the
transmission line T and renewable generation capacity PN1 at B. The line investor’s profits
however, depend also on the investment capacity decisions taken by local generators and
the storage investor. In the context of the game, the line investor needs to decide how much
generation capacity PN1 and transmission capacity T to install to maximise his profit. Local
generators and the storage investor share the available capacity at location B by playing a
Cournot game. Local generators determine how much generation capacity they need to
install PN2 , and the storage investor needs to decide the storage capacity S that maximises
his own profit.
Profit equations for each player are determined from the total energy quantities, price
and cost parameters. The profit of the line investor is equal to:
Π1 = (Ed1 +ED1)pG +(ED2 +ESD)pT +ESin1 pS− cG1EG1− cT T (7.15)
Line investors’ revenues stem from selling energy to serve the demand (local and/or
remote) for which he earns pG, from the energy transmitted through the transmission line
(originating from local generators or the storage investor) charged with pT , and from the
energy sold to the storage system, charged with pS. On the other hand, the line investor
incurs costs related to the installation and operation of renewable generation capacity cG1
and costs related to the installation of the transmission capacity cT .
Local generators earn pG per unit of demand served (local or remote) and pS for the
energy sold to storage. The costs incurred by local generators are the energy production
costs cG2 , and the cost for energy transmitted through the power line pT :
Π2 = (Ed2 +ED2)pG +ESin2 pS− cG2EG2−ED2 pT (7.16)
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Similarly, the storage player earns pG when serving the local and/or remote demand.
The storage investor pays pS for the energy purchased by the renewable generators, pT for
the energy transported through the transmission line and cS for installing energy storage
capacity of S:
Π3 = (ESd +ESD)pG− (ESin1 +ESin2)pS−ESD pT − cSS (7.17)
Note here that the energy purchased by storage from renewable generators would otherwise
be wasted, meaning that the storage player can negotiate a low tariff price pS with the line
investor and local generators. Essentially, the storage investor can purchase energy from
renewable producers at very low prices, therefore increasing the profitability of storage
investments in the region.
Similarly to the analysis presented in Section 4.2.2, the estimation of the Stackelberg-
Cournot game equilibrium answers the research question of the optimal strategies that
players adopt, in order to maximise their profits, given that the line investor has a first mover
advantage over local investors at B 2. The game equilibrium can be found by backward
induction. At the first level, the line investor estimates the Cournot game equilibrium,
determined by the joint actions of local generators and the storage player, for every possible
action taken by the leader ⟨PN1,T ⟩. For a given ⟨PN1,T ⟩, the Cournot game equilibrium
can be found by the intersection of the local investors best responses. Local generators’
best response needs to account for all possible actions of the storage player, i.e. for every





BR2← (P#N2,S)|⟨PN1,T ⟩ (7.19)
Similarly, the storage investor’s best response needs to account for all possible actions of






The Cournot game equilibrium solution is given by the intersection of the local investors
best responses:
(PN2,S)
† = intersect(BR2,BR3)|⟨PN1,T ⟩ (7.22)
2The Stackelberg-Cournot game represents a static game, as optimal decisions on strategy actions are
estimated one-off, as opposed to a repeated game.
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The equilibrium of the Stackelberg-Cournot game is equal to (P∗N1 ,T
∗,P∗N2,S
∗).
Energy quantities in Eq. (7.15) - Eq. (7.17) represent the sum of energy quantities over
a larger time horizon. To estimate this, we first need to estimate the energy flows (or power
flows) for each t in the time horizon under consideration. The power flows are determined
by a control mechanism that is used to define priorities over available suppliers and demand.
The control scheme used in the energy system is presented in detail in the following section
along with an algorithmic approach for the analysis of the Stackelberg-Cournot game.
7.3 Algorithmic approach for Stackelberg-Cournot game
analysis
An algorithmic approach is developed for the estimation of the Stackelberg-Cournot game
equilibrium. Profit equations required for the game equilibrium estimation depend on the
sum of energy flows or power flows for each t. The power flows are determined by a
control mechanism that is used to define priorities over available suppliers and demand,
analysed in the following section.
7.3.1 Control scheme for power flow estimation
In this section, the control scheme that defines the energy flows and priorities in the two-
location system is presented. The control scheme used in the energy system is shown in
the flowchart depicted in Fig. 7.2.
Recall here, the line investor needs to decide how much generation capacity PN1 and
transmission capacity T he needs to install. Local generators need to estimate PN2 and the
storage investor S, so that their profits are maximised. For any combination of possible
⟨PN1,T,PN2,S⟩ and each t, the power flows are determined by the control algorithm logic
presented in Fig. 7.2 and more analytically in Algorithm 5.
In summary, for each time step t in the simulation process, the residual demand
(total demand minus potential RES production) is estimated. When there is a shortage
of renewable supply, the control algorithm estimates the energy storage discharge. The
power discharged by the storage system cannot be larger than the maximum power that
can be discharged at t. In addition, the storage system’s state of charge is not allowed to
exceed SOCmin. In the next step, available supply from all three players, is used to serve
the local demand on a Pro Rata basis. Local demand is prioritised over remote demand
due to reduced energy losses, but also because of transmission charges imposed to local
generators and the storage investor. The remaining renewable generation and power from
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⟨PN1 ,T,PN2 ,S⟩ repeat
Estimate potential gener-
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available RES and storage
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Satisfy remote demand
with remaining RES






Fig. 7.2 Flowchart summarising control algorithm logic to derive energy flows estimation
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the storage system is used to serve the remote demand. If there is any deficit, the remaining
power required to fully serve the demand is served by other sources in the system. On the
other hand, when there is an oversupply of renewable production, renewable generators
serve the local and remote demand on a Pro Rata basis. Any excess energy is stored in
the storage system, as long as the state of charge does not exceed its nominal value and
maximum charging power constraints are not violated. Any excess generation that cannot
be stored in the storage tank is curtailed.
Energy flows for each t are estimated by Algorithm 5 and total energy quantities
for the period under examination are given by the summation of energy flows for all t.
The next step is to calculate the profits of the players for given cost parameters and all
possible combinations of ⟨PN1,T,PN2,S⟩. The procedure is summarised in Algorithm 6.
Profit estimation is followed by the actual determination of the Stackelberg-Cournot game
equilibrium. The methodology developed is discussed in the following section.
7.3.2 Stackelberg-Cournot game estimation
When energy storage is introduced, the game evolves into a Stackelberg-Cournot game
between the line investor (leader) and local generators and storage player (followers).
The solution of the Stackelberg-Cournot game is found by backward induction and is
summarised in Algorithm 7. Recall here that the strategy actions of each player are: the
line investor chooses his renewable generation capacity PN1 and transmission capacity
T , local generators choose their renewable energy capacity PN2 and the storage investor
chooses the storage capacity to be installed S. The objective of all players is to maximise
their profits. In order to do so, the line investor needs to anticipate the reaction of other
investors to his own actions i.e. to building the transmission line and renewable generation
capacity at B. Hence, the line investor needs to compute for every possible strategy
⟨PN1,T ⟩), the equilibrium solution of the Cournot game played between local generators
and the storage investor.
For every given ⟨PN1,T ⟩, local generators estimate their best response to all possible
strategies of the storage player. In other words, local generators estimate the renewable
capacity they need to install PN2
# for every possible storage capacity S, for every given
⟨PN1,T ⟩. This is the best response of local generators to the storage capacity being built. At
the same time, the storage investor estimates his best response to the renewable generation
capacity built by local generators. For every possible PN2 , the storage investor estimates
the quantity of storage capacity he needs to build S# to maximise his own profit Π3.
The Cournot game equilibrium solution between local generators and the storage
investor is given by the intersection of the best responses (PN2,S)
†. A Cournot solution
is found for all possible strategies of the line investor and the line investor’s profits Π1
are computed. The line investor then estimates the optimal generation and transmission
capacity that maximises his profit Π1, throughout the set of all Cournot game equilibria.
This concludes the backward induction process followed by the line investor to select his
optimal strategy. The line investor then installs (P∗N1,T
∗). Local generators and the storage
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Algorithm 5 POWER & ENERGY ESTIMATION
1: PNmax ◃ max rated capacity in search space
2: PNi ← [0 : δPN : PNmax ] ◃ generation capacity strategies i=1,2 player
3: T ← [0 : δT : Tmax] ◃ transmission capacity strategy
4: S← [0 : δS : Smax] ◃ storage capacity strategy






◃ i player normalised generation
7: PL ◃ demand profile
8: for all ⟨PN1 ∈ {0, ...,PNmax},T ∈ {0, ...,Tmax}⟩ do
9: for all PN2 ∈ {0, ...,PNmax} do
10: for all S ∈ {0, ...,SNmax} do
11: for all t
12: PG1 ← xG1 ·PN1 ◃ generation 1 player




◃ initial storage state
15: Smin← SOCmin ·S ◃ minimum SOC
16: γ ◃ ratio of local to remote demand
17: d← γPL ◃ local demand
18: D←
{
PL, if PL < T
T, otherwise
◃ remote demand
19: RD← d +D− (PG1 +PG2) ◃ residual demand
20: if RD > 0 then ◃ shortage of RES generation
21: if RD > Pdchmax then ◃ check maximum discharge rate
22: Pdch← Pdchmax ◃ discharge at max rate
23: else
24: Pdch← RD ◃ discharge power
25: end
26: f rom_store← ESt (1− sdch)−
Pdch
ηdch
◃ storage state no constraints
27: if f rom_store > Smin then ◃ no violation of min SOC
28: ESt+1 ← f rom_store ◃ update storage state
29: else
30: ESt+1 ← Smin ◃ min storage state
31: Pdch← (ESt (1− sdch)−Smin)ηdch ◃ update power discharged
32: end
33: if PG1 +PG2 +Pdch >= d then ◃ supply exceeds local demand












◃ served by storage
38: else
39: Pd ← PG1 +PG2 +Pdch ◃ local demand satisfied
40: Pd1 ← PG1 ◃ served by generator 1
41: Pd2 ← PG2 ◃ served by generator 2
42: PSd ← Pdch ◃ served by storage
43: end
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44: PD1 ← PG1−Pd1 ◃ remote demand served by generator 1
45: PD2 ← PG2−Pd2 ◃ remote demand served by generator 2
46: PSD ← Pdch−PSd ◃ remote demand served by storage
47: PD← PD1 +PD2 +PSD ◃ total remote demand
48: Pdoth ← d−Pd ◃ local demand served by other sources
49: PDoth ← D−PD ◃ remote demand served by other sources
50: PSin = PSin1 = PSin2 = 0 ◃ renewable generation to storage
51: PC = PC1 = PC2 = 0 ◃ RES generation curtailed
















◃ remote demand served by generator 2
57: if -RD > Pchmax then ◃ check max charge rate
58: Pch← Pchmax ◃ charge at max rate
59: else
60: Pch←−RD ◃ update charge power
61: end
62: to_store← ESt (1− sdch)+Pchηch ◃ storage state no constraints
63: if to_store <= Smax then ◃ no violation of max storage capacity
64: ESt+1 ← to_store ◃ update storage state
65: ESin ← Pch ◃ charging power
66: else ◃ storage capacity is exceeded













◃ in storage from gen 2








◃ power curtailed from gen 2
75: PSd = PSD = 0 ◃ demand served by storage



















83: return ⟨EGi,Edi,EDi,ESd ,ESD ,ESini⟩ ◃ total energies
162 Transmission capacity game with energy storage
Algorithm 6 PROFIT ESTIMATION
1: pG, pT ,pS ◃ generation tariff, transmission fee, storage fee
2: cT ◃ transmission capacity cost
3: cGi ◃ i player’s generation cost
4: for all ⟨PN1 ∈ {0, ...,PNmax},T ∈ {0, ...,Tmax}⟩ do
5: for all PN2 ∈ {0, ...,PNmax} do
6: for all S ∈ {0, ...,SNmax} do
7: Π1← (Ed1 +ED1)pG +(ED2 +ESD)pT +ESin1 pS− cG1EG1− cT T
8: Π2← (Ed2 +ED2)pG +ESin2 pS− cG2EG2−ED2 pT





Algorithm 7 STACKELBERG-COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM ESTIMATION
1: for each ⟨PN1,T⟩ ∈ ⟨{0, ...,PNmax},{0, ...,Tmax}⟩ do
2: for each S ∈ {0, ...,Smax} do
3: Π#2←maxPN2






6: BR2← (P#N2,S)|⟨PN1,T ⟩
7: for each PN2 ∈ {0, ...,PNmax} do





11: BR3← (PN2,S#)|⟨PN1,T ⟩
12: (PN2,S)
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player observe the leader’s strategy and respond by installing their best responses and
Cournot game solution P∗N2 and S
∗.
(Π1, Π2, Π#3) (Π1, Π2, Π3)
... ... ... (Π1, Π2, Π3)
(Π1, Π#2, Π3)
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...




... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
(Π1, Π2, Π3) (Π1, Π2, Π#3)
... ... ... (Π1, Π#2, Π3)
Storage S
Local gen PN2





Fig. 7.3 Cournot game equilibrium estimation process from normal form of the game
The the game equilibrium estimation in practice is achieved from the normal form of
the Stackelberg-Cournot game. Profits represent the players’ expected payoffs and are
computed for every possible action in the strategy space ⟨PN1 ,T,PN2,S⟩.
The normal form of the Cournot game given a line investor’s strategy (PN1,T ) is shown
in Fig. 7.3. The figure shows the local investors payoff matrix and the procedure followed
to determine the players best responses. The best response of local generators to the
installation of storage capacity S corresponds to finding PN2 that maximises profit Π2 i.e.
finding the maximum Π2 at each column (shown in yellow color). Respectively, finding
the best response of the storage player for every possible strategy coming from the local
generators is equal to finding the maximum Π3 at every row of the payoff matrix (shown
in green). The equilibrium solution of the Cournot game lies in the intersection of the
followers best responses (shown in pink color).
The strategies that implement this solution (PN2 ,S)
† are estimated for all possible
actions in the line investor’s strategy space. The leader computes the followers’ payoff
matrix for every PN1 ,T , finds their best responses, estimates the Cournot game equilibrium
and from this set equlibria selects the optimal payoff strategy that maximises his own
profit. Cournot game equilibria are shown in Fig. 7.4. From the set of Cournot solutions,
the line investor selects the optimal strategy that maximises Π1. The equilibrium of the
Stackelberg-Cournot game is ⟨P∗N1,T
∗,P∗N2,S
∗⟩ (encircled by a red box in Fig. 7.4).
An application of the methods developed for the estimation of the Stackelberg-Cournot
game equilibrium is shown in the following section. The empirical analysis was based on
realistic assumptions based on the project for network reinforcement between Hunterston
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Fig. 7.4 Stackelberg-Cournot game equilibrium estimation











Fig. 7.5 Summarised methodology steps for transmission capacity game with energy
storage
7.4 Practical application of algorithmic approach
This section elaborates on the three player game equilibrium estimation of the emerging
Stackelberg-Cournot game using realistic assumptions based on the Kintyre-Hunterston
grid reinforcement project. The procedure and methodology steps followed are summarised
in Fig. 7.5. In summary, at first, historic data are collected and processed. Next, we sample
future energy scenarios through a modified Gibbs sampling technique, which is similar
to the sampling procedure presented in Chapter 6, but also preserves time dependency
of resulting samples, in order to account for the introduction of energy storage and its
time-dependent operation. For each scenario, power and energy flows in the system are
estimated. Next, total energies are used to compute profits of players for a combination of
different strategies and cost parameters. Once profits are available, the equilibrium of the
game can be estimated. The steps followed for the simulation analysis are discussed in
detail in the following sections.
7.4.1 Model assumptions
In more detail, the first step of the analysis is to collect historic data on wind resources and
demand at locations of main demand (Location A) and high renewable potential (Location
B). We assume that location B is represented by the Kintyre peninsula and location A by
Hunterston. Wind speed data were collected from the UK Met Office and the MIDAS
dataset. Two weather stations were identified in the area of interest, the weather station
with ID 908 was used to model the renewable production and capacity installed by the
line investor, and the weather station with ID 23417 was selected to represent renewable
production by local generators. ID numbers refer to the UK Met Office database. As for
the demand data, UK National Demand data over the 2006-2015 period were used. For
additional information on data used, the reader is referred to Section 5.3 of Chapter 5.
Second from historic data, we can generate or sample multiple future scenarios by
utilising a Gibbs sampling or MCMC technique, which is suitable for the analysis with
energy storage. The Gibbs sampler used for the analysis of the transmission game with
storage is shown in Algorithm 8. Historic data refer to mean wind speed data at location B
for all players that invest in renewable generation capacity w1,w2, and historic demand
data from which a generic demand profile is determined PL3. To preserve time dependency
and capture seasonal variations, demand data was classified into hour-season distributions.
3Recall here that PL represents a generic demand profile derived from historic data, while D represents
the remote demand that can be served by renewable and storage investors, when also accounting for the
capacity of the transmission line T , as shown in Eq. (7.10).
166 Transmission capacity game with energy storage
For example, G(PLh=1,s=4) represents the distribution of demand from 0 : 00−00 : 59 in
Winter. Preserving the time dependency is crucial for transmission capacity game with
energy storage, as the storage system sizing depends heavily, not only on the magnitude
of demand, but also on the actual demand shape with time. Optimal sizing for storage
usually follows a typical daily cycle that depends on demand, wind power and their
interdependencies. Demand, however, follows a daily pattern and shape which depends
on time. This time dependency needs to be preserved, otherwise peaks and valleys may
appear more frequently after sampling, which might lead to undersizing of storage capacity
required for the application. In previous models (without storage), such as in Chapter 6,
time dependence preservation of demand was not required for the estimation of curtailment,
but this is a crucial factor when storage is incorporated in the model.
Wind speeds larger than 48 knots were considered outliers and therefore were removed
from the datasets. Moreover, only data that reside in common time periods were used
to construct the joint distribution of wind speeds. Conditional distributions of players’
wind speeds were found as follows: wind speed data were grouped into bins with a step
of 1 knot e.g. [0,1), [1,2), ..., [47,48). Available wind speed measurements from which
the dataset is constructed are rounded into the nearest knot. This means that the first
bin corresponds to wind speeds equal to 1 knot and so on. Historic wind speed data are
recorded in pairs ⟨w1,w2⟩. For every possible value of w1, all w2 values were recorded
and grouped together. The procedure created 48 bins that contain w2 wind speed data
conditional on w1 values. As expected, several bins are sparse. For example, very high
wind speeds are rare and therefore bins might have a limited number of elements. To
ensure the Markov Chain after the utilisation of the Gibbs sampler is ergodic, several bins
were merged into forming bins with a larger number of elements. The bins merged into
larger bins were the following [39th,40th], [41th,42th,43th] and [44th,45th,46th,47th,48th].
A similar procedure was followed to derive the distribution of the local generators wind
speed conditional on the wind speed of the line investor.
The sampling procedure for wind speeds is initialised by randomly selecting a pair
of wind speeds. This represents the initial state of the MC of wind speeds generated.
Subsequent states of the MC w(t+1)i were generated by replacing the value of the wind
speed by a randomly selected value from the conditional F(wi |w−i(t)). Demand sampling
followed a procedure that preserved the time dependency. At first, a random sample was
drawn from the demand distribution for h = 1, s = 4, i.e. 1am winter time. The consecutive
sample was drawn from the demand distribution for h = 2 and s = 4. The values of h and s
are alternated to form a time series of demand data that contains n samples.
Similarly to the analysis in Chapter 6, to ensure that the sampling procedure is inde-
pendent of the starting condition, a burn-in period was adopted and the first 20% of the
data generated were not included in the simulation procedure. The final length of data
included in the analysis was equal to a duration of a year. A yearly analysis was performed
in this model, for the reason that inclusion of storage introduced additional computational
requirements that made simulations time-consuming and demanding. Safe conclusions
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can be drawn, even if a single year is assumed, as seasonal and hourly variations are still
accounted for. The procedure is summarised in Algorithm 8.
Algorithm 8 GIBBS SAMPLING
1: w1,w2,PL ◃ wind speed 1,2, power demand
2: n ◃ number of samples





L ⟩, k ∈ {1,2, ...,kmax} ◃ historic data
5: F(w1,w2) ◃ wind distribution from data




2 ⟩ ← sample(w1,w2) ◃ initialise wind
9: ⟨P(t)L ⟩ ← sample(PLh,s) ◃ initialise demand (h = 1,s = 4)
10: repeat
11: w(t+1)1 ← sample F(w1 |w(t)2
)
12: w(t+1)2 ← sample F(w2 |w(t+1)1
)
13: P(t+1)L ← sample G(PLh,s)
14: t← t +1
15: until t > T




L ⟩, t ∈ {tburn, tburn +1, ...,n}
Wind speed data generated by the Gibbs sampler are used to estimate the per unit
power output of wind generators installed by the line investor and local generators. The
conversion from wind speed to power output data was based on a generic power curve4
and a sigmoid function approximation.
Demand samples were used to estimate local and remote demand. For the three player
game, it was assumed that location B has some local demand which is significantly smaller
than the remote demand, but follows the same shape and pattern as the UK demand profile.
For simplicity, we assumed in the experimental analysis that the demand d is a portion
γ ≃ 20% of the demand PL.
Power and energy flows were estimated every δ t = 1hr and for the duration of one year.
Costs of the transmission line and the energy storage system were adjusted to represent
the cost for a single year. For example, as in the analysis in previous chapters, the total
cost of a transmission line of T = 150 MW capacity was assumed to be CT = £230m for a
period of 20 years. Dividing the total cost by the capacity of the line and the years results
in an annual transmission cost per unit of transmission capacity installed cT . Similarly for
the storage system, an annual storage cost per unit of energy storage capacity installed
was derived as the ratio of the total storage cost divided by a useful lifetime of 10 calendar
years. After 10 years, we assume the energy storage system has exceeded its useful lifetime
and is substituted with a new storage system.
Energy storage system parameters were based on typical values for Lithium-ion bat-
teries. The battery storage system was limited to an operational range of SOCmin = 20%
4Parameters derived by a 2.05 MW Enercon E82 wind turbine: http://www.enercon.de/en/
products/ep-2/e-82/
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Local generators best response
Storage player best response
Cournot Equilibrium
Fig. 7.6 Cournot game: Best responses of local generators and storage investor for
⟨PN1,T ⟩= ⟨100,100⟩ and cG1 = cG2 = pT = 0.30pG, pS = 0.10pG
and SOCmax = 100%. The round-trip efficiency was assumed ηrt = 0.81 leading to a
charging and discharging efficiency of ηch = ηdch = 0.9. Charging and discharging rates
were assumed equal to a 1 MW/1 MWh rate (normalised for the storage nominal capac-
ity S). This means that the battery can charge/discharge from/to SOC = 0%− 100% to
SOC = 100%−0% in δ t = 1 hr. Note here that in reality, the useful lifetime of battery
storage systems is greatly affected by the DOD and charging/discharging rates. Although
technically possible, often battery storage systems are limited to lower rates in order to
increase their useful lifetime. Considerations about such costs were not assumed in this
work. Instead, a useful lifetime of 10 calendar years was assumed, after which the storage
system is replaced. Annual costs were adjusted to represent this assumption. Moreover, cS
was assumed to follow a linear approach with the storage capacity installed. In real-world
settings large-scale energy storage may have a lower per unit cost due to economies of
scale.
The search space and potential strategies of players were assumed to be PNmax =
500 MW with an incremental capacity of δPN = 1 MW. Potential strategy actions for
transmission capacity were assumed equal to T = [0,75,100,125,150,175] MW and for
the storage system Smax = 300 MWh with dS = 1 MWh.
The Stackelberg-Cournot game equilibrium was estimated as follows. For every
possible strategy action of the line investor ⟨PN1,T ⟩, the local generators PN2 and the
storage player S, aggregated energy quantities were estimated on an annual basis from the
hourly energy flows, as derived by the control algorithm 5. Next, for different combination
of cost parameters and tariff prices, profits were estimated and the normal form of the
Stackelberg-Cournot game (payoff matrix) was constructed (see Fig. 7.3). For every
⟨PN1,T ⟩, the solution of the Cournot game was found. As shown by Fig. 7.3, the Cournot
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Fig. 7.7 Empirical equilibrium estimation: single intersection point for ⟨PN1,T ⟩ =
⟨100,100⟩ and cG1 = cG2 = pT = 0.30pG, pS = 0.10pG
equilibrium is found by the intersection of the local generators and the storage player best
responses (Line 12 of Algorithm 7). A practical example of local investors best responses
and the Cournot game equilibrium is shown in Fig. 7.6.
Due to the discreteness of data and search space for equilibrium estimation in the
empirical approach, the players’ best responses are vectors of pair elements (or arrays).
For example, local generators best response is equal to a vector of (P#N2,S), with S being
all potential strategies for the storage investor (see Line 6 of Algorithm 7). Respectively,
storage player’s best response is equal to a vector of (PN2,S
#), with PN2 being all potential
strategies for local generators (see Line 11 of Algorithm 7). The intersect function (Line
12 of Algorithm 7) represents the intersect function between two arrays and returns the
data that are common in both arrays BR2 and BR3. As such, the following cases were
observed during the simulation procedure:
• The search for an intersection between the local generators and storage investor best
responses returns exactly one intersection point (PN2,S)
†. In this case, the single
point is the Cournot game equilibrium between the local generators and the storage
player (see Fig 7.7).
• The search for an intersection returns multiple (two) intersection points. In this case,
the Cournot game equilibrium is assumed to be the average of the intersection points
(see Fig. 7.8).
170 Transmission capacity game with energy storage
































Fig. 7.8 Empirical equilibrium estimation: multiple intersection points for ⟨PN1,T ⟩ =
⟨181,100⟩ and cG1 = cG2 = pT = 0.30pG, pS = 0.10pG
• Finally, the search for intersection may lie in a point in-between of the best responses
recorded. In this case, the empirical algorithm finds the intersection of the lines
formed by the best response curves (intersection of multiple line segments). The so-
lution is considered to be the Cournot game equilibrium between the local generators
and the storage investor (see Fig. 7.9).
Note here, the cases above only occur because the method for estimation of the equilibrium
is empirical and based on real large-scale data, rather than analytically derived by abstract
mathematical functions, like in other studies. On completion of the estimation of all
Cournot equilibria for each ⟨PN1,T ⟩, we search for the Cournot equilibrium that maximises
the profit of the line investor. The solution is the equilibrium of the Stackelberg-Cournot
game.
7.4.2 Computational requirements
In the previous section, the numerical assumptions on key parameters of the game were
presented. With regards to the algorithmic approach followed in the simulation analysis, a
few remarks should be made about the computational resources required:
• The potential strategies for all players lead to 501×301×3006 potential combina-
tions of strategies, where 501 are the possible PN2 local generators strategies, 301
the possible S storage investor’s strategies and 501×6 = 3006 possible ⟨PN1,T ⟩ line
investor’s strategies. This leads to more than 450 million potential combinations.
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Fig. 7.9 Empirical equilibrium estimation: no intersection point (illustration based on
⟨PN1,T ⟩= ⟨100,100⟩ and cG1 = 0.28pG, cG2 = pT = 0.30pG, pS = 0.10pG)
• Moreover, for every strategy above, the control algorithm needs to estimate the
hourly energy flows and quantities on an annual basis (vectors of a magnitude of
8760). While results from different strategy actions are independent from each other,
and therefore calculations can be carried out and executed simultaneously with the
use of parallel computing, the storage element, however, does not allow any further
use of parallel computing, especially for the estimation of the hourly energy flows.
Hourly energy flows depend on previous states of the system (current state of charge
depends on the state of charge of the previous time step). Independent simulations
for all possible strategies were executed in a state-of-the-art and high-performance
computing facility, funded by EPSRC (Cirrus UK National Tier-2 HPC Service at
EPCC (http://www.cirrus.ac.uk) and the University of Edinburgh (EP/P020267/1)).
The simulations were executed with MATLAB software environment and were split
into 36 parallel workers.
• For a given set of financial parameters, the payoff matrix dimensions are 501×301×
3006, where 501 are the possible PN2 strategies, 301 the possible S strategies and
501×6 = 3006 possible ⟨PN1,T ⟩ strategies. However, for each scenario (presented
in the following sections) at least 51 combinations of cost parameters were estimated,
increasing further the computational requirements of the work.
In the following section, the Stackelberg-Cournot game is analysed under different
scenarios and cost parameters.
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
cG1 0.10pG : 0.02pG : 0.70pG 0.30pG 0.36pG 0.36pG 0.36pG
cG2 0.30pG 0.10pG : 0.02pG : 0.70pG 0.30pG 0.30pG 0.30pG
pT 0.30pG 0.30pG 0.10pG : 0.02pG : 0.90pG 0.30pG 0.30pG
pS 0.10pG 0.10pG 0.10pG pS = 0 : 0.02pG : pG 0.10pG
cS 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 0.30cS : 0.05cS : 1.60cS
Table 7.1 Summary of cost parameters considered in scenarios for the analysis of the trans-
mission capacity game with energy storage (in all scenarios the generation price remained
fixed at pG = £74.3/MWh and the per unit transmission cost at ct = £76,666.67/MW)
7.5 Scenario results
The following scenarios were considered to study the Stackelberg-Cournot game formed
between low-carbon technology investors. The scenarios examine the dependence of the
equilibrium results on the line investor’s generation cost cG1 , the local generators’ cost cG2 ,
the transmission fee pT , the storage tariff price pS and finally dependence on the actual
cost of storage cS. For each scenario, the cost variable under study varies while all other
parameters remain fixed. A summary of all cost parameters for each scenario is provided
at Table 7.1.
The time horizon for the simulation analysis is equal to one calendar year. The
introduction of energy storage resulted in high computational requirements that restricted
the analysis in a single year, a sufficient time period for the purpose of the analysis, as
hourly energy calculations on an annual basis take into consideration seasonal and hourly
variations of generation and demand. RES generation and transmission capacity useful
lifetime was considered to be 20 calendar years. Energy storage useful lifetime was
assumed equal to 10 calendar years. The model did not account for degradation of storage
in relation to the depth of discharge. Transmission cost cT and storage cost cS were adapted
for a single year analysis by dividing overall project lifetime costs by 20 years. Useful
lifetime for energy storage was assumed to be 10 calendar years, after which the storage
system is replaced. This is reflected in the storage cost cS assumed. No remaining value
of energy system assets was considered, although for several components, such as the
transmission line, there is significant value remaining after the end of the project lifetime
of 20 years. A linear dependence of cS and cT per unit of capacity installed was considered
in this work. Finally, profit estimation did not account for discounting factors or net present
value calculations for future cash flows.
7.5.1 Scenario 1: Varying cG1
The first scenario shows how the equilibrium results depend on the line investor’s generation
cost cG1 . Other cost parameters remain fixed cG2 = 0.30pG, pT = 0.30pG, pS = 0.10pG,
cS = 15,000 (for energy storage a cost of $200/kWh of capacity installed was assumed, a
useful lifetime of 10 years leading to a cost per MWh installed of £15,000), pG = 74.3 and
ct = 76,666.67 (£230m/(150 MW · 20 years), while cG1 varies from 0.10pG to 0.70pG
with a step of 0.02pG.
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Fig. 7.10 Scenario 1: Generation capacity installed at equilibrium and its dependence on
the line investor’s generation cost. Storage capacity value is shown in green color and on
the right y-axis, while all other variables are shown on the left axis.
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Fig. 7.11 Scenario 1: Profits at equilibrium and their dependence on the line investor’s
generation cost
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Fig. 7.10 reveals the generation capacity installed by the players for varying generation
cost of the line investor. Fig. 7.11 shows the profits earned by players at the Stackelberg-
Cournot game equilibrium. Transmission capacity, storage capacity and generation capacity
installed by the line investor, decreases as cG1 increases with other parameters remaining
equal. On the contrary, generation capacity installed by local generators increases as cG1
increases and PN1 decreases. For low leader’s generation cost, the line investor installs
more generation capacity, leading also to larger profits earned. However, as cG1 increases
less capacity is installed by the line investor leading to reduced profits. At cG1 ≃ 0.38pG,
the line investor and local generators install equal RES capacities, with the line investor
generating slightly higher profits. Storage capacity decreases as total RES capacity drops,
mainly caused by the line investor installing less generation capacity. Storage capacity
ranges from 223 MWh to 37 MWh for cG1 = 0.10pG and cG1 = 0.70pG, respectively. The
transmission capacity drops from T = 125 MW to T = 100 MW from cG1 = 0.30pG to
cG1 = 0.32pG. In other areas, transmission capacity remains unchanged. Profit functions
follow similar trends to the growing or reducing generation capacity installed. Storage
player profits are significant lower in magnitude than other players in the game and despite
presenting a large range in the rated storage capacity installed. This result is expected as
the storage investor is allowed to purchase energy only in the cases of oversupply. Recall
here, the storage player is allowed to serve the demand only when this cannot be satisfied
by renewable generators. Moreover, storage investor also incurs significant costs, related
to the installation of storage capacity itself, but also charges for transmission and energy
purchase by renewable generators.
It is also worth exploring here, the difference between the capacities installed at the
equilibrium of the game, before and after the introduction of storage. When no storage
is present, the game reduces into a Stackelberg game between the line investor and local
generators. The behaviour of players in this game was studied extensively in previous
chapters of this thesis. Fig. 7.12 shows the generation and transmission capacity installed
by the line investor at the equilibrium of the game with and without storage. It is shown
(Fig. 7.12) that the line investor can increase the RES capacity installed, while also
increasing his profits, as in Fig. 7.14, when storage is introduced. The margin is higher
when cG1 is in a lower range. For the line investor, profits are higher due to an increase in
the capacity installed, but also because the line investor can generate additional revenue
from the storage player by both trading (charged with pS) and transmission (charged with
pT ). Note here, this result is not obvious, as in the case of RES shortage, the storage
investor and RES generators compete for serving the demand on equal terms (Pro Rata
access rules). This may be a significant factor in the different behaviour observed for local
generators. Fig. 7.14 shows a minor reduction in local generators profits, when storage
is introduced. A similar minor decrease in capacity is observed in Fig. 7.13. Recall here
that local generators can also increase their revenues by trading their energy surplus with
the storage system, however they also compete with storage when there is a shortage of
supply. The introduction of storage does not bring significant benefits for local generators,
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Fig. 7.12 Scenario 1: Line investor’s generation and transmission capacity with and without
storage
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Fig. 7.13 Scenario 1: Local generators generation capacity with and without storage
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Fig. 7.14 Scenario 1: Profits of line investor and local generators at equilibrium with and
without storage
as they are slightly worst off, after storage is introduced in the game. On the contrary, the
line investor reaps the rewards of its advantageous market position.
An important aspect to compare is the curtailment imposed to the energy system with
and without energy storage. As shown in Fig. 7.15, the curtailment issue is not eliminated.
In fact, curtailment happens when storage devices have already reached their maximum
storage capacity, therefore excess power generated by RES producers, needs to be curtailed.
Low generation costs cG1 , cause a massive deployment in RES capacity installed by the
line investor, leading to extremely high curtailment rates reaching approximately 64% of
the potential RES capacity. Storage devices, however, managed to reduce total curtailment
at a range of 5.6% (117 GWh) to 1.9% (1.1 GWh), as cG1 increases. Fig. 7.16 shows a
breakdown of energy curtailed by individual RES investors.
Finally, Fig. 7.17 shows a significant decrease in the demand (local or remote) served
by other sources in the energy system. The most significant increase is observed for the
remote demand served. Local demand d is significantly lower than remote demand D
(about 20% according to model assumptions). Moreover, local investors are not charged for
transmission when serving the local demand. Furthermore, local demand is also prioritised
over remote demand D due to lower energy losses. All these factors contribute to lower
magnitude increase in local demand served rather than in remote demand. Fig. 7.17 also
reveals that larger penetration of RES generation is possible with the introduction of energy
storage in energy systems.
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Fig. 7.15 Scenario 1: Total curtailed energy as a percentage of available energy at equilib-
rium with and without storage
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Fig. 7.16 Scenario 1: Curtailed energy as a percentage of available energy at equilibrium
with and without storage
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Fig. 7.17 Scenario 1: Demand served by other sources with and without storage
7.5.2 Scenario 2: Varying cG2
The second scenario shows how the equilibrium results depend on the local generators’
generation cost cG2 . Other cost parameters remain fixed cG1 = 0.30pG, pT = 0.30pG,
pS = 0.10pG, cS = £15,000/MWh, pG = £74.3/MWh and ct = £76,666.67/MW, while
cG2 varies from 0.10pG to 0.70pG with a step of δcG2 = 0.02pG.
Fig. 7.18 indicates the generation capacity installed by players for varying generation
costs of the local generators. Fig. 7.19 shows the profits at the equilibrium of the game.
Transmission and generation capacity installed by the line investor, increases as cG2
increases with other parameters remaining equal. On the contrary, generation capacity
installed by local generators decreases as cG2 , as expected, due to higher costs. For lower
values of cG2 , local generators install more generation capacity, leading also to larger
profits earned. However, as cG2 increases less capacity is installed by local generators,
leading to reduced profits. At cG2 ≃ 0.24pG, the line investor and local generators install
approximately equal RES capacities, with the line investor generating slightly higher
profits. Profits are equalised approximately for cG2 ≃ 0.22pG. Storage capacity decreases
as total RES capacity drops, mainly caused by the local generators installing less generation
capacity. Storage capacity ranges from 179 MWh to 65 MWh for cG2 = 0.10pG to cG2 =
0.70pG. The transmission capacity increased from T = 100 MW to T = 150 MW from
cG2 = 0.26pG to cG2 = 0.28pG. In other areas, transmission capacity remains unchangeable.
Profit functions follow similar trends to the growing or reducing generation capacity
installed. Storage player profits are significantly lower in magnitude than other players
in the game and despite presenting a large range in the rated storage capacity installed.
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Fig. 7.18 Scenario 2: Generation capacity installed at equilibrium and dependence on the
local generators’ generation cost. Storage capacity value is shown in green color and on
the right y-axis, while all other variables are shown on the left axis.
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Fig. 7.19 Scenario 2: Profits at equilibrium and dependence on the local generators’
generation cost
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The storage investor may purchase energy only in the case there is a RES oversupply.
Moreover, it is allowed to serve the demand only when this cannot be satisfied by renewable
generators. The storage investor also incurs significant costs, related to the installation of
storage capacity itself, but also charges for transmission and energy purchase by renewable
generators.
Fig. 7.18 shows that for cG2 ≥ 0.50pG RES capacity investment is not profitable for
local generators. An interesting observation is that in the range of cG2 = 0.50pG to cG2 =
0.66pG, while local generators install zero or approximately zero capacity, generation
capacity by the line investor and storage capacity gradually decrease until constant values
are reached cG2 ≥ 0.66pG. This is due to the method followed for the Stackelberg-
Cournot equilibrium estimation. First, the Cournot equilibrium is found for every ⟨PN1 ,T ⟩.
Crucially, the Cournot game equilibrium depends on local investors profits Π2 and Π3.
However, Π2 directly depends on cG2 . When cG2 increases, Π2 decreases. This dependence
leads to a different estimation of the Cournot game equilibrium with regards to the storage
capacity S†, as solution points to a different ⟨Π†2,Π
†
3⟩, albeit the generation capacity of
local generators is estimated as P†N2 ≃ 0, in this value range. Consequently, this also leads
to a different estimation of the Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium, as shown in Fig. 7.18. A
careful examination of the equilibrium profit values in the same region shows an increase
in the line investor’s profit values and a decrease in storage profit values. Line investors
profit values increased from £17.59m to £19.78m, while capacity dropped from 266 MW
to 189 MW. This corresponds to a 112.5% profit increase and a 30% capacity decrease.
Storage profit values decreased from £0.93m to £0.46m (50.5% decrease), while capacity
dropped from 139 MWh to 68 MWh (51.1% decrease).
It is also worth exploring here, the difference between the capacities installed at the
equilibrium of the game, before and after the introduction of storage. When no storage
is present, the game reduces into a Stackelberg game between the line investor and local
generators. The behaviour of players in this game was studied extensively in previous
chapters of this thesis. Fig. 7.20 shows the generation and transmission capacity installed
by the line investor at the equilibrium of the game with and without storage. It is shown in
Fig. 7.20 that the line investor can increase the RES capacity installed, while also increasing
his profits, as in Fig. 7.22, when storage is introduced. The profit margin increase is more
or less equal for all values of cG2 . However, the capacity margin is higher when cG2 is more
expensive, as it is cheaper for the line player to invest in RES capacity. For the line investor,
profits are higher due to an increase in the capacity installed, but also because the line
investor can generate additional revenue from the storage player by both trading (charged
with pS) and transmission (charged with pT ). Note here, this result is not obvious, as in
the case of RES shortage, the storage investor and RES generators compete for serving
the demand on equal terms (Pro Rata access rules). This may be a significant factor in the
different behaviour observed for local generators. Fig. 7.22 shows similar profit values for
cG2 < 0.24pG and a minor reduction in local generators profits for higher cG2 values, when
storage is introduced. Fig. 7.21 shows that profit values are largely affected by generation
capacity installed by local generators. For cG2 < 0.32pG, local generators install more
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Fig. 7.20 Scenario 2: Line investor’s generation and transmission capacity with and without
storage
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Fig. 7.21 Scenario 2: Local generators generation capacity with and without storage
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Fig. 7.22 Scenario 2: Profits of line investor and local generators at equilibrium with and
without storage
capacity when storage is introduced. Larger cG2 values display a decrease in capacity, as
the storage investor competes with local generators for serving the demand. Recall here
that local generators can also increase their revenues by trading their energy surplus with
the storage system, however, they compete with storage when there is a shortage of supply.
The introduction of storage brings higher profits for local generators, only if they have a
lower cost of generation than the line investor. When generation costs are more expensive,
storage does not bring significant benefits for local generators, as they are worst off. On
the contrary, the line investor can increase his profit in all scenarios.
An important aspect to compare is the curtailment imposed to the energy system
with and without energy storage. As shown in Fig. 7.15, the issue of curtailment is
not eliminated. In fact, curtailment happens when storage devices have already reached
their maximum storage capacity, therefore excess power generated by RES producers,
needs to be curtailed. Low generation costs cG2 , cause a massive deployment in RES
capacity installed by local generators, leading to extremely high curtailment rates reaching
approximately 57% of the potential RES capacity. Storage devices, however, managed to
reduce total curtailment up to 6.8% (for cG2 = 0.56pG) and up to 130 GWh (cG2 = 0.10pG).
Fig. 7.24 shows a breakdown of energy curtailed by individual RES investors. When local
generators are driven out of the game, RES curtailment is imposed only to the line investor.
Finally, Fig. 7.25 shows how a significant decrease in the demand (local or remote)
served by other sources in the energy system. Most significant change is shown in the
remote demand served. Local demand d is significantly lower than remote demand D
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Fig. 7.23 Scenario 2: Total curtailed energy as a percentage of available energy at equilib-
rium with and without storage
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Fig. 7.24 Scenario 2: Curtailed energy as a percentage of available energy at equilibrium
with and without storage
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Fig. 7.25 Scenario 2: Demand served by other sources with and without storage
(about 20% according to model assumptions). Moreover, local investors are not charged for
transmission when serving the local demand. Furthermore, local demand is also prioritised
over remote demand D due to lower energy losses. All these factors contribute to lower
magnitude increase in local demand served rather than in remote demand. Fig. 7.25 shows
that larger penetration of RES generation is possible with the introduction of energy storage
in energy systems.
7.5.3 Scenario 3: Varying pT
The third scenario shows how the equilibrium results depend on the transmission fee
pT . Other cost parameters remain fixed cG1 = 0.36pG, cG2 = 0.30pG, pS = 0.10pG,
cS = £15,000/MWh, pG = £74.3/MWh and ct = £76,666.67/MW, while pT varies from
0.10pG to 0.90pG with a step of δ pT = 0.02pG.
Fig. 7.26 shows the generation capacity installed by the players for varying transmission
fee pT and Fig. 7.27 shows the profits at the Stackelberg-Cournot game equilibrium.
As shown in Fig. 7.26, total generation capacity in location B decreases, as pT increases,
due to local generators installing less capacity. The leader’s generation capacity is relatively
constant with varying pT , and increases slightly for large values of pT . On the contrary,
the leader responds to the increase of pT by increasing the transmission capability of
the power line installed. Generation capacity installed by local generators decreases
with pT , as expected, due to higher transmission costs and inability to serve remote
demand. A transmission fee of pT = 0.10pG is sufficient for the line investor to build
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Fig. 7.26 Scenario 3: Generation capacity installed at equilibrium and dependence on the
transmission fee. Storage capacity value is shown in green color and on the right y-axis,
while all other variables are shown on the left axis.
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Fig. 7.27 Scenario 3: Profits at equilibrium and dependence on the transmission fee
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larger generation capacity than local generators, despite the fact that cG1 > cG2 . However,
the line investor achieves greater profits than the local investors only for greater values
of transmission charges pT ≥ 0.22pG. Local generators’ profits reduce as pT increases
and PN2 decreases. Storage capacity decreases as total RES capacity drops, mainly caused
by the local generators installing less generation capacity. Storage capacity ranges from
212 MWh to 0 MWh for cG2 = 0.10pG to cG2 = 0.90pG. The transmission capacity
increased from T = 100 MW to T = 150 MW from cG2 = 0.36pG to cG2 = 0.38pG. In
other areas, transmission capacity remains unchangeable. Profit functions follow similar
trends to the growing or reducing generation capacity installed. Storage player’s profits
are significantly lower in magnitude than other players in the game and despite presenting
a large range in the rated storage capacity installed. The storage investor may purchase
energy only in the case there is a RES oversupply. Moreover, it is allowed to serve the
demand only when this cannot be satisfied by renewable generators. The storage investor
also incurs significant costs, related to the installation of storage capacity itself, but also
charges for transmission and energy purchase by renewable generators.
Fig. 7.27 shows that high transmission fees might negatively impact the uptake of RES
generation and storage by local producers. On the other hand, when transmission charges
are set low, the line investor can still make a profit, as the transmission line permits him to
access the demand at the remote location A. The line investor also generates revenue from
serving the local demand and from trading with the storage player. Storage capacity drops
as pT increases in direct correlation with the total generation capacity installed by RES
investors. An interesting observation is that the leader reacts to other investors capacity
being reduced and higher transmission fees, by first increasing the line’s transmission
capacity, instead of increasing his RES capacity installed.
It is also worth exploring here, the difference between the capacities installed at the
equilibrium of the game, before and after the introduction of storage. When no storage
is present, the game reduces into a Stackelberg game between the line investor and local
generators. The behaviour of players in this game was studied extensively in previous
chapters of this thesis. Fig. 7.28 shows the generation and transmission capacity installed
by the line investor at the equilibrium of the game with and without storage. It is shown in
Fig. 7.28 that the line investor can increase the RES capacity installed, while also increasing
his profits, as in Fig. 7.30, when storage is introduced. The profit margin increase is larger
for lower values of pT . For the line investor, profits are higher due to an increase of the
capacity installed, but also because the line investor can generate additional revenue from
the storage player by both trading (charged with pS) and transmission (charged with pT ).
Note here, this result is not obvious, as in the case of RES shortage, the storage investor
and RES generators compete for serving the demand on equal terms (Pro Rata access rules).
This may be a significant factor in the different behaviour observed for local generators.
Fig. 7.30 shows similar or minor reduction in local generators profits as pT increases, when
storage is introduced. Fig. 7.29 shows that profit values are largely affected by the minor
reduction in generation capacity installed by local generators and higher transmission fees.
Local generators are also affected by competition with the storage investor. Recall here
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Fig. 7.28 Scenario 3: Line investor’s generation and transmission capacity with and without
storage
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Fig. 7.29 Scenario 3: Local generators generation capacity with and without storage
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Fig. 7.30 Scenario 3: Profits of line investor and local generators at equilibrium with and
without storage
that local generators can also increase their revenues by trading their energy surplus with
the storage system, however, they compete with storage when there is a shortage of supply.
The introduction of storage brings slightly lower profits for local generators, as they are
slightly worst off. On the contrary, the line investor can increase his profit in all the range
of the parameter pT under study.
An important aspect to compare is the curtailment imposed to the energy system
with and without energy storage. As shown in Fig. 7.31, the curtailment issue is not
eliminated. In fact, curtailment happens when storage devices have already reached
their maximum storage capacity, therefore excess power generated by RES producers,
needs to be curtailed. Low transmission charges pT , cause a larger deployment in RES
capacity installed, especially by local generators, leading to high curtailment rates reaching
approximately 43.8% of the potential RES capacity.
Storage devices, however, managed to reduce total curtailment up to 7% and up to
76 GWh (pT = 0.10pG). For very large transmission charges a small increase in curtailment
is observed. Fig. 7.32 shows a breakdown of energy curtailed by individual RES investors.
Finally, Fig. 7.33 shows how a significant decrease in the demand (local or remote)
served by other sources in the energy system. Most significant increase is shown in the
remote demand served. Local demand d is significantly lower than remote demand D
(about 20% according to model assumptions). Moreover, local investors are not charged for
transmission when serving the local demand. Furthermore, local demand is also prioritised
over remote demand D due to lower energy losses. All these factors contribute to lower
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Fig. 7.31 Scenario 3: Total curtailed energy as a percentage of available energy at equilib-
rium with and without storage
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Fig. 7.32 Scenario 3: Curtailed energy as a percentage of available energy at equilibrium
with and without storage
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Fig. 7.33 Scenario 3: Demand served by other sources with and without storage
magnitude increase in local demand served rather than in remote demand. Fig. 7.33 shows
that larger penetration of RES generation is possible with the introduction of energy storage
in energy systems. The decrease in values observed after pT ≃ 0.36pG is caused by an
increase in transmission capacity installed by the line investor.
7.5.4 Scenario 4: Varying pS
The fourth scenario shows how the equilibrium results depend on the transmission fee
pS. Other cost parameters remain fixed cG1 = 0.36pG, cG2 = 0.30pG, pT = 0.30pG,
cS = £15,000/MWh, pG = £74.3/MWh and ct = £76,666.67/MW, while pS varies from
0 to pG with a step of δ pS = 0.02pG.
The capacity results installed by players at the game equilibrium are shown in Fig. 7.34.
Storage capacity decreases as the storage fee increases. Recall here that the storage fee
pS represents the cost for purchasing energy from RES investors. Increase of pS beyond
40% of pG results in no storage capacity installed, as charges for energy purchased make
investing in energy storage not profitable. The storage player purchases only energy that
would otherwise have been curtailed, therefore in practice pS charges can be set quite
low. Moreover, the effect of pS on generation and transmission capacity installed is not
significant, with most variables remaining approximately constant.
The profit results are shown in Fig. 7.35. The storage player’s profits decrease as pS
increases. Line investors profits decrease slightly as the storage capacity decreases, while
local generators capacity shows a slight increase. For the cost parameters assumed in
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Fig. 7.34 Scenario 4: Generation capacity installed at equilibrium and its dependence on
the storage fee. Storage capacity value is shown in green color and on the right y-axis,
while all other variables are shown on the left axis.
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Fig. 7.35 Scenario 4: Profits at equilibrium and their dependence on the storage fee
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Scenario 4, when pS = 0 the storage capacity is equal to 167 MWh and generates a profit
of≃ £1m. When pS increases to 0.20pG, the storage capacity drops to 54 MWh and profits
fall to £0.212m. This equals to 68% drop in storage capacity and a 79% drop in the storage
player profit.
7.5.5 Scenario 5: Varying cS
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Fig. 7.36 Scenario 5: Generation capacity installed at equilibrium and its dependence on
the cost of storage. Storage capacity value is shown in green color and on the right y-axis,
while all other variables are shown on the left axis.
The fifth scenario shows how the equilibrium results depend on the cost of storage
cS. Other cost parameters remain fixed cG1 = 0.36pG, cG2 = 0.30pG, pT = 0.30pG, pS =
0.10pG, pG = £74.3/MWh, ct = £76,666.67/MW and cS = £15,000/MWh. The cost of
storage in this scenario varies from 0.30cS to 1.60cS with a step of δcS = 0.05cS.
The capacity results installed by players at the game equilibrium are shown in Fig. 7.36.
The value of cS = 100% represents the current cost of storage. Values lower than 100%
represent different levels of cost storage reduction, up to 30% of the current value, while
larger values represent potentially higher costs. Figures up to 160% of current costs were
examined. Higher costs may also represent other storage technology types that are more
expensive. Storage capacity is equal to 100 MWh for current prices and varies from
950−10 MWh as the cost of storage increases. As expected, Fig. 7.36 shows a significant
drop in the storage capacity installed at equilibrium, however the reduction is not linear.
This result indicates that further reduction in storage costs could lead to massive adoption
of storage devices. For very low costs cS = 30%−35%, increased storage capacity leads
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Fig. 7.37 Scenario 5: Profits at equilibrium and its dependence on the cost of storage
to higher generation capacity installed by RES investors and higher transmission capacity.
Generation capacity installed by the line investor drops slightly as cost of storage increases,
while capacity from local generators and transmission capacity remains largely unaffected.
Local generators benefit from less competition when serving the demand as less storage
is installed. Recall here that RES investors can generate higher revenues by trading their
energy surplus with the storage player, but they also engage in competition when there is
RES shortfall. The transmission capacity also appears largely unaffected, however the step
size considered for T in the simulations was quite large 25 MW, therefore any trends in
the reduction in T may take a smaller step size to show.
Similarly, the results on profits achieved by players at the equilibrium of the game
are shown in Fig. 7.37. Storage and line investor’s profits decrease as the cost of storage
increases. An interesting result shown here is that local generators profits slightly increase,
as storage costs increase, despite the fact that the generation capacity remains unaffected.
This result is due to the line investor installing less generation capacity, leading to larger
participation of local generators in serving the demand.
7.6 Discussion of results
The scenarios presented in Section 7.5 were developed to explore the dynamics of the
Stackelberg-Cournot game and its equilibrium properties for a wide range of cost parame-
ters. For each scenario, the value of the tested cost parameter varies, while other financial
parameters remain fixed.
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Scenarios 1-3 showed that the total generation capacity installed by RES investors
decreases, as the tested parameter value increases. RES generation investors, i.e. the
line investor and local generators, install less capacity as their individual generation cost
increases. Reduction on one type of investor RES capacity benefits their opponents (other
RES investor), who may respond by increasing their own generation capacity. For example,
results from Scenario 1 show that PN1 decreases with cG1 , while local generators increase
PN2 . In a similar fashion, in Scenario 2, local generators decrease PN2 as cG2 increases,
while PN1 increases. In Scenario 3, PN1 is relatively constant (it increases slightly for large
pT ), while PN2 decreases.
The storage player also invests in smaller storage capacity as the storage fee pS
(Scenario 4) or cost of storage cS increases (Scenario 5). In scenarios 1-3, storage capacity
decreases as RES generation installed by the line investor decreases, leading also to
decreasing total RES capacity installed.
Transmission capacity remains largely unchanged, with some step changes presented
within the range of the cost parameter tested in each Scenario. In Scenarios 1 and 5,
T decreases while lower RES generation capacity is installed by the line investor. In
Scenarios 2 and 3, T increases as more RES capacity is installed by the line investor. The
transmission capacity does not show significant dependence on the storage fee pS or the
cost of storage cS.
Profit functions have a similar behaviour to the capacity installed by players. Note
here that RES players profits are not equalised when PN1 = PN2 , because of transmission
charges pT , but also because of different generation costs and cost for transmission capacity
installation cT . In all tested scenarios, the storage player’s profits demonstrate significantly
lower values than profits achieved by the line investor or local generators. This outcome is
attributable to high installation cost for energy storage investments cS and the additional
tariff charges pS and pT . These costs can be substantial and are related to the installation of
storage capacity itself, but also charges for transmission and energy purchase by renewable
generators. The storage player has limited control over the market as he is allowed
to purchase energy only when there is RES oversupply and can participate in serving
the demand, only when this cannot be satisfied by renewable generation. On the other
hand, energy purchased from RES generators can be charged with low prices of pS, as it
represents energy that would otherwise be curtailed.
In Scenario 3, Fig. 7.27 shows that high transmission fees might negatively impact
the uptake of RES generation and storage projects by local investors. Local generators
and storage player invest in lower capacity, as their profits diminish by high charges for
transmission. On the other hand, when transmission charges are set low, the line investor
can still make a profit, as the transmission line permits him to access demand at remote
location A. The line investor also generates revenue from serving the local demand and
from trading with the storage player. As pT is set by the system regulator, the method
developed here determines a feasible range that allows transmission, generation and storage
capacity investments to be profitable.
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Scenario 4 studied the effects of the storage pS on the capacities installed at the game
equilibrium. While the effect of pS on generation and transmission capacities is not
significant, with most variables remaining approximately constant, the results showed
that an increase of pS beyond 40% of pG results in no storage capacity installed, as fees
for energy purchased constitute investing in energy storage not profitable. However, the
storage player purchases only energy that would otherwise have been curtailed, therefore
in practice pS charges can be set quite low. Suitable values for pS can be agreed between
players under the oversight of the system regulator, so that storage capacity investments
are not discouraged.
A significant beneficiary in the energy system when storage is introduced is the line
investor. In all scenarios under consideration (Scenarios 1-3), the line investor is able to
achieve larger profits, when storage devices are deployed. The line investor is able to
do so by increasing the RES capacity installed. Comparison of results with and without
energy storage also show that the step change in transmission capacity is achieved for
different values of the tested parameter. In Scenario 1, T reduces for cG1 = 0.30pG
when no storage is deployed, compared to a reduction of cG1 = 0.32pG observed after
the introduction of energy storage. In Scenario 2, T increases for cG2 = 0.32pG and
cG2 = 0.28pG, without and with storage, respectively. In Scenario 3, T increases for
pT = 0.40pG and cG2 = 0.38pG, without and with storage, respectively. For the line
investor, profits are higher due to an increase in the capacity installed, but also because
the line investor can generate additional revenue from the storage player from engaging
in trading (charged with pS) and transmission (charged with pT ). Note here, this result is
not obvious, as in the case of a RES generation shortage, the storage investor and RES
generators compete for serving the demand on equal terms (Pro Rata access rules).
On the other hand, in the majority of cases, local generators are slightly worst off when
storage is deployed. In Scenarios 1 and 3, local generators deploy slightly less generation
capacity when storage is introduced and achieve slightly lower profits. In Scenario 2,
local generators achieve similar profit values for low cG2 values and slightly lower profits
for larger cG2 values. In Scenario 2, the introduction of storage brings higher profits for
local generators, only if they have a lower generation cost than the line investor. When
generation costs are higher, storage does not bring significant benefits for local generators,
as they are worst off. A significant factor in the different behaviour observed for local
generators is the competitive game between local generators and storage. Local generators
can generate additional revenue by trading energy surplus with the storage system, however,
they also compete with storage when there is a shortage of supply. The outcome of the
competitive behaviour is a reduction in profits for local generators. As a result, with
regards to profitability, introduction of storage does not bring significant benefits for local
generators, as they are slightly worst off, after storage is introduced in the game. On the
contrary, the line investor is able to exploit his competitive advantage, as a first mover, to
reap the benefits from the introduction of storage. This is a key finding, which is expected
by the rules of the game. In real world applications, energy trading might be determined
in a level-playing field in energy markets. In addition, the storage investor may achieve
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additional revenue streams, by participating in flexibility markets or ancillary services for
the grid. Provision of such services can significantly increase profitability and the value
added by energy storage into achieving more efficient operation of energy systems.
Despite energy storage entering the market, RES generation curtailment is not elimi-
nated. In the system with energy storage, curtailment takes place when storage devices
have already reached their maximum storage capacity, hence, excess power generated
by RES producers cannot be absorbed. Complete elimination of RES curtailment would
require a massive storage capacity installed that in the current financial situation would not
be profitable. Simulation results, however, show significant reduction in the curtailment
rates imposed that reach savings up to 7% and 130 TWh.
Comparison between results with and without energy storage showed significant
decrease in the demand (local or remote) served by other sources in the energy system,
after utilisation of storage. Most significant decrease is shown in the remote demand served.
Local demand d is significantly lower than remote demand D (about 20% according to
model assumptions), therefore the largest part of d is already served by RES generators
before storage is introduced. Local investors are not charged for transmission when serving
the local demand and furthermore, local demand is also prioritised over remote demand
D, due to lower energy losses. These factors contribute to a lower magnitude change in
local demand served rather than in the remote demand served by other sources in the
system. Storage introduction causes an increase in the RES capacity installed and reduces
the remote energy demand served by other sources in the grid. As a consequence, results
show that energy storage deployments may achieve larger penetration of RES generation
in energy systems.
A sensitivity analysis was performed by investigating the cost of storage cS in Scenario
5. Results showed a significant drop in the storage capacity installed at the equilibrium
of the game, as cS increases, however the reduction is not linear. This indicates that
large reduction in storage costs, at the range of cS = 30%− 35% of current prices or
below, could lead to massive adoption of storage devices. Large storage capacity leads to
higher generation capacity installed by RES investors and higher transmission capacity.
Generation capacity installed by the line investor drops slightly as cost of storage increases,
while capacity from local generators and transmission capacity remains largely unaffected.
A general observation is that results from tested scenarios may fluctuate and may not
be monotonic. The main reason for the behaviour observed is the empirical approach on
the Stackelberg-Cournot game estimation that is based on simulation and data analysis.
Traditional game-theoretic approaches employ purely theoretical studies that assume
mathematical functions with properties that allow for analytical estimation of the game
equilibrium. Moreover, as shown in Section 7.4.1, granularity assumed in the search space
of strategy actions, dictated at a significant extent by computational limitations, combined
with non-linearities introduced by storage, lead in several cases in multiple equilibria or
intersection solutions that are positioned in-between actions in the discrete search space.
In these cases, the equilibrium solution was approximated either by the average or the
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intersection of the line segments formed by the nearest available results, respectively. The
approximation process therefore may contribute to the fluctuation of the final result.
7.7 Concluding remarks
In summary, the work in Chapter 7 presented a game-theoretic approach that can model
new low-carbon capacity investments, such as RES generation capacity, energy storage and
network expansion projects, undertaken by private investors, who are self-interested and
aim to maximise their profits. Curtailment and line access rules play a key role in the strate-
gic game formed, the equilibrium of which can be used to determine optimal generation,
transmission and storage capacity installed in such settings and their associated profits.
Low-carbon technology investors form a bilevel Stackelberg-Cournot game between the
leader (line investor) and multiple followers (local generators and storage investor). Follow-
ers’ competitive behaviour is studied as a Cournot game. Optimal generation, transmission
and storage capacities installed at the equilibrium of the game are estimated by backward
induction. The simulation analysis and empirical approach for equilibrium estimation
studied the dynamics of the game for a range of cost parameters that can help investors,
network operators and regulators evaluate suitable tariff prices for transmission or storage,
that allow low-carbon investments to be profitable. The results show that low charges for
storage and transmission are able to achieve profitable investments. Most crucially, this
work shows that a profitable business model is possible for energy storage investments
that make use of curtailed energy from RES generation installed. It would be possible for
the storage player to negotiate a low storage fee that would allow energy purchase from
RES generators in a favourable price. Typical settings where this model can be applied
in practice include numerous locations where demand and generation are not co-located
leading to large curtailment rates.
Moreover, the results showed that energy storage can increase the total RES generation
capacity built at a particular location. Leader’s profits and RES generation capacity increase
in all scenarios studied in this work. In fact, the analysis results show that the line investor
is able to exploit his competitive advantage, as a first mover, to reap the benefits from the
introduction of storage. Local generators on the other hand, are slightly worse off when
storage is deployed. Local generators deploy slightly less generation capacity when storage
is introduced and achieve slightly lower profits, in the majority of cases. They are able to
generate larger profits only if they have a lower cost of generation than the line investor.
While curtailment is not eliminated, energy storage can significantly reduce imposed
curtailment up to a 7% factor. Energy storage causes an increase in the RES capacity
installed and reduces the total energy demand served by other sources in the system. As
a result, it is shown that energy storage deployments may achieve larger penetration of
RES generation in energy systems. Finally, a sensitivity analysis on the cost of storage,
indicated that large reduction in storage costs, could lead to massive adoption of storage
devices.
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Several extensions of the work presented in Chapter 7 are considered for future work.
The current approach did not account for lifetime degradation of battery storage with
usage or the development of a battery control energy management system that aims to
optimally control battery operation and preserve degradation. Another extension would
be repeating the analysis for multiple storage types, in addition to Lithium-ion batteries,
used in the current work. Different energy storage types and costs consideration is key
to identify the most promising technologies for similar applications. Consideration of
different configurations in storage ownership could significantly alter the results. For
example, RES investors could decide to invest in their own storage capacity or they can
jointly invest in a common storage system. Fair allocation of profits generated by co-owned
storage system is of interest especially as RES generators may have invested in dissimilar
generation capacities. Different configurations would lead to significant changes in the
strategic games formed between low-carbon investors. Finally, the game could be expanded
to consider for numerous local investors, each modelled as an individual agent. This would
lead to an interesting formulation of the game and a model of distributed storage.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
Research work in this thesis studied the effects of curtailment and line access rules to
strategic decision-making of privately developed generation, transmission and energy
storage infrastructure. Procedures on how renewable generators get grid access and how
curtailment is applied, are key factors that determine, to a significant extent, the interplay
between investors and their decisions on capacity investments. This dissertation investi-
gated the effect of curtailment strategies and flexible interruptible connections, imposed to
variable and intermittent renewable generators, on the viability of RES investment projects.
Critical features and characteristics of curtailment rules, such as fairness, were discussed
along with their effect on existing and future volumes of renewable energy generation
capacity, installed and connected to electricity grids.
A game-theoretic framework was produced to address challenges caused by excess
renewable generation at constrained grid areas with notable curtailment. Settings where
one private investor develops the required infrastructure to access the grid and multiple
low-carbon technology projects (such as wind generation and energy storage) can use
this infrastructure against the payment of a transmission fee, were considered in this
thesis. Stackelberg and Cournot game formulations were utilised to model private low-
carbon technology investors, as self-interested and profit-maximising entities that act
autonomously in order to achieve their own local objective. Strategy actions of players
on the optimal capacity installed are interdependent on strategies adopted by opponents.
Theoretical formulations of the strategic games were produced conjointly with practical
applications of the theoretical models to relevant case studies. Empirical solution concepts
and algorithmic approaches were developed for game equilibrium estimation of optimal
capacity decisions for a wide range of cost parameters. The solutions proposed rely
on detailed simulation analysis for players’ payoff estimation, as opposed to smooth
mathematical functions. Similar approaches can be used in other game-theoretic models
in the energy sector allowing for more accurate enumeration of the players’ action sets
and payoff functions, hence leading to more accurate estimation of the game equilibrium.
Similar market frameworks can model private network infrastructure investments and help
network operators to bridge the knowledge gap about setting the optimal curtailment rule
200 Conclusions
and deduce transmission charges and tariff prices for privately developed energy system
assets and infrastructure.
8.1 Summary of research work
Proliferation of RES generation and deregulation of the energy markets pose new chal-
lenges to the ever changing energy landscape. Generating assets and energy system
infrastructure are increasingly decentralised and owned by independent agents, who act
with the aim of satisfying their own private objectives. In this light, game-theoretic
modelling and multi-agent techniques are required to model agent behaviours and their
interactions. One emerging issue is the unprecedented growth in renewable generation
curtailment. Methods to tackle curtailment include operational techniques, such as smart
interruptible renewable connections and curtailment strategies, network expansion, energy
storage and the development of local energy marketplaces that aim to match renewable
supply to local demand. A literature survey on the techniques applied to minimise curtail-
ment was presented in this thesis. The innovative technology of blockchain or distributed
ledgers is recently being reported as a potential enabler of smart local energy marketplaces,
hence, a detailed literature review on the potential of the technology was also part of this
research work.
The first part of the research work undertaken studied the impact of curtailment rules
applied in several countries, including the UK, on the economic performance of renewable
generators and the aggregate generation capacity investment at a certain location. Three
widely used curtailment rules were considered, LIFO, Pro Rata and Rota. Their effect
on the capacity factor of wind generators was also estimated. Upper bounds of tolerable
curtailment at a given location were assessed and the effects of renewable resource spatial
correlation on the resulting curtailment. The analysis performed highlighted the importance
of fair allocation of curtailment among generators. In fact, network operators face a
significant knowledge gap about how to implement curtailment rules that achieve desired
operational objectives, but at the same time minimise disruption and economic losses for
renewable generators. In this context, this thesis showed that equal allocation of imposed
curtailment resulted in maximisation of the renewable generation capacity installed at a
certain area. A new curtailment rule was proposed, called FRR, that abides by this criteria
and ensures equal share of curtailment among generators of unequal rated capacity.
A long-term solution to dealing with curtailment is network expansion. Investment
in additional grid capacity, however, is costly, therefore, from a public policy viewpoint,
privately developed network infrastructure is highly desirable. A key knowledge gap
faced by network operators and regulators is how to incentivise privately developed
network upgrades projects, that could prove beneficial, especially in cases where several
distributed generators can use the same power lines against the payment of a transmission
fee (‘common access’ line rule). Line access rules and curtailment play a crucial role
in network capacity investments. To study this, a two-node transmission model was
considered and two agent types, a line investor, who builds a transmission line and RES
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generation, and a second agent representing local RES generators. Both agents access
demand via the same transmission line. This formulation leads to a leader-follower
Stackelberg game with the line investor having the ’first mover advantage’ and local
generators acting after observing the leader’s actions. Moreover, two agent settings were
assumed in this work, myopic and strategic agents, who are able to foresight and forecast
opponents’ strategic moves. In the first case, a relation that makes investments profitable
was established between the curtailment rate and transmission capacity installed. In the
second case, decisions on optimal (and interdependent) renewable capacities built by
investors were determined in the equilibrium of the game.
Strategic behaviour of agents was first examined for a simple model and assumptions
based on average values of RES production and demand over a larger time horizon. This
achieved a closed-form, analytical solution of the game equilibrium and an investigation
of equilibrium properties for a wide range of cost parameters.
Subsequently, a refined model was developed with the ability to capture stochastic RES
production and variability of energy demand. A theoretical formulation of the problem was
presented along with an empirical algorithmic approach for game equilibrium estimation
that utilised large datasets of wind speed and demand data. The proposed method for
equilibrium assessment represents a general framework that is applicable to locations where
there is excess of renewable generation capacity, and where sufficient data is available.
Effectively however, limited data may be available or data may be erroneous and
experience significant gaps. To deal with this issue, a MCMC method for generating time
series data was developed, based on Gibbs sampling. The technique allowed for exploration
of the solution space for future scenarios of generation and demand by repetition of the
simulation analysis with different time series data. The process is of great importance
for reducing uncertainties regarding decisions taken by investors on optimal generation
capacities to be installed.
The last part of this work was devoted to the study of energy storage that could reduce
curtailment or defer network upgrades. An extension of the game-theoretic model was
considered consisting of a line investor, local generators and a third independent storage
player, who can absorb part of the renewable production, that would otherwise have
been curtailed. Optimal transmission, generation and storage capacity decisions were
determined by the computation of the Stackelberg-Cournot game equilibrium formed
between the line investor (leader) and local investors of generation and storage (followers).
The equilibrium properties were studied for different scenarios and financial parameters.
A comparison of the energy system before and after the introduction of energy storage
revealed the value added by storage devices for achieving reduction of curtailment and
further integration of renewables.
All models proposed in this thesis were validated and applied to a practical setting of a
grid reinforcement project, in the UK, and a large dataset of wind speed measurements
and demand. Algorithmic approaches based on large dataset analysis were developed
for the assessment of the equilibria formed and determination of optimal decisions. The
game-theoretic modelling solutions proposed in this thesis rely on direct enumeration of
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the players’ utility functions (payoffs) from simulation analysis and energy system control
algorithms, as opposed to smooth mathematical functions. Similar approaches can be used
in other game-theoretic models in the energy sector allowing for more accurate estimation
of the game equilibrium.
Overall, this thesis studied the interplay among self-interested and independent low-
carbon investors, at areas of excess renewable capacity with network constraints and high
curtailment. The work proposed mechanisms for setting suitable charges for transmission
and trading that ensure the transmission line gets built, but also investors from the local
community can benefit from investing in renewable energy and energy storage. In summary,
the results of this work showed how game-theoretic modelling frameworks can help
network operators to bridge the knowledge gap about setting optimal curtailment rules and
determining appropriate tariffs for privately developed energy system infrastructure.
The following section digs deeper into the novelty and contributions of the work
presented in this thesis and the main conclusions reached by the analysis and model
development.
8.2 Research contributions revisited and main conclusions
As stated in Section 1.2 of the Introduction of this thesis, the broader objective of the
work was to explore how game-theoretic and artificial intelligence techniques can address
challenges caused by excess renewable generation at areas of the grid with network
constraints and significant volumes of curtailment. Methodologies and model formulations
produced in this work are relevant to the fields of smart energy systems, energy economics,
game theory, artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. Main research contributions,
model outputs and conclusions of this work can be summarised below:
• Comprehensive review of the topic of renewable curtailment:
First of all, this thesis provided a detailed analysis, description and comparison
of curtailment rules and practices applied by network operators for curtailment
allocation in ANM schemes. The literature survey revealed that curtailment rules may
significantly impact the profitability of existing renewable generators and future RES
development. Theoretical assessments to evaluate curtailment rules were found in
the literature, however, effects of curtailment rules in RES capacity investments, but
also in transmission capacity were not formalised and required further investigation.
This knowledge gap was addressed in this work by the provision of a principled
study of curtailment rules and their impact on renewable and transmission capacity.
Second, the thesis provided a state-of-the-art analysis on game-theoretic and eco-
nomic models that are suitable for analysing market behaviour and strategic decision-
making of investors in settings where renewable curtailment plays a significant role.
Literature review on game-theoretic modelling for network upgrades and generation
capacity investments shows a shortfall in works that jointly consider transmission
and generation expansion, while also considering curtailment and line access rules.
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Research works have studied transmission constraints and congestion, however to
the best of our knowledge, the current work was one of the first to study the effect of
commercial agreements, curtailment and line access rules, in settings of private grid
reinforcement.
Finally, potential solutions to dealing with the issue of curtailment were also in-
vestigated in the literature survey of this work, including energy storage and novel
technologies such as blockchain technologies.
Blockchains offer a novel way and promise secure, tamper-proof and transparent
transactional or data exchanges in energy systems, including decentralised P2P
energy networks. The systematic review on blockchain technologies revealed a wide
range of potential applications in the energy sector, including facilitating smart grid
applications and local energy markets. In relation to the topic of this thesis, i.e. the
topic of curtailment and privately developed energy system assets and infrastructure,
the literature review revealed several key advantages. First, when combined with
smart metering infrastructure, blockchain technologies can be used to record trace-
ability of energy flows and verify proof of origin for energy produced and consumed
in energy systems. Second, in combination with smart contracts, blockchains can
be used to impose curtailment rules or develop new business models for contractual
arrangements between private investors, such as enforcing the rules for ‘common
access’ grid infrastructure. Third, blockchains promise automated market platforms
that could facilitate the adoption of local energy marketplaces by enabling consumers
to take an active role in energy systems and change their behaviour towards energy
usage. Smart local energy marketplaces may lead to better matching of locally
produced renewable supply to local demand, hence may also reduce curtailment
and network congestion. Finally, blockchain technologies may increase or facilitate
regulatory compliance due to tamper-proof and transparent record keeping. Our liter-
ature survey was one of the first academic-led, peer-reviewed studies on blockchains
and revealed a good potential, however it also found that the technology needs to
mature and overcome several technical challenges that inhibit further adoption and
deployment. Research efforts on technology improvements, such as scalability,
sustainability and speed of transactions, are ongoing. Other challenges come from
the legal and regulatory sphere and need to be addressed for mainstream adoption.
• Effects of curtailment rules to existing and future renewable generation
A principled study on different curtailment strategies and their underlying properties
was undertaken in this work. Network operators face a significant knowledge gap
about how to implement curtailment rules that achieve desired operational objec-
tives, but at the same time minimise disruption and economic losses for renewable
generators. The effects of curtailment rules on the RES capacity installed at a par-
ticular location were studied and formalised. The results revealed that the capacity
installed and profitability of different generators can differ widely under different
curtailment models. Work focused on three widely used curtailment rules, LIFO,
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Rota and Pro Rata. A simulation analysis for wind generation showed how these
rules affect the capacity factor of RES generators in our study. Results revealed that
LIFO favours early connections, since the CF of the last generator was substantially
reduced. Rota might disfavour smaller size generators. Pro Rata achieved equal
sharing of curtailment and similar reduction of CF across all generators. However,
it required simultaneous intervention to all generators participating in the scheme.
A new rule was proposed in this study (FRR), which equally allocates curtailment
to generators according to their actual production, while also achieving minimal
disruption. Reduced disruption was shown in the simulation results by the average
number of curtailment events per generator.
This work also studied the effect of spatial wind speed correlation to the result-
ing curtailment and lost generator revenues. It was found that CF reduction is
closely linked to higher correlation. This highlights the importance of geographical
dispersion of RES resources, when possible, to minimise curtailment.
Next, the work focused on the long-term effects of curtailment on decisions about
future investments in RES capacity. A Cournot game approach was used to determine
the feasible level of RES capacity that can be built at a single location with network
constraints. An upper bound of tolerable curtailment was estimated in relation to
the curtailment rate at location. More specifically, it was shown that a RES project
is profitable, if the curtailment rate is smaller than a threshold that depends on the
economic parameters of the investment and more specifically on the ratio of the
generation cost to the selling tariff price. If marginal costs of generation at a single
location are equal, this threshold is the same for all generators and can characterise a
particular location.
Moreover, under perfect competition analysis assumptions, it was proved that fair
curtailment rules such as Pro Rata and FRR can be selected by network operators and
regulators in order to maximise the generation capacity built at a single location. The
generation capacity is maximised when generators are curtailed at their maximum
acceptable curtailment rate. This conclusion highlights the importance of fairness
when allocating curtailment. In real-world applications however, marginal costs
of generators may not be known, therefore a promising approach would be the
establishment of a market for curtailment and required flexibility. This would allow
curtailment allocation according to the real cost of curtailment for each generator.
• Impact of curtailment and line access rules to network upgrade expansion
An interesting problem studied was the effect of curtailment and line access rules
to new transmission capacity. Network upgrades investments were performed by
private investors. The research work developed appropriate modelling techniques that
capture the strategic decision-making and interdependencies between low-carbon
energy investors, modelled as self-interested agents and profit maximising agents.
Two agent settings were explored, myopic and strategic agents.
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The behaviour of myopic agents was examined in areas experiencing high curtailment
rates. The model results showed that the transmission line investment is viable if
and only if the curtailment rate (prior to the construction of the line) is higher than a
threshold τT . Model results also showed that local generators would be willing to
accept high transmission charges, which theoretically converge to the energy selling
price, as long as they are able to trade even an infinitesimally larger energy that
would otherwise have been curtailed and marginally increase their profits. Arguably,
however, in real-world situations, such rates may not be acceptable.
The analysis for strategic agents was analysed for two cases of curtailment rules,
LIFO and Pro Rata/FRR. For the latter case, the work showed that grid capacity
can be built under a ‘common access principle’, where a private investor is granted
a license to build the line, subjected to the condition he grants network access to
other competing generators, who pay a transmission fee for the energy transported
through the line.
A theoretical formulation of a simple model based on average values of renewable
production and demand was studied, and an analytical solution provided for the
optimal generation capacities were found at the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game.
Afterwards, the model was expanded in order to have the ability to capture stochas-
ticity in renewable production and variability of demand. A theoretical analysis of
the game was presented along with an algorithmic estimation of the equilibrium by
utilisation of empirical game theory and large datasets of production/demand data
from a real network upgrade project in the UK. The algorithmic approach developed
for equilibrium estimation represents a general game-theoretic framework that can
be applied in areas where supply and demand are not co-located and sufficient data
is available. Moreover, the formulation used energy system control algorithms and
simulation analysis to enumerate the players’ utility functions, which were then used
to inform the equilibrium estimation. Similar solution concepts can be used in other
energy-related settings with game-theoretic formulations for payoff and equilibrium
estimation. Equilibrium properties and evolution of the Stackelberg game were
studied for a wide range of cost parameters, including dependence on agent cost of
generation and transmission fee. Results identified a feasible range for transmission
charges that allows both transmission and generation capacity investments to be
profitable.
As a result, this work developed a game-theoretic model that enabled network
operators to bridge the knowledge gap of incentivising privately developed grid
infrastructure, especially in settings where multiple generators can share access
through the same transmission line, and determining suitable transmission charges.
Shared-capacity line models can also be used in privately developed grid infrastruc-
ture settings. In real-world settings, the line investor would be inclined to share grid
access if there is spare capacity or RES resources are not correlated, and would prefer
a LIFO type of rule. Limitations on such schemes are associated with increased
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capital costs and risks. Investments on larger capacity lines, in expectation that other
generators might connect and use the line, are very expensive and hold huge risks.
Finally, regulatory challenges may inhibit such schemes.
• Technique for data generation and multiple simulation of future events
Practical applications and algorithmic approaches developed for the estimation
of the Stackelberg game equilibrium rely on the availability of large datasets and
followed a single-shot approach. However, in real-world settings, only limited data
may be available or data may experience significant gaps. This work showed that
significant improvement on these issues is possible. A Gibbs sampler was used to
generate observations from historic resource and demand data in order to simulate
multiple future scenarios. Generated data display correlation in the same fashion as
real data available. This allowed for multiple iterations of the simulation analysis
with different time series data, on the principles of Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) analysis, that allowed the exploration of the solution space for multiple
future scenarios, leading to a reduction of uncertainties when considering future
renewable generation capacity decisions. A significant limitation of the method is
that adequate historic data are required for the sampling procedure to be reliable.
• Value of energy storage in network expansion with renewable generation
Evaluation of energy storage was accomplished by the extension of the work to
a three-player game, consisting of a line investor, local generators and a third
independent storage player, who can purchase energy from renewable generators
that would otherwise have been curtailed. The model can estimate optimal capacity
decisions on transmission, generation and storage, based on a Stackelberg-Cournot
game analysis. The line investor is the leader of the game, whose decision variables
are the transmission capacity of the line and RES generation capacity to be installed.
Local investors, i.e. local generators and storage investor, represent the followers.
Followers optimal generation and storage capacities are determined at a Cournot
game equilibrium. A simulation analysis and empirical algorithmic approach for
equilibrium estimation was developed. The evolution of the Stackelberg-Cournot
game equilibrium was studied for a range of cost parameters. Model outputs showed
that investors, network operators and regulators can use game-theoretic formulations
to deduce suitable tariff prices for transmission or storage, that allow low-carbon
investments to be profitable.
Model results showed that low charges for storage and transmission are able to
achieve profitable investments. Most crucially, this work showed that a profitable
business model is possible for energy storage investments that make use of curtailed
energy from RES generation installed, although profits for storage are much lower
than other investors. Moreover, it would be possible for the storage player to
negotiate a low storage fee that would allow energy purchase from RES generators
in a favourable price.
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The main findings of the work revealed that energy storage increases the total RES
generation capacity built at a particular location. Comparative results with and
without storage showed that a beneficiary is the line investor, who is able to exploit
his competitive advantage and raise profits in all scenarios under consideration, when
storage is introduced to the game. Local generators on the other hand, are slightly
worse off when storage is deployed. They deploy slightly less generation capacity
when storage is introduced and achieve slightly lower profits, in the majority of
cases. Local generators are able to generate larger profits only if they have a lower
cost of generation than the line investor.
Moreover, model results showed that energy storage can significantly reduce imposed
curtailment up to a 7% factor and may reduce the total energy demand served by
other sources in the system. Hence, energy storage deployments may achieve larger
penetration of RES generation in energy systems. Finally, a sensitivity analysis on
the cost of storage, indicated that large reduction in storage costs, could lead to
massive adoption of storage devices coupled with larger RES generation capacity
installed.
• Application of models and algorithmic approaches for equilibrium estimation
in practical settings
All models and solution concepts of the strategic games formed between low-carbon
investors in this thesis, were experimentally validated by a practical application
based on realistic assumptions from the Kintyre-Hunterston grid reinforcement
project, in the western coast of Scotland. Large datasets of renewable resources and
electricity demand were utilised for this purpose reaching 17 years of hourly data.
The direct use of data for equilibrium estimation, distinguishes this work from other
works in the literature, which usually assume that profits or costs are represented
bysmooth mathematical functions of special form and follow a theoretical analysis
of game-theoretic approach. As opposed to the theoretical approach, we followed an
alternative formulation that used energy system control algorithms and simulation
analysis payoff estimation. Similar solution concepts can be used in renewable
energy settings with game-theoretic modelling to allow for accurate game equilib-
rium estimation. Moreover, it is worth noting that, while the numerical application
is specific to the UK case, the analysis and equilibrium results are general, and
the underlying problem of renewable generation and demand not being co-located
occurs in many other places around the globe, facing similar challenges. Therefore,
results from this work can easily be replicated to model other case studies.
8.3 Future work
The following directions are appraised for future work consideration with regards to the
work presented in this thesis:
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• Model extension for multiple players
One of the assumptions followed in this thesis is that local generators and their
behaviour are represented as a single player in the game. However, local generators
may act autonomously and may even experience different costs. Relaxation of
the single player assumption leads to a more complex game formulation, i.e. to
a leader-multifollower Stackelberg game between the line investor and multiple
local generators. In this case, local generators would share the available generation
capacity by playing a Cournot game between each other. The approach for the
strategy followed by the line investor would be similar to the approach taken in
this thesis (e.g. Chapter 7 analysis), i.e. the line investor needs to estimate the
Cournot equilibrium reached between local players for each strategy of the line
investor. For a given line investor’s strategy, each player belonging to the class
of local generators would need to determine their best response to every possible
strategy followed by their opponents. An estimation of each opponent strategy would
not be required, on the contrary only aggregate opponents’ strategies need to be
accounted for. The Cournot equilibrium would be found by the intersection of local
generators’ best response curves. Pragmatic estimation of the equilibrium by an
empirical and algorithmic approach such as the one developed in this thesis would be
challenging due to issues expected by limitation in computational resources and data
granularity. To overcome such issues, a new approach for the equilibrium estimation
might prove useful, such as by formulating the problem and solving it with a dynamic
programming or genetic optimisation algorithm. Moreover, an interesting case study
would be to follow a similar relaxation approach for the storage investor. This would
lead towards a model of distributed storage (such as home battery systems or EVs)
and an interesting formulation of the strategic game.
• Model extension for multiple locations
The models produced in this thesis considered a two-node location. An interesting
extension of the work would be to consider multiple locations for RES generation or
storage, which could also lead to multiple leaders installing transmission capacity
lines and multiple followers. In similar settings, a computationally tractable algorith-
mic approach is highly relevant due to the increased complexity of the distributed
model. Moreover, transmission losses need to be accounted for. A comparison be-
tween complex and distributed model formulations to traditional approaches where
network expansion is performed by the system operator would be extremely useful
in order to evaluate decentralised versus centralised decision-making processes.
• Consideration of transmission losses, real-time constraints and power flows
Future directions of this work need to account for power losses during transmission,
so far considered negligible, and enhanced estimation of curtailment events caused
by technical constraints and power flows of the energy system under study. Current
work followed a techno-economic approach and used energy calculations for the
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estimation of energy flows and equilibrium properties. Note here that a more realistic
approach for network constraints estimation and imposed curtailment would require
simulation analysis on a much smaller time scale than the hourly analysis assumed so
far, to be able to capture technical constraints caused by RES volatility and demand.
• Exploration of different renewable and storage technology types
An interesting future extension of the work, would be the study of different types of
RES technology for more realistic estimation of curtailment. Current work focused
on wind generation, as it represents the dominant RES technology in terms of market
share and capacity installed in the UK. However, combination of different RES
technologies and diversification of resources could minimise imposed curtailment.
In addition, it would be of high importance, to repeat the analysis of the three-
player Stackelberg-Cournot game for multiple storage technology types. Different
storage technologies and different cost consideration are key factors in identifying
the most promising type for applications that aim to reduce curtailment. Moreover,
consideration of alternative configurations in storage ownership could significantly
alter the results. For example, RES investors could decide to invest in their own
storage capacity or they can jointly invest in a common storage system. In the latter
case, fair allocation of profits generated by the co-owned storage system becomes of
interest, especially as RES generators may have invested in dissimilar generation
capacities. Fair profit allocation could be achieved by cooperative game-theoretic
solution concepts, such as the Shapley value. Different configurations could lead to
significant changes in the strategic game formed between low-carbon technology
investors.
• Refinement of financial assumptions and life-cycle cost of storage
Research work presented in this thesis could be improved by further refinement of
the financial and cost assumptions and by integrating a realistic model that estimates
the life-cycle cost of storage. Depreciation of future cash flows was not considered
in this thesis. Moreover, per unit costs of generation, transmission and storage were
considered constant and independent from the size of capacity installed. However,
in realistic settings, building a larger storage system or RES capacity might have
a lower cost per capacity installed, when compared to smaller-scale systems. In
addition, the energy selling price in this thesis was considered constant in order
to simplify the interpretation of results. A future direction of the work, however,
could utilise real data from the wholesale energy market that would lead to varying
tariff prices, changing with the shape of the electricity demand. Finally, current
approach did not account for lifetime degradation of battery storage with usage
or the development of a battery control energy management system that aimed to
optimally control battery operation and preserve storage capacity and useful lifetime.
Future work will develop methods to accurately estimate a cost per cycle (or partial
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cycle) of the storage system based on DOD-useful cycles curve and degradation for
different SOCs.
• Creation of curtailment market
Efficient allocation of curtailment could be achieved by the creation of a curtail-
ment market and flexibility services, where generators submit offers and bids for
curtailment. This would allow curtailment allocation according to the real cost
of individual generators, as lower-cost generators should be able to tolerate larger
quantities of curtailment. In this vein, a research question of interest would be to
design suitable market rules that encourage generators to report their true costs and
avoid collusion and market manipulation. Generally speaking, market solutions
may be preferred by regulators and are compliant with continuous trend towards
deregulation of electricity markets. Hence, it would be very valuable to consider
such market models in future work.
• Blockchain-enabled management of curtailment
Finally, future work will investigate using blockchain technologies and transactive
energy systems to track renewable curtailment arrangements. In combination with
smart contracts, blockchain technologies could be used to enforce renewable curtail-
ment rules or to enable novel contractual arrangements between private investors
with shared access to energy system infrastructure. For example, blockchain tech-
nology could track use of shared transmission lines or storage devices in a local
energy community. Future work will also focus on technical requirements such as
scalability or speed of transactions that are required to achieve efficient operation in
decentralised energy systems.
8.4 Concluding remarks
Overall, this thesis presented a framework on the study of low-carbon capacity investment
and the interplay between self-interested, independent and profit-maximising agents, at
areas of excess renewable capacity, with network constraints and high curtailment rates.
The work proposed a game-theoretic framework for setting charges and trade tariff fees
that ensure the transmission line gets built, while investors from the local community also
benefit from investing in renewable energy and energy storage. Overall, the results of
this work show how game-theoretic techniques can help network operators to bridge the
knowledge gap about setting optimal curtailment rules and determining appropriate market
models for privately developed network infrastructure.
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Appendix A
The Appendix provides additional information and sample codes for the simulation analysis
of the research work presented in this thesis.
A.1 Simulation analysis presented in Chapter 3
Listing A.1 Sample code for simulation analysis in Section 3.2.3: CF of wind generators,
fairness and correlation effects under different curtailment schemes
1 %With Pearson correlation
2 %U = wblrnd(A,B)generates random numbers for the Weibull distribution
with scale parameter, A and shape parameter, B.
3 URef = wblrnd(9,1.8,[1,8760]);
4 U1r = URef;
5 U2r = wblrnd(9,1.8,[1,8760]);
6 U3r = wblrnd(9,1.8,[1,8760]);





12 %Power Curve fit in the region [U_cut_in − U_nom] as polynomial
13 U_fit=[3:16];
14 P_fit=[4,20,50,96,156,238,340,466,600,710,790,850,880,905];
15 p1 = 0.01877; %polynomial coefficients
16 p2 = −0.9387;
17 p3 = 16.68;
18 p4 = −125;
19 p5 = 436.3;
20 p6 = −563.2;






26 index=0;% index for each r=Pearson correlation factor
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67 for r=0:0.05:1 %r=Pearson correlation factor
68 index=index+1;
69 R(index)=r;
70 %cr calculate such as in Wolf's paper
71 cr=1/pi*acos(1−2*r);








80 Pout1 = powerGen(U1, p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, P_nom);
81 Pout2 = powerGen(U2, p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, P_nom);
82 Pout3 = powerGen(U3, p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, P_nom);















98 cur_yes=0;%number of curtailment events
99 cur_no=0;




104 Pc=Pg1*0;%Counts total curtialment
105
106 pc_lifo=0;%power curtailed for LIFO at each time step
107 P_lifo=PG;%Power generated with LIFO scheme
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108 c_lifo=[0,0,0];%number of curtailment events for LIFO, for each
generator
109 Clifo=Pg1*0;%sum of power curtailed Clifo(i) at LIFO at each time
step
110
111 pc_pr=0;%power curtailed for Pro rata at each time step
112 P_pr=PG;%Power generated with Pro rata scheme
113 c_pr=[0,0,0];%number of curtailment events for Pro rata, for each
generator
114 Cpr=Pg1*0;%sum of power curtailed Cpr(i) at Pro rata at each time
step
115
116 pc_rota=0;%power curtailed for Rota at each time step
117 P_rota=PG;%Power generated with Rota scheme
118 c_rota=[0,0,0];%number of curtailment events for Rota, for each
generator






124 pc_frr=0;%power curtailed for FRR at each time step
125 P_frr=PG;%Power generated with FRR scheme
126 c_frr=[0,0,0];%number of curtailment events for FRR, for each
generator























































































































242 %Total number of curtailment
243 Tcur_yes(index)=cur_yes;
244 Tcur_no(index)=cur_no;


































Listing A.2 Sample code for simulation analysis in Section 3.2.3 and function powerGen:
Polynominal fit for wind power output
1 function [Pout] = powerGen(U, p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, P_nom)
2 for i=1:1:size(U,2)
3 if (U(i)>=3) && (U(i)<=16)
4 Pout(i)= (p1*U1(i)^5 + p2*U1(i)^4 + p3*U1(i)^3 + p4*U1(i)
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Table A.1 First 20 random samples of wind speed from Weibull distribution
Sample Ur1 Ur2 Ur3
1 3.73 12.83 8.48
2 2.49 7.16 2.6
3 13.46 8.33 8.36
4 2.37 6.27 5.3
5 5.83 10.34 17.55
6 14.39 6.28 12.19
7 10.32 6.36 14.52
8 6.8 13.62 13.51
9 1.58 15.12 11.96
10 1.41 17.88 7.75
11 12.66 12.41 12.33
12 1.28 7.06 7.1
13 1.58 3.39 5.35
14 7.52 9.88 3.03
15 3.91 11.91 4.42
16 13.05 15.73 0.9
17 8.29 1.81 11.34
18 2.33 10.88 12.3
19 4.01 5.91 2.22
20 1.53 11.59 2.59
0 5 10 15 20 25 30






















Fig. A.1 Histogram for wind speed Ur1
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Fig. A.2 Histogram for wind speed Ur2
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Rated power: 900 kW
Rotor diameter: 44 m
Hub height in meter: 45 / 55 
Wind zone (DIBt): -
Wind class (IEC): IEC/EN IA 
WEC concept:  Gearless, variable speed,  
 single blade adjustment
Rotor
Type:  Upwind rotor with active
  pitch control
Rotational direction: Clockwise 
No. of blades: 3
Swept area: 1,521 m2 
Blade material:  GRP (epoxy resin); 
 Built-in lightning protection
Rotational speed: Variable, 16 - 34.5 rpm
Pitch control:  ENERCON single blade 
pitch system; one inde-
pendent pitch system per 
rotor blade with allocated 
emergency supply
 Drive train with generator
Main bearing:  Twin tapered roller bearing
Generator:  ENERCON direct-drive 
 annular generator
Grid feed:  ENERCON inverter 
Brake systems: –  3 independent pitch con-
trol systems with emer-
gency power supply
 –  Rotor brake 
 –  Rotor lock
Yaw system:  Active via yaw gear,
  load-dependent damping
Cut-out wind speed: 28 - 34 m/s
  (with ENERCON storm 
control*)
Remote monitoring: ENERCON SCADA
 
* For more information on the ENERCON storm control feature, 
please see the last page.
E-44
                  900 kW
Wind speed v at hub height (m/s)



















Power P (kW) Power coefficient Cp (-)
  1 0.0 0.00
 2 0.0 0.00
 3 4.0 0.16
 4 20.0 0.34
 5 50.0 0.43
 6 96.0 0.48
 7 156.0 0.49
 8 238.0 0.50
 9 340.0 0.50
 10 466.0 0.50
 11 600.0 0.48
 12 710.0 0.44
 13 790.0 0.39
 14 850.0 0.33
 15 880.0 0.28
 16 905.0 0.24
 17 910.0 0.20
 18 910.0 0.17
 19 910.0 0.14
 20 910.0 0.12
 21 910.0 0.11
 22 910.0 0.09
 23 910.0 0.08
 24 910.0 0.07
 25 910.0 0.06
PAGE 4                       ENERCON  product overview E-44 E-44  PAGE 5
 Calculated power curve
 Wind Power P
 (m/s) (kW)
Fig. A.4 Power curve for Enercon E-44 wind turbine of 910 kW nominal capacity
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A.2 Simulation analysis presented in Chapter 4
Listing A.3 Sample code for simulation analysis in Section 4.4.1: Effects of line investor’s
generation cost cG1
1 %% Scenario 1: Varying line investor's generation cost c_g1 (all
other parameters remain fixed)
2 p_g=74.3; %Generation tariff price
3 c_g2=0.30*p_g; %Cost of generation for local generators
4 %Curtailment condition p_g−p_t>2*c_g1
5 x_curt=(p_g−2*c_g1)/p_g %Proposed percentage of p_t for curtailment
smaller than
6 x=0.26; %x<=x_curt
7 p_t=x*p_g; %Transmission fee
8 % Specify net energy demand at location A in MWh for project lifetime
(150MW*35%*8760h*20years)
9 E_d=150*0.35*8760*20;
10 c_g1=linspace(p_g/8,p_g*0.50); %Line investor's generation cost
11 % Energy production














Listing A.4 Sample code for simulation analysis in Section 4.4.1: Effects of local genera-
tors’ generation cost cG2
1 %% Scenario 2: Varying local generators' cost c_g2 (all other
parameters remain fixed)
2 p_g=74.3; %Generation tariff price
3 c_g1=p_g*0.3; %Cost of generation for leader (1) is as a fraction of
p_g
4 %Curtailment condition p_g−p_t>2*c_g1
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5 x_curt=(p_g−2*c_g1)/p_g; %Proposed percentage of p_t for curtailment
smaller than
6 x=0.26; %x<=x_curt
7 p_t=x*p_g; % Transmission fee
8 % Specify net energy demand at location A in MWh for project lifetime
(150MW*35%*8760h*20years)
9 E_d=150*0.35*8760*20;
10 c_g2=linspace(0.0*c_g1,p_g); %Local generators' generation cost
11 % Energy production






17 C_t=230*10^6; %Cost of transmission line
18 % Profits





Listing A.5 Sample code for simulation analysis in Section 4.4.1: Effects of transmission
fee pT for cG1 > cG2
1 %% Scenario 3a: Varying transmission fee p_t and c_g1>c_g2 (all other
parameters remain fixed)
2 p_g=74.3; %Generation tariff price
3 c_g1=p_g*0.26; % Line investor's generation cost
4 c_g2=0.20*p_g; % Local generators' generation cost
5 p_t=linspace(0,p_g); %Transmission fee
6 % Specify net energy demand at location A in MWh for project lifetime
(150MW*35%*8760h*20years)
7 E_d=150*0.35*8760*20;
8 % Energy production















Listing A.6 Sample code for simulation analysis in Section 4.4.1: Effects of transmission
fee pT for cG1 < cG2
1 %% Scenario 3b: Varying transmission fee p_t and c_g1<c_g2 (all other
parameters remain fixed)
2 p_g=74.3; %Generation tariff price
3 c_g1=p_g*0.20; % Line investor's generation cost
4 c_g2=0.26*p_g; % Local generators' generation cost
5 p_t=linspace(0,p_g); %Transmission fee
6 % Specify net energy demand at location A in MWh for project lifetime
(150MW*35%*8760h*20years)
7 E_d=150*0.35*8760*20;
8 % Energy production
























Feed-in Tariff Generation & Export Payment Rate Table for Non-Photovoltaic Installations 
 
All tariffs have been adjusted by the annual Retail Price Index rate (as at December 2015) of 1.2 percent, and are 




Description Period in which Tariff Date falls 
Tariff 
(p/kWh) 
Anaerobic digestion with total installed capacity 
of 250kW or less 
1 April 2010 to 29 September 2011 13.82 
30 September 2011 to 31 March 2014 16.01 
1 April 2014 to 30 September 2014 12.81 
1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 11.53 
1 April 2015 to 30 September 2015 10.25 
1 October 2015 to 15 January 2016 9.23 
Anaerobic digestion with total installed capacity 
greater than 250kW but not exceeding 500kW 
1 April 2010 to 29 September 2011 13.82 
30 September 2011 to 31 March 2014 14.81 
1 April 2014 to 30 September 2014 11.84 
1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 10.67 
1 April 2015 to 30 September 2015 9.47 
1 October 2015 to 15 January 2016 8.52 
Anaerobic digestion with total installed capacity 
greater than 500kW 
1 April 2010 to 30 November 2012 10.79 
1 December 2012 to 31 March 2014 9.76 
1 April 2014 to 30 September 2014 9.76 
1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 9.27 
1 April 2015 to 30 September 2015 8.78 
1 October 2015 to 15 January 2016 8.78 
 
Hydro 
Description Period in which Tariff Date falls 
Tariff 
(p/kWh) 
Hydro generating station with total installed 
capacity of 15kW or less 
1 April 2010 to 30 November 2012 23.84 
1 December 2012 to 31 March 2014 22.86 
1 April 2014 to 30 September 2014 21.72 
1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 19.54 
1 April 2015 to 30 September 2015 17.38 
1 October 2015 to 15 January 2016 15.64 
Hydro generating station with total installed 
capacity greater than 15kW but not exceeding 
100kW 
1 April 2010 to 31 March 2014 21.34 
1 April 2014 to 30 September 2014 20.28 
1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 18.25 
1 April 2015 to 30 September 2015 16.22 
1 October 2015 to 15 January 2016 14.60 
Hydro generating station with total installed 
capacity greater than 100kW but not exceeding 
500kW 
1 April 2010 to 14 March 2013 13.19 
15 March 2013 to 31 March 2014 16.87 
1 April 2014 to 30 September 2014 16.03 
1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 14.42 





1 October 2015 to 15 January 2016 11.54 
Hydro generating station with total installed 
capacity greater than 500kW but not exceeding 
2MW 
1 April 2010 to 31 March 2014 13.19 
1 April 2014 to 30 September 2014 12.52 
1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 11.27 
1 April 2015 to 30 September 2015 10.02 
1 October 2015 to 15 January 2016 9.02 
Hydro generating station with total installed 
capacity greater than 2MW 
1 April 2010 to 30 November 2012 5.33 
1 December 2012 to 31 March 2013 4.88 
1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014 3.41 
1 April 2014 to 30 September 2014 3.41 
1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 3.08 
1 April 2015 to 30 September 2015 2.73 




Description Period in which Tariff Date falls 
Tariff 
(p/kWh) 
Wind with total installed capacity of 1.5kW or 
less 
1 April 2010 to 31 March 2012 41.25 
1 April 2012 to 30 November 2012 38.98 
1 December 2012 to 31 March 2014 22.86 
1 April 2014 to 30 September 2014 18.28 
1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 16.46 
1 April 2015 to 30 September 2015 14.62 
1 October 2015 to 15 January 2016 13.89 
Wind with total installed capacity greater than 
1.5kW but not exceeding 15kW 
1 April 2010 to 31 March 2012 31.91 
1 April 2012 to 30 November 2012 30.48 
1 December 2012 to 31 March 2014 22.86 
1 April 2014 to 30 September 2014 18.28 
1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 16.46 
1 April 2015 to 30 September 2015 14.62 
1 October 2015 to 15 January 2016 13.89 
Wind with total installed capacity greater than 
15kW but not exceeding 100kW 
1 April 2010 to 31 March 2012 28.85 
1 April 2012 to 30 November 2012 27.66 
1 December 2012 to 31 March 2014 22.86 
1 April 2014 to 30 September 2014  18.28 
1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 16.46 
1 April 2015 to 30 September 2015 14.62 
1 October 2015 to 15 January 2016 13.89 
Wind with total installed capacity greater than 
100kW but not exceeding 500kW 
1 April 2010 to 30 November 2012 22.43 
1 December 2012 to 31 March 2014 19.06 
1 April 2014 to 30 September 2014 15.24 
1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 13.71 
1 April 2015 to 30 September 2015 12.19 
1 October 2015 to 15 January 2016 10.98 
Wind with total installed capacity greater than 
500kW but not exceeding 1.5MW 
1 April 2010 to 30 November 2012 11.32 
1 December 2012 to 31 March 2014 10.33 
1 April 2014 to 30 September 2014 8.27 
1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 7.45 





1 October 2015 to 15 January 2016 5.96 
Wind with total installed capacity greater than 
1.5MW  
1 April 2010 to 30 November 2012 5.33 
1 December 2012 to 31 March 2013 4.88 
1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014 4.38 
1 April 2014 to 30 September 2014 3.50 
1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 3.16 
1 April 2015 to 30 September 2015 2.80 
1 October 2015 to 15 January 2016 2.52 
 
 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) 
Description Period in which Tariff Date falls 
Tariff 
(p/kWh) 
Combined Heat and Power with total installed 
electrical capacity of 2kW or less (tariff only 
available for 30,000 units) 
1 April 2010 to 14 March 2013 11.98 
15 March 2013 to 15 January 2016 13.61 
 
Renewables Obligation Order Migrated Installations 
Description Period in which Tariff Date falls 
Tariff 
(p/kWh) 
Eligible Installations with a declared net capacity 
of 50kW or less Commissioned on or before 14 
July 2009 and accredited under the ROO on or 
before 31 March 2010 
1 April 2010 to 31 March 2014 10.79 
 
Export Tariffs 
Description Period in which Tariff Date falls 
Tariff 
(p/kWh) 
All Eligible Installations 
1 April 2010 to 30 November 2012 3.48 
on or after 1 December 2012 4.91 
 
 
Note: FIT Payment rates for installations have been determined by the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (Ofgem) under Article 
13 of the Feed-in Tariffs Order 2012, in accordance with Annexes 2-4 to the Standard Licence Conditions. 
 
All tariff rates are specified as pence per kilowatt hour at 2016/17 values. 
 
Date of publication: 01 February 2016 
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A.3 Simulation analysis presented in Chapter 5
Wind speed data were imported from the UK MIDAS dataset Met Office. Two weather
stations were identified in the region of interest. Weather station with ID 908 located in the
Kintyre peninsula and weather station with ID 23417 located in Islay. Distance between
the weather stations is 44 km. Available data for ID 908 start from January 1969 until
December 2015 and consist of hourly data. Weather ID 23417 available data from January
1999 until December 2015. Common data available from 1999 to 2015 used for analysis.
Raw data sample were provided in csv file format.
Fig. A.5 First 20 wind speed data points provided my the MIDAS dataset
Listing A.7 Sample code for wind speed data import in Section 5.3.1: Data import for
weather station with ID 908
1 %% Import data weather station ID 908 − Clean data
2 numfiles = 47; %years data is available
3 temp_data = cell(1, numfiles);
4 mydata1=cell(1,numfiles);%data without NaN
5 mydata2=cell(1,numfiles);%full data NaN included





11 %% Import files
12 for k = 1:numfiles
13 myfilename = sprintf('file%d.csv', k);
14 temp_data{k} = importfile(myfilename, 1, 20000);
15 end
16 %% Clean data
17 for k=1:numfiles
18 %% Assign data to different variable
19 T=temp_data{k};
20 T(1,:)=[];
21 %% Find empty data and erase them
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22 toDelete=find(isnan(T.mean_wind_speed));
23 T(toDelete,:)=[];
24 %% Find exact duplicates and erase them
25 count_dupl=size(T)−size(unique(T));
26 T=unique(T);
27 %% Find double entries for same point in time




32 i_dupl=find(ismember(bin, multiple));%index of rows that are
duplicate
33 %% Delete duplicate entries with version_num=0
34 if not(isempty(i_dupl))
35 toKeep=find(ismember(i_dupl,find(T.version_num==1)));%rows





40 %% Delete any remaining version_number=0
41 toDelete=find(T.version_num==0);
42 T(toDelete,:)=[];














57 i_dupl=find(ismember(bin, multiple));%index of rows that are
duplicate













69 %% Keep only relevant data
70 D=table(T.ob_end_time,T.mean_wind_speed,'VariableNames',{'
ob_end_time' 'mean_wind_speed'});
71 mydata1{k}=D; %data including NaN values
72 %% Identify missing data






79 A_dt=Aref';%copy in datetime format
80 Aref=datenum(Aref');
81 C=setxor(A,Aref);%setxor(A,B) returns the data of A and B that










89 %% Clear all variables except what we need for next iteration
90 clearvars −except mydata1 mydata2 numfiles temp_data start_t1
end_t2




95 %% Data interpolation for gaps smaller or equal to 6 hr
96 small_gap=6;%define here desired gap











107 vq1=round(interp1(x,y,xq,'linear'));%round to nearest knot








Listing A.8 Sample code for wind speed data analysis in Section 5.3.1: Data analysis and
quality check for weather station with ID 908
1 %% Load data
2 load qual_data_908;%908
3 %% Collect data from 1999−2015
4 data20=[];
5 for k=31:47 %12−31
6 data20=cat(1,data20,data_interp{1,k});%put data in one table
7 end







































42 %% Fit Weibull Distribution














57 mean_wind908(i,j) = nanmean(temp);
58 max_wind908(i,j) = nanmax(temp);
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59 min_wind908(i,j) = nanmin(temp);
60 isvector(temp);%check if vector









70 % Weibull parameters for anemometer height
71 save('c_imported_908.mat','c_shape908');
72 save('k_imported_908.mat','k_scale908');
73 %% Adjust wind speeds for wind turbine height
74 %based on an Enercon E82 E2 turbine of height h=85 m
75 clearvars −except data20 data_distr_908
76 z0=0.03;%30mm roughness surface
77 zh=85;%hub height




























102 mean_wind908_85(i,j) = nanmean(temp);
103 max_wind908_85(i,j) = nanmax(temp);
104 min_wind908_85(i,j) = nanmin(temp);
105 isvector(temp);%check if vector









115 c_908=c_shape908_85*0.514444;%convert to m/s
116 save('c_908.mat','c_908');
117 save('k_908.mat','k_scale908_85');
118 %% Save data for in long and seasonal format
119 save('data_seas_908.mat','data_distr_908');
120 save('data_long_908.mat','data908_long');
Listing A.9 Sample code for simulation analysis in Section 5.3.1: Sigmoid fit for wind
power output
1 %% Wind power output
2 % Enercon E82 E2 values
3 u=[0:28].*1.94384;% in knots
4 Pw=[0;0;3;25;82;174;321;532;815;1180;1580;1810;1980;2050;..];
5 P=Pw'/2050;%per unit






















Listing A.10 Sample code for simulation analysis in Section 5.3.1: Beta fit for power
output distribution









10 isvector(temp);%check if vector
11 if any(temp<0)%check there are non negative values
12 temp(temp<0)=nan;
13 end
14 if any(temp==0)%check there are non zero values
15 temp(temp==0)=0+10^(−6);
16 end












The analysis is based on the UK National Demand data obtained by the UK’s system
operator, i.e. National Grid (http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Industry-information/
Electricity-transmission-operational-data/Data-Explorer/). The data used for the study
span from 2006 to 2015. The observations include national demand data in half-hourly
settlement intervals.
Fig. A.6 First 20 demand data points provided my the UK national demand database
Listing A.11 Sample code for demand data import in Section 5.3.2: Data imported from
UK national demand
1 %% Demand data import and analysis
2 numfiles=10; %10 years of available data
3 temp_data = cell(1, numfiles);
4 demand_data=cell(1,numfiles);%data without NaN
5 %% Import files
6 for k = 1:numfiles
7 myfilename = sprintf('demand_data%d.csv', k);
8 temp_data{k} = importfile_demand(myfilename, 1, 20000);
9 end
10 %% Data analysis
11 for k=1:numfiles
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22 end
23 save('real_demand.mat','demand_data');
Listing A.12 Sample code for demand data analysis in Section 5.3.2: Data analysis and
quality check












13 %delete odd rows
14 T(2:2:end,:)=[];
15 %replace with average
16 T.TSD=aver;





22 temp=addtodate(temp, add_hour, 'hour');
23 A(i,1)=temp;
24 end
25 A=datetime(A, 'ConvertFrom', 'datenum');





31 %% Put data in one table
32 data=[];
33 for k=1:10 %12−31
34 data=cat(1,data,final_demand{1,k});%put data in one table
35 end






































Listing A.13 Sample code for simulation analysis in Section 5.4.2: Effects of local genera-
tors’ generation cost cG2
1 %% Stackelberg game analysis for Scenario 2
2 % Initialisation
3 line_cap=150;% 150MW is the capacity of the transmission line
4 load demand;%scaled down from UK national demand
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5 load power_data_908
6 load power_data_23417
7 %% Define search space
8 dP=0.5;%Granularity of x MW











































49 clearvars −except all_sum Pn1 Pn2 ss1 ss2
50 pg=73.4;%in pounds/MWh
51 Ct=230*10^6;%cost of building the line

















69 %Find first maxP2 for each row
70 [val_2 id_2]=max(prof_2,[],2);
71 id_1=sub2ind(size(prof_1),[1:size(prof_2)]',id_2);









80 %Find corresponding rated capacities built
81 Cap1=Pn1(1,loc_k);
82 Cap2=Pn2(1,loc_l);
83 %Find statistics of equilibrium
84 all_sum{loc_k,loc_l};








num_elem,'VariableNames',{'Cap1' 'Cap2' 'max_1' 'max_2' 'Gen1'
'Gen2' 'Curt1' 'Curt2' 'Curtailment' 'Num_Elem'});
92 clearvars val_1 val_2 id_1 id_2 prof_1 prof_2 max_1 max_2 loc_k


































PAGE 12                     ENERCON  product overview E-82 E2 E-82 E2  PAGE 13
 Rated power: 2,000 kW
Rotor diameter: 82 m
Hub height in meter: 78 / 84 / 85 / 98 / 108 / 138 
Wind zone (DIBt): WZ III
Wind class (IEC): IEC/EN IIA
WEC concept:  Gearless, variable speed,  
 single blade adjustment
Rotor
Type:  Upwind rotor with active
  pitch control
Rotational direction: Clockwise 
No. of blades: 3
Swept area: 5,281 m2 
Blade material:  GRP (epoxy resin); 
 Built-in lightning protection
Rotational speed: Variable, 6 - 18 rpm
Pitch control:  ENERCON single blade 
pitch system; one inde-
pendent pitch system per 
rotor blade with allocated 
emergency supply
 Drive train with generator
Main bearing:  Double row tapered/cylin-
drical roller bearings
Generator:  ENERCON direct-drive 
 annular generator
Grid feed:  ENERCON inverter 
Brake systems: –  3 independent pitch con-
trol systems with emer-
gency power supply
 –  Rotor brake 
 –  Rotor lock
Yaw system:  Active via yaw gear,
  load-dependent damping
Cut-out wind speed: 28 - 34 m/s
  (with ENERCON storm 
control*)
Remote monitoring: ENERCON SCADA
 * For more information on the ENERCON storm control feature, 
please see the last page.
E-82
                2,000 kW

















Wind speed v at hub height (m/s)
Power P (kW) Power coefficient Cp (-)
  1 0.0 0.00
 2 3.0 0.12
 3 25.0 0.29
 4 82.0 0.40
 5 174.0 0.43
 6 321.0 0.46
 7 532.0 0.48
 8 815.0 0.49
 9 1,180.0 0.50
 10 1,580.0 0.49
 11 1,810.0 0.42
 12 1,980.0 0.35
 13 2,050.0 0.29
 14 2,050.0 0.23
 15 2,050.0 0.19
 16 2,050.0 0.15
 17 2,050.0 0.13
 18 2,050.0 0.11
 19 2,050.0 0.09
 20 2,050.0 0.08
 21 2,050.0 0.07
 22 2,050.0 0.06
 23 2,050.0 0.05
 24 2,050.0 0.05
 25 2,050.0 0.04
 Calculated power curve
 Wind Power P 
 (m/s) (kW)  
Fig. A.7 Power curve for Enercon E-82 wind turbine of 2000 kW nominal capacity
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A.4 Simulation analysis presented in Chapter 6
Listing A.14 Sample code for simulation analysis in Section 6.2: Estimation of conditional
probability distributions
1 %% Gibbs sampling data
2 x1 % Wind speed at location 1
3 x2 % Wind speed at location 2
4 X3D % Demand
5 ii=48;% number of bins for step=1knot/number of bins is kept equal
for all variables
6 line_cap=150;%line capacity
7 XD3(find(XD3>line_cap))=line_cap;% adjust demand for line capacity
8 aver=(x1+x2)/2;%average wind speed for cond. distribution




13 %li computes the bin edges to achieve 48 bins/49 bin edges




18 %% Derive conditional distributions
19 %conditional distribution of x1 given x2
20 for k=1:1:ii










































































89 save('newl3','newl3')%saves bin edges




Listing A.15 Sample code for simulation analysis in Section 6.2: Gibbs sampling process
1 %% Gibbs sampler
2 % Input required data
3 x1 % Wind speed at location 1
4 x2 % Wind speed at location 2
5 X3D % Demand









15 line_cap=150;% 150MW is the capacity of the transmission line
16 x1=X(:,1);
17 x2=X(:,2);
18 aver=(x1+x2)/2;%average wind speed for 17years
19 %% Gibbs sampling winds and demand by joint/average wind only
20 niter=500;% number of iterations N



















































69 save('gsamp','gsamp')%save sampled data by Gibbs sampler
70 %% Adjust to wind turbine height and compute power outputs
71 % Adjust for wind turbine height based on an Enercon E82 E2 turbine
of height h=85 m









81 %compute power produced
82 temp1=ggsamp(:,1);
83 temp1=1./(1+exp(−a*(temp1−c)));
84 temp1(ggsamp(:,1)>Umax)=0;%adjust for cut out wind speed
85 temp2=ggsamp(:,2);
86 temp2=1./(1+exp(−a*(temp2−c)));





92 save('gsamppow','gsamppow')%save power data (per unit)
Listing A.16 Sample code for simulation analysis in Section 6.2: Energy quantities
estimation
1 %% Search space for building rated capacities
2 up_lim=500;%Search space maximum
3 dP=0.5;%Granularity of rated capacity built set to 0.5MW
4 Pn1=0:dP:up_lim+dP;%rated capacity for player 1
5 Pn2=0:dP:up_lim+dP;%rated capacity for player 2
6 ss1=size(Pn1,2);%size of search space
7 ss2=size(Pn2,2);%size of search space
8 load gsamppow
9 niter=500;% number of iterations N
266
10 nsampl=50000;% number of sampling size/how many hours are enough in
Gibbs sampling







18 %estimate generation for all Pni
19 G1=power1*Pn1;
20 G2=power2*Pn1;
























Listing A.17 Sample code for simulation analysis in Section 6.3.2: Effects of local genera-
tors’ generation cost cG2
1 %% Stackelberg game Scenario 2
2 %%
3 niter=170;
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4 nsampl=50000;%number of samples
5 resiz=145071/nsampl;%for cost adaption to period of analysis
6 pg=74.3;%in pounds/MWh
7 %resize cost of line




















26 %Find first maxP2 for each row
27 [val_2 id_2]=max(prof_2,[],2);
28 id_1=sub2ind(size(prof_1),[1:size(prof_2)]',id_2);









37 %Find corresponding rated capacities built
38 Cap1=Pn1(1,loc_k);
39 Cap2=Pn2(1,loc_l);








Curt1,Curt2,'VariableNames',{'Cap1' 'Cap2' 'max_1' 'max_2'
'Gen1' 'Gen2' 'Curt1' 'Curt2'});
47 clearvars val_1 val_2 id_1 id_2 prof_1 prof_2 max_1 max_2
loc_k loc_l Cap1 Cap2 Gen1 Gen2 Curt1 Curt2
48 end
49 end
50 save 'all_profits_scen1.mat' 'all_profits'













A.5 Simulation analysis presented in Chapter 7
Listing A.18 Sample code for simulation analysis in Section 7.4.1: Gibbs sampling process
1 %% Gibbs sampling winds




































37 %% Demand sampling
38 %Demand: random samples from hourly−seasonal distributions
39 t1 = datetime(2000,1,1,0,0,0);% create a vector for 20 years
40 t2 = datetime(2019,12,31,23,0,0);
41 time_vect = t1:hours(1):t2;






























68 % sort table data according to first column that represents time
69 xD=sortrows(demand_table);




74 %% Adjust for hub height and calculate power outputs
75 z0=0.03;%30mm roughness surface
76 zh=85;%hub height
77 zr=10;%27m anemometer height




82 %compute power produced
83 temp1=gsamp(:,1);
84 temp1=1./(1+exp(−a*(temp1−c)));
85 temp1(gsamp(:,1)>Umax)=0;%adjust for cut out wind speed
86 temp2=gsamp(:,2);
87 temp2=1./(1+exp(−a*(temp2−c)));
88 temp2(gsamp(:,2)>Umax)=0;%adjust for cut out wind speed
89 gsamp(:,1)=temp1;
90 gsamp(:,2)=temp2;
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95 save('final_data','final_data')
Listing A.19 Sample code for simulation analysis in Section 7.3.1: Energy quantities
estimation




5 x1=final_data(1:proj_life,1);%per unit loc1
6 x2=final_data(1:proj_life,2);%per unit loc2





12 Pn1=0:dP:Pn1max;%in MW rated capacity for player 1
13 s1=size(Pn1,2);
14 Pn2max=500;






21 S=0:dS:Smax;% storage capacity in MWh













34 Dmax=150;%max remote load that can be satified by RES (no line
considered)
35 D=x3*Dmax;%remote demand (no line considered)
36 d=D*0.20;%local demand
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37 % Line capacity
38 %T=150;%line capacity in MWs
39 T=[0,75,100,125,150,175];% Line capacity in MW
40 s4=size(T,2);
41

























67 EG=EG1_now+EG2_now; % RES available
68 dif=EG−(LD_now+d);














































































141 clearvars −except SumED1 SumED2 SumEd1 SumEd2 SumEsd SumESD SumEs_in1
SumEs_in2 SumEG1 SumEG2
142 save('c_main.mat')







3 if diff(i)>=0 % excess of RES generation
4 %compute pro rata RES
5 prorata_res=EEG1(i,1)/(EEG1(i,1)+EEG2(i,1));
6 %satisfy local demand
7 Ed(i,1)=dd(i,1);%local demand at time i
8 Ed1(i,1)=prorata_res*Ed(i,1);
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9 Ed2(i,1)=Ed(i,1)−Ed1(i,1);
10 %satisfy remote demand
11 ED(i,1)=LLD(i,1);%remote demand at time i
12 ED1(i,1)=prorata_res*ED(i,1);
13 ED2(i,1)=ED(i,1)−ED1(i,1);
14 %STORE whatever remains if possible
15 if diff(i)>PPch_max%check if max charge power is violated







23 %check if capacity of battery is exceeded
24 if for_store<SS_now %check if capacity is exceeded
25 EE_t(i+1,1)=for_store; %if not update storage







33 EE_t(i+1,1)=SS_now; % storage at max capacity
34 Es_in(i,1)=(SS_now−EE_t(i,1)*(1−sself_dch))/nn_ch;%there







41 Esd(i,1)=0;%from storage to local demand






48 else % shortage of RES generation









57 %check battery min SOC constraint
58 if from_store>SSmin_now %SOCmin is not exceeded
59 EE_t(i+1,1)=from_store; %if not update storage
60 else
61 EE_t(i+1,1)=SSmin_now; % storage at min capacity
62 Pdch=(EE_t(i,1)*(1−sself_dch)−SSmin_now)*nn_dch;%
calculate how much storage is offering
63 end























































Listing A.21 Sample code for simulation analysis in Section 6.3.2: Effects of line investor’s
generation cost cG1





6 x1=final_data(1:proj_life,1);%per unit loc1
7 x2=final_data(1:proj_life,2);%per unit loc2
8 x3=final_data(1:proj_life,3);%per unit demand
9
10 % Generation
11 Pn1max=500;%parallel runs till Pn1
=50,100,150,200,250,300,350,400,450,500
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12 dP=1;%5 Granularity of rated capacity built set to 0.5MW
13 Pn1=0:dP:Pn1max;%in MW rated capacity for player 1
14 s1=size(Pn1,2);
15 Pn2max=500;






22 S=0:dS:Smax;% storage capacity in MWh













35 Dmax=150;%max remote load that can be satified by RES (no line
considered)
36 D=x3*Dmax;%remote demand (no line considered)
37 d=D*0.20;%local demand
38 % Line capacity
39 %T=150;%line capacity in MWs
40 T=[0,75,100,125,150,175];% Line capacity in MW
41 s4=size(T,2);
42





48 %% Load cost parameters for Scen1−dependence on local generators'
cost
49 pg=74.3;%in pounds/MWh
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55 cs=15000;%cost of storage
56 CG1=0*pg:dx:0.7*pg;























































17 %% Cournot equilibrium
18 %preallocate cournot best responses and where equilibrium is stored
19 BR2=cell(1,s1*s4);%local generators best response
20 BR3=cell(1,s1*s4);%storage investor best response
21 cournot=cell(1,s1*s4);
22
23 %find cournot equilibrium for every strategy of line investot (Pn1,T)
−>i
24 for i=1:1:s1*s4
25 %for every Pn2 find Ps that makes prof3 max − max for every row
26 [max_Prof3,opt_idPs]=max(Prof3(:,:,i),[],2);
27 BR3{1,i}=S(opt_idPs);







33 %potential outcomes after intersection are i)1 solution OK ii)
multiple solutions iii) no solution
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34 if isempty(cournot{1,i})%if no solution
35 Prof_cournot{1,i}=[];%Profits that correspond to cournot are
set empty
36 else%if 1 solution or multiple solutions
37 for all_eq=1:size(courn_tmp,1)%all_eq is the size of
solutions =1 if 1 sol etc
38 ja=find(Pn2==courn_tmp(all_eq,1));%(all_eq,1) returns Pn2
, (all_eq,2) returns S
39 ka=find(S==courn_tmp(all_eq,2));%ja,ka are the indeces of
equilibria
40 Prof_cournot{1,i}=[Prof1(ja,ka,i),Prof2(ja,ka,i),Prof3(ja









49 %% Cases ii)Multiple intersections and iii) No intersection





55 if (size(temp,1)>1)| (isempty(temp))
56 count=count+1;





62 %calculate also Prof1eq,Prof2eq,Prof3eq for (Pn2_sol,
S_sol)





















78 if (isempty(temp))%no intersection
79 %retrieve best responses = lines
80 S_test=S';
81 Pn2_test=Pn2';
82 %find intersection of line segments through
intersect_solution
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A.6 Summary of assumptions used in simulation analysis
Fig. A.8 Summary of assumptions used in simulation analysis and model evolution across
different chapters
